REESE   LIBRARY 
I 

UNIVERSITY    OF   CALIFORNIA. 

Received  ^^ ^^i^^?^Z>C^    ,  i8S 


Accessions  No.-^  ^y^B    Shelf  No. 


Jb 


EXAMINATION 


EDWARDS  ON  THE  WILL, 


c/ 


AN   EXAMINATION 


PRESIDENT   EDWARDS'   INaUIRY 


INTO  THE 


FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL. 


BY 


ALBERT  TAYLOR  BLEDSOE. 


"Man,  as  the  ipinister  and  interpreter  of  nature,  does  and  un- 
derstands  as  much  alB  his, observations  on  the  order  of  nature,  either 
with  regard  to  things  or  the  mind,  permit  him,  and  neither  knows 
more,  nor  is  capable  of  more." — Novum  Organum. 


PHILADELPHIA: 

H.  HOOKER,  16  SOUTH  SEVENTH  STREET. 

1845. 


^ 


■  Entered,  according  to  act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1845,  by  H. 
HOOKER,  in  the  clerk's  office  of  the  District  Court  for  the  Eastern 
District  of  Pennsylvania. 


^Z^f 


King  &  Baird,  Printers,  9  George  St. 


TO 
THE  REV.  WILLIAM  SPARROW,  D.  D. 

AS  A  TOKEN 

OF  ADMIRATION  FOR  HIS  GENIUS, 

AKD 

AFFECTIONATE  REGARD  FOR  HIS  VIRTUES, 

€||t0  UttU  Voiumt 

IS  RESPECTFULLY  INSCRIBED, 
BY  THE  AUTHOR. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/examinationofpreOObledrich 


CONTENTS. 


Page 

Introductory  Remarks      -----        9 

SECTION  I. 
Of  the  point  in  controversy     -  -         -         -      16 

SECTION  II. 
Of  Edwards'  use  of  the  term  cause  -  -      22 

SECTION  III. 

The  Inquiry  involved  in  a  vicious  circle    -         -      36 

SECTION  IV. 

Volition  not  an  effect    -----      47 

SECTION  V. 

Of  the  consequences  of  regarding  volition  as  an 

effect    -------55 

SECTION  VI. 
Of   the  maxim  that   every  effect  must  have  a 

cause      -------65 

SECTION  VII. 
Of  the  application  of  the  maxim  that  every  ef- 
fect must  have  a  cause       -         -         -         -      76 


8  CONTENTS. 

Page 
SECTION  VIII. 
Of  the   relation  between  the  feelings  and  the 

WILL 87 

SECTION  IX. 

Of  the  LIBERTY  OF  INDIFFERENCE  -  -  -  -      103 

SECTION  X. 

Of  ACTION  AND  PASSION  -  -  -  -  -      112 

SECTION  XI. 

Of  the  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE  FOREKNOWLEDGE  OF  GoD      131 

SECTION  XII. 

Of  Edwards'  use  of  the  term  necessity       -  -    156 

SECTION  XIII. 
Of  natural  and  moral  necessity  -  -  -    175 

SECTION  XIV. 
Of  Edwards'  idea  of  liberty     -  -  -         -    184 

SECTION  XV. 
Of  Edwards'  idea  of  virtue        -  -  -         -     195 

SECTION   XVT. 

Of  the  SELF-DETERMINING  POWER  -  -  -      206 

SECTION  XVII. 

Of  THE  DEFINITION  OF  A  FREE-AGENT  -  -  -      216 

SECTION  XVIII. 

Of  the  TESTIMONY  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS       -  -  -       224 


INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS. 

I  ENTERED  upon  an  examination  of  the  "  Inquiry"  of 
President  Edwards,  not  with  a  view  to  find  any  fallacy 
therein,  but  simply  with  a  desire  to  ascertain  the  truth 
for  myself.  If  I  have  come  to  the  conclusion,  that  the 
whole  scheme  of  moral  necessity  which  Edwards  has 
laboured  to  establish,  is  founded  m  error  and  delusion ; 
this  has  not  been  because  I  came  to  the  examination  of  his 
work  with  any  preconceived  opinion.  In  coming  to  this 
conclusion  I  have  disputed  every  inch  of  the  ground  with 
myself,  as  firmly  and  as  resolutely  as  I  could  have  done 
with  an  adversary.  The  result  has  been,  that  the  views 
which  I  now  entertain,  in  regard  to  the  philosophy  of  the 
will,  are  widely  difierent  from  those  usually  held  by  the 
opponents  of  moral  necessity,  as  well  as  from  those  which 
are  maintained  by  its  advocates. 

The  formation  of  these  views,  whether  they  be  correct 
or  not,  has  been  no  light  task.  Long  have  I  struggled 
under  the  stupendous  difficulties  of  the  subject.  Long  has 
darkness,  a  deep  and  perplexing  darkness,  seemed  to  rest 
upon  it.  Faint  glimmerings  of  light  have  alternately  ap- 
peared and  disappeared.  Some  of  these  have  returned  at 
intervals,  while  others  have  vanished  for  ever.  Some  have 
returned,  and  become  less  wavering,  and  led  on  the  mind 
to  other  regions  of  mingled  obscurity  and  light.  Gladly 
and  joyfully  have  I  followed.  By  patient  thought,  and 
sustained  attention,  these  faint  glimmerings  have,  in  more 
2 


10  INTRODUCTORY   REMARKS. 

instances  than  one,  been  made  to  open  out  into  what  has 
appeared  to  be  the  clear  and  steady  hght  of  truth.  If  these 
are  not  mere  fond  illusions,  the  true  intellectual  system  of 
the  world  is  far  different  from  that  which  has  been  con- 
structed by  the  logic  of  President  Edwards. 

If  his  system  be  false,  why,  it  may  be  asked,  has  the 
Inquiry  so  often  appeared  to  be  unanswerable?  Why 
has  it  been  supposed,  even  by  some  of  the  advocates  of 
free  agency,  that  logic  is  in  favour  of  his  system,  while 
consciousness  only  is  in  favour  of  ours  ?  One  reason  of 
this  opinion  is,  that  it  has  been  taken  for  granted,  that 
either  the  scheme  of  President  Edwards  or  that  of  his 
opponents  must  be  true  ;  and  hence,  his  system  has  ap- 
peared to  stand  upon  immoveable  ground,  in  so  far^  as 
logic  is  concerned,  only  because  he  has,  with  such  irre- 
sistible power  and  skill,  demolished  and  trampled  into 
ruins  that  of  his  adversaries.  Reason  has  been  supposed 
to  be  on  his  side,  because  he  has  so  clearly  shown  that  it 
is  not  on  the  side  of  his  opponents.  But  the  scheme  of 
the  motive-determining  power,  does  not  necessarily  arise 
out  of  the  ruins  of  the  self-determining  power  ;  it  is  only 
to  the  imagination  that  it  appears  to  do  so.  Because  the 
one  system  is  false,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  other  is 
true. 

There  is  another  and  still  more  powerful  reason  for  the 
idea  in  question.  The  advocates  of  free  agency  have 
granted  too  much.  The  great  foundation  principles  of  the 
scheme  of  moral  necessity  have  been  incautiously  admit- 
ted by  its  adversaries.  These  principles  have  appeared  so 
obvious  at  first  view,  that  their  correctness  has  not  been 
doubted ;  and  hence  they  have  been  assumed  by  the  one 
side  and  conceded  by  the  other.  Yet,  if  I  am  not  greatly 
mistaken,  they  have  been  derived,  not  from  the  true  ora- 


INTRODUCTORY   REMARKS.  11 

cles  of  nature,  but  from  what  Bacon  quaintly  calls  the 
"idols  of  the  tribe."  If  this  be  the  case,  as  I  think  it  will 
hereafter  appear  to  be ;  then  in  order  to  secure  a  complete 
triumph  over  the  scheme  of  moral  necessity,  even  on  the 
arena  of  logic,  we  must  not  only  know  how  to  reason, 
but  also  how  to  doubt. 

I  fully  concur  with  the  younger  Edwards,  that  "  Clarke, 
Johnson,  Price,  and  Reid  have  granted  too  much ;"  and 
while  I  try  to  show  this,  I  shall  also  endeavour  to  show 
that  President  Edwards  has  assumed  too  much,  not  for 
the  good  of  the  cause  in  which  he  is  engaged,  but  for  the 
attainment  of  truth. 

If  his  system  had  not  been  founded  upon  certain  natural 
illusions,  by  which  the  true  secrets  of  nature  are  concealed 
from  our  view,  it  could  never  have  been  the  boast  of  its 
admirers,  "  that  a  reluctant  world  has  been  constrained 
to  bow  in  homage  to  its  truth."  If  we  would  try  the 
strength  of  this  system  then,  we  must  bend  a  searching 
and  scrutinizing  eye  upon  the  premises  and  assumptions 
upon  which  it  is  based ;  we  must  put  aside  every 
preconceived  notion,  even  the  most  plausible  and  com- 
monly received  opinions,  and  lay  our  minds  open  to 
the  steady  and  unbiased  contemplation  of  nature,  just 
as  it  has  been  created  by  the  Almighty  Architect ;  we 
must  view  the  intellectual  system  of  the  world,  not  as  it 
is  seen  through  our  hasty  and  careless  conceptions,  but  as 
it  is  revealed  to  us  in  the  light  of  consciousness  and  severe 
meditation.  This  will  be  no  light  task,  I  am  aware  ;  but 
whosoever  would  seek  the  truth  on  such  a  subject,  must 
not  expect  to  find  it  by  light  and  trifling  efforts  ;  he  must 
go  after  it  in  all  the  loving  energy  of  his  soul.  Let  this 
course  be  pursued,  honestly  and  perseveringly  pursued, 
and  I  am  persuaded,  that  a  system  of  truth  will  be  re- 


12  INTRODUCTORY   REMARKS. 

vealed  to  the  mind,  to  which  it  will  not  be  constrained  to 
render  "  a  reluctant  homage,"  but  which,  by  harmonizing 
the  deductions  of  logic  with  the  dictates  of  nature,  will 
secure  to  itself  the  most  pleasing  and  delightful  homage  of 
which  the  human  mind  is  susceptible. 

Those  false  conceptions  which  are  common  to  the 
human  mind,  those  "  idols  of  the  tribe,"  of  which  Bacon 
speaks,  have  bejgfh,  as  it  is  well  known,  the  sources  of  some 
of  the  most  obstinate  errors,  both  in  science  and  in  reli- 
gion, that  have  ever  infested  the  world.  And  it  is  evident, 
that  while  the  assumptions  from  which  any  system,  how- 
ever false,  legitimately  results,  are  conceded,  it  will  stand, 
like  a  wall  of  adamant,  against  the  most  powerful  artillery 
of  logic.  It  will  remain  triumphant  in  spite  of  all  opposi- 
tion. It  may  be  contrary  to  our  natural  convictions,  and 
consequently  liable  to  our  suspicions ;  but  it  cannot  be 
refuted  by  argument.  Its  advocates  may  reason  correctly, 
and  its  adversaries  may  appeal  to  opposite  truths ;  but 
neither  can  ever  arrive  at  the  truth,  and  the  whole  truth. 
This  has  appeared  to  me  to  be  the  case,  with  respect  to 
the  long  controverted  question  of  liberty  and  necessity. 

The  above  causes,  conspiring  with  some  instances  of 
false  logic,  which  have  been  overlooked  amid  so  much  that 
is  really  conclusive,  and  also  with  a  number  of  unsound, 
yet  plausible,  devices  to  reconcile  the  scheme  of  moral 
necessity  with  the  reality  of  virtue  and  free-agency,  have, 
in  the  minds  of  many,  rendered  the  work  of  President 
Edwards  both  an  acceptable  and  an  unanswerable  produc- 
tion. Such,  at  least,  is  the  conclusion  to  which  I  have 
been  constrained  to  come ;  but  whether  this  conclusion  be 
correct  or  not,  it  is  not  for  me  to  determine.  Time  alone 
can  show,  whether  the  foundation  of  his  system,  like  that 
of  truth,  is  immutable,  or  whether,  like  many  which  have 


INTRODUCTORY   REMARKS.  13 

been  laid  by  the  master  spirits  of  other  ages,  it  is  destined 
to  pass  away,  though  not  to  be  forgotten. 

In  the  above  enumeration  of  causes  I  have  not  alluded 
to  those  of  a  theological  nature ;  because  they  have  been 
but  partial  in  their  operation.  And  besides,  I  have  not 
wished  to  refer  to  this  subject  at  all,  except  in  so  far  as 
is  necessary  to  indicate  wherein  I  conceive  the  errors  of 
the  Inquiry  to  consist,  and  thereby  to  point  out  the  course 
which  I  intend  to  pursue  in  the  following  discussion. 


2» 


^^ 


^NIVKRRT 


SECTION  I. 

OF   THE   POINT   IN   CONTROVERSY. 

It  is  worse  than  a  waste  of  time,  it  is  a  grievous  offence 
against  the  cause  of  truth,  to  undertake  to  refute  an  author 
without  having  taken  pains  to  understand  exactly  what  he 
teaches.  In  every  discussion,  the  first  thing  to  be  settled 
is  the  point  in  dispute ;  and  if  this  be  omitted,  the  contro- 
versy must  needs  degenerate  into  a  mere  idle  logomachy. 
It  seldom  happens  that  any  thing  affords  so  much  satis- 
faction, or  throws  so  much  light  on  a  controversy,  as  to 
have  the  point  at  issue  clearly  made  up,  and  constantly 
borne  in  mind. 

What  then,  is  the  precise  doctrine  of  the  Inquiry  which 
I  intend  to  oppose  ?  The  great  question  is,  says  Edwards, 
what  determines  the  will.  It  is  taken  for  granted,  on  all 
sides,  that  the  will  is  determined ;  and  the  only  point  is, 
or  rather  has  been,  as  to  what  determines  it.  It  is  deter- 
mined by  the  strongest  motive,  says  one  ;  it  is  not  deter- 
mined by  the  strongest  motive,  says  another.  But  although 
the  issue  is  thus  made  up  in  general  terms,  it  is  very  far 
from  being  settled  with  any  tolerable  degree  of  clearness 
and  precision ;  ample  room  is  still  left  for  all  that  loose 
and  declamatory  kind  of  warfare  in  which  so  many  con- 
troversiahsts  delight  to  indulge. 

The  question  still  remains  to  be  settled,  what  is  meant 
by  determining  the  will?    In  regard  to  this  point,  the 


16  EXAMINATION   OF 

necessitarian  does  not  seem  to  have  a  very  clear  and  defi- 
nite idea.  "  The  object  of  our  Inquiry,"  says  President 
Day,  "  is  not  to  learn  whether  the  mind  acts  at  all.  This 
no  one  can  doubt.  Nor  is  it  to  determine  why  we  will 
at  all.  The  very  nature  of  the  faculty  of  the  will  implies 
that  we  put  forth  volitions.  But  the  real  point  of  inquiry 
is,  why  we  will  one  way  rather  than  another  ;  why  we 
choose  one  thing  rather  than  its  oppositei'^  p.  42.  One 
would  suppose  from  this  statement,  that  we  have  nothing 
to  do  with  the  question,  why  we  put  forth  volitions,  but 
exclusively  with  the  question,  why  we  will  one  way 
rather  than  another.  Here  the  author's  meaning  seems 
to  be  plain,  and  we  may  imagine  that  we  know  exactly 
where  to  find  him ;  but,  in  the  very  next  sentence,  he  de- 
clares that  the  object  of  our  inquiry  is,  "  what  is  it  that 
determines  not  only  that  there  shall  be  volitions,  but 
what  they  shall  be  ?"  p.  42.  In  one  breath  we  are  told, 
that  we  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  question,  why  our 
volitions  are  put  forth  or  come  into  existence ;  these  are 
admitted  to  be  implied  in  the  "  very  nature  of  the  faculty 
of  the  will ;"  but,  in  the  very  next,  we  are  informed  that 
we  have  to  inquire  into  this  point  also.  One  moment,  only 
one  of  these  points  is  in  dispute,  and  the  next,  both  are 
put  in  controversy.  Surely,  this  does  not  indicate  any 
very  clear  and  definite  idea,  on  the  part  of  President  Day, 
as  to  the  point  at  issue. 

The  notion  of  President  Edwards,  on  this  subject,  ap- 
pears to  be  equally  unsteady  and  vacillating.  "  Thus," 
says  he,  "  by  determinimg  the  will,  if  the  phrase  be  used 
with  any  meaning,  must  he  intended,  causing  that 
the  act  of  the  tvill  should  be  thus,  and  not  otherivise: 
and  the  will  is  said  to  be  determined,  when,  in  consequence 
of  some  action,  or  influence,  its  choice  is  directed  to,  and 


EDWARDS   ON    THE   WILL.  17 

fixed  upon  a  particular  object.  As  when  we  speak  of  the 
determination  of  motion,  we  mean  causing  the  motion  of 
the  body  to  be  in  such  a  direction,  rather  than  another," 
p.  18. 

Now,  are  we  to  understand  from  this,  that  the  determi- 
nation of  the  will  can  only  refer  to  the  question,  why  it  is 
directed  to  and  fixed  upon  a  particular  object,  and  not  to 
the  question,  how  it  comes  to  put  forth  a  volition  at  all  ? 
One  would  certainly  suppose  so ;  and  that,  according  to 
Edwards,  we  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  question, 
"  How  a  spirit  comes  to  act,"  but  with  the  question, 
"  why  its  action  has  such  and  such  a  particular  direction 
and  determination."  But  this  supposition  would  be  very 
far  from  the  truth.  For  he  informs  us,  that  "  the  question 
is  not  so  much,  How  a  spirit  endowed  with  activity  comes 
to  act,  as  why  it  exerts  such  an  act,  and  not  another ;  or 
why  it  acts  with  such  a  particular  determination?"  This 
clearly  implies,  that  although  the  question,  "  How  a  spirit 
comes  to  act,"  is  not  chiefly  concerned  in  the  present 
controversy ;  yet  it  is  partly  concerned  in  it.  This  ques- 
tion is  concerned  in  it,  though  not  so  much  as  the  other 
question,  why  the  act  of  the  mind  is  as  it  is,  rather  than 
otherwise. 

This  is  not  all.  When  Edwards  attacks  the  doctrine 
of  his  adversaries,  in  regard  to  the  determining  of  the 
will,  he  never  seems  to  dream  of  the  idea,  which,  accord- 
ing to  himself,  if  the  phrase  mean  any  thing,  must  be 
attached  to  it.  He  treats  it  as  a  settled  point,  that  by  de- 
termining the  will  must  be  intended,  not  causing  volition 
to  be  one  way  rather  than  another,  but  causing  it  to  come 
into  existence.  He  could  take  this  expression  to  mean 
the  one  thing  or  the  other,  just  as  it  suited  his  purpose. 

Are  these  two  questions  really  distinct  ?     Can  there  be 


18  EXAMINATION    OF 

one  cause  of  volition,  and  another  cause  of  its  particular 
direction  ?  I  answer,  there  cannot.  No  such  distinction 
can  be  shown  to  exist  by  a  reference  to  the  cause  of  mo- 
tion. Force  is  the  cause  of  motion.  One  force  may  put 
a  body  in  motion ;  and,  afterwards,  another  force  may 
change  the  direction  of  its  motion.  Upon  a  superficial 
observation,  this  may  seem  to  illustrate  the  distinction  in 
question ;  but,  upon  more  mature  reflection,  it  will  not  ap- 
pear to  do  so.  For  the  force  which  sets  a  body  in  motion 
necessarily  causes  it  to  move  in  one  particular  direction, 
and  not  another  ;  because  it  is  impossible  for  a  body  to 
move  without  moving  in  a  particular  direction.  After  one 
force  has  put  a  body  in  motion,  another  force,  it  is  true, 
may  change  its  directiop ;  but  in  such  a  case,  it  is  not  cor- 
rect to  say,  that  one  force  caused  its  motion  and  another 
the  direction  of  that  motion.  For,  in  reality,  both  the 
motion  of  the  body  and  its  direction,  result  from  the  joint 
action  of  the  two  forces ;  or,  in  other  words,  each  force 
contributes  to  the  motion,  and  each  to  its  direction.  Both 
the  motion  and  its  direction  are  caused  by  what  is  techni- 
cally called,  in  mechanical  philosophy,  the  "  resultant'*  of 
the  two  forces  ;  and  the  case  is  really  not  different,  so  far 
as  the  distinction  in  question  is  concerned,  from  the  case 
of  motion  produced  by  the  action  of  a  single  force.  The 
absurdity  of  this  distinction  consists,  in  supposing  that  a 
body  may  be  put  in  motion  without  moving  in  a  particular 
direction ;  and  that  something  else  beside  the  cause  of  its 
motion,  is  necessary  to  account  for  the  direction  of  that 
motion.  The  illustration,  therefore,  drawn  from  the  phe- 
nomena of  motion,  fails  to  answer  the  purpose  for  which 
President  Edwards  has  produced  it. 

The  same  absurdity  is  involved  in  the  supposition,  that 
one  thing  may  cause  volition  to  exist,  and  another  may 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  19 

cause  it  to  be  directed  to  and  fixed  upon  a  particular 
object.  No  man  can  conceive  of  a  choice  as  existing, 
which  has  not  some  particular  object.  It  is  of  the  very 
nature  and  essence  of  a  choice  to  have  some  particular 
direction  and  determination.  If  a  choice  exists  at  all,  it 
must  be  a  choice  of  some  particular  thing.  Hence,  what- 
ever causes  a  volition  to  exist,  must  cause  it  to  have  a 
particular  direction  and  determination.  Let  any  one  show 
a  choice,  which  is  not  the  preference  of  one  thing  rather 
than  another,  and  then  we  may  admit  that  there  is  some 
reason  for  the  distinction  in  question ;  but  until  then,  we 
must  be  permitted  to  regard  it  as  having  no  foundation  in 
the  nature  of  things.  If  it  were  necessary,  this  matter 
might  be  fully  and  unanswerably  illustrated ;  but  a  bare 
statement  of  it  is  sufficient  to  render  it  perfectly  clear. 

We  shall  hereafter  see,  that  the  reason  why  President 
Edwards  supposed  that  there  is  some  foundation  for  such 
a  distinction  is,  that  he  did  not  sufficiently  distinguish  be- 
tween the  cause  of  a  thing  and  its  condition.  Although  we 
may  suppose  that  the  "  activity  of  the  soul"  is  the  cause 
of  its  acting ;  yet  motive  may  be  the  indispensable  condi- 
tion of  its  acting ;  and,  in  this  sense,  may  be  the  reason 
why  a  volition  is  one  way  rather  than  another.  But  it  is 
denied  that  there  can  be  two  causes  in  the  case ;  one  to 
produce  volition,  and  another  to  determine  its  object.  We 
have  seen  that  such  a  supposition  is  absurd ;  and  we  shall 
hereafter  see,  that  Edwards  was  led  to  make  it,  by  con- 
founding the  condition  with  the  cause  of  volition. 

After  all,  it  may  be  said,  that  Edwards  himself  did  not 
really  consider  these  two  things  as  distinct,  but  only  as 
different  aspects  of  the  same  thing.  If  so,  it  will  follow, 
that  when  he  undertook  to  estabhsh  his  own  scheme,  he 
represented  motive  as  the  cause  of  volition ;  and  yet  when 


20  EXAMINATION    OF 

he  was  reminded,  that  the  activity  of  the  nature  of  the 
soul  is  the  cause  of  its  actions,  he  repHed,  that  akhough 
this  may  be  very  true,  yet  this  activity  of  nature  is 
not  the  "  cause  why  its  acts  are  thus  and  thus  Umited, 
directed  and  determined."  He  repUed  that  the  question 
is  not  so  muchf  "  How  a  spirit  comes  to  act,"  as  why  it 
acts  thus,  and  not  otherwise.  That  is  to  say,  it  will  follow, 
that  he  chose  to  build  up  his  scheme  under  one  aspect  of 
it,  and  to  defend  it  under  another  aspect  thereof;  that  as 
the  architect  of  his  system,  he  chose  to  assume  and  occupy 
the  position,  that  motive  is  the  cause  of  volition  itself;  yet 
as  the  defender  of  it,  he  sometimes  preferred  to  present 
this  same  position  under  the  far  milder  aspect,  that  although 
"  the  activity  of  spirit,  may  be  the  cause  why  it  acts," 
yet  motive  is  the  cause  why  its  acts  are  thus  and  thus 
limited,  &;c.  In  other  words,  it  will  follow,  that  his  doc- 
trine possesses  two  faces ;  and  that  with  the  one  it  looks 
sternly  on  the  scheme  of  necessity,  whilst,  with  the  other, 
it  seems  to  smile  oa.  its  adversaries. 

The  truth  is,  the  great  question  which  President'  Ed- 
wards discusses  throughout  the  Inquiry,  as  we  shall  see, 
is  "  How  a  spirit  comes  to  act ;"  and  the  other  question, 
"  why  its  action  is  thus  and  thus  limited,"  &;c.,  which,  on 
occasion,  swells  out  into  such  immense  importance,  as  to 
seem  to  cover  the  whole  field  of  vision,  generally  shrinks 
down  into  comparative  insignificance.  As  a  general  thing, 
he  goes  along  in  the  even  tenor  of  his  way,  to  prove  that 
no  event  can  begin  to  be  without  a  cause  of  its  existence ; 
and,  in  particular,  that  no  volition  can  come  into  existence 
without  being  caused  to  do  so  by  motive  ;  and  it  is  only 
when  it  is  urged  upon  him,  that  "a  spirit  endowed  with 
activity"  may  give  rise  to  its  own  acts,  that  he  takes  a 
sudden  turn  and  reminds  us,  that  the  question  is  not  so 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  21 

much  "  how  a  spirit  comes  to  act  ?"  as  "  why  its  acts  are 
thus  and  thus  limited  ?" 

From  the  supposition  made  by  Edwards,  that  "if 
activity  of  nature  be  the  cause  why  a  spirit  acts,"  it  has 
been  concluded  that  he  regarded  the  soul  of  man  as  the 
efficient  cause  of  its  volitions,  and  motive  as  merely  the 
occasion  on  which  they  are  put  forth  or  exerted.  But 
surely,  those  who  have  so  understood  the  Inquiry,  have 
done  so  very  unadvisedly,  and  have  but  little  reason  to 
complain,  as  they  are  prone  to  do,  that  his  opponents  do 
not  understand  him.  If  Edwards  makes  mind  the  effi- 
cient cause  of  vohtion,  what  becomes  of  his  famous  argu- 
ment against  the  self-determining  power,  by  which  he 
reduces  it  to  the  absurdity  of  an  infinite  series  of  volitions  ? 
"  If  the  mind  causes  its  volition,"  says  he,  "  it  can  do  so 
only  by  a  preceding  volition ;  and  so  on  ad  infinitum,'''' 
Is  not  all  this  true,  on  the  supposition  that  the  mind  is 
the  efficient  cause  of  volition  ?  And  if  so,  how  can  any 
reader  of  Edwards,  who  does  not  wish  to  make  either  his 
author  or  himself  appear  ridiculous,  seriously  contend  that 
he  holds  mind  to  be  the  efficient,  or  producing  cause  of 
volition?  There  be  pretended  followers  and  blind  ad- 
mirers of  President  Edwards,  who,  knowing  but  little  of 
his  work  themselves,  are  ever  ready  to  defend  him, 
whensoever  attacked,  even  by  those  who  have  devoted 
years  to  the  study  of  the  Inquiry,  by  most  ignorantly  and 
ffippantly  declaring  that  they  do  not  understand  him. 
These  pseudo-disciples  will  not  listen  to  the  charge,  that 
Edwards  makes  the  strongest  motive  the  producing  cause 
of  volition ;  but  whether  this  charge  be  true  or  not,  we 
shall  see  in  the  following  section. 
3 


22  EXAMINATION    OF 


SECTION  II. 

OF  Edwards'  use  of  the  term  cause. 

We  have  already  seen  that  Edwards  must  be  under- 
stood as  holding  motive  to  be  the  cause  of  volition ;  but 
still  we  cannot  make  up  the  issue  with  him,  until  we  have 
ascertained  in  what  sense  he  employs  the  term  cause.  It 
has  been  contended,  by  high  authority,  that  he  did  not 
regard  motive  as  the  efficient,  or  producing  cause  of  voli- 
tion, but  only  as  the  occasion  or  condition  on  which  voli- 
tion is  produced.  Hence,  it  becomes  necessary  to  examine 
this  point,  and  to  settle  the  meaning 'of  the  author,  in  order 
that  I  may  not  be  supposed  to  misrepresent  him,  and  to 
dispute  with  him  only  about  words. 

The  above  notion  is  based  on  the  following  passage  : 
"  I  would  explain,"  says  President  Edwards,  "  how  I 
would  be  understood  when  I  use  the  word  cause  in  this 
discourse  ;  since,  for  want  of  a  better  word,  I  shall  have 
occasion  to  use  it  in  a  sense  which  is  more  extensive, 
than  that  in  which  it  is  sometimes  used.  The  word  is 
often  used  in  so  restrained  a  sense  as  to  signify  only  that 
which  has  a  positive  efficiency  or  influence  to  prociuce  a 
thing,  or  bring  it  to  pass.  But  there  are  many  things 
whicli  have  no  such  positive  productive  influence  ;  which 
yet  are  causes  in  this  respect,  that  they  have  truly  the 
nature  of  a  reason  why  some  things  are,  rather  than  others ; 
or  why  they  are  thus  rather  than  otherwise."  ....*'  I 
sometimes  use  the  word  Cause,  in  this  Inquiry,  to  signify 
any  antecedent,  either  natural  or  moral,.. .upon  which  an 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  23 

event  so  depends,  that  it  is  the  ground  or  reason,  either  in 
whole  or  in  part,  why  it  is,  rather  than  not ;  or  why  it  is 
as  it  is,  rather  than  otherwise ;  or,  in  other  words,  any 
antecedent  with  which  a  consequent  event  is  so  connected, 
that  it  truly  belongs  to  the  reason  why  the  proposition 
which  affirms  that  event,  is  true ;  whether  it  has  any  posi- 
tive influence,  or  not.  And,  agreeably  to  this,  I  some- 
times use  the  term  effect  for  the  consequence  of  another 
thing,  which  is  perhaps  rather  an  occasion  than  cause, 
most  properly  speaking."  And  he  tells  us,  that  "I  am 
the  more  careful  thus  to  explain  my  meaning,  that  I  may 
cut  off  occasion,  from  any  that  might  seek  occasion  to 
cavil  and  object  against  some  things  which  I  may  say 
concerning  the  dependence  of  all  things  which  come  to 
pass,  on  some  cause,  and  their  connection  with  their 
cause,"  p.  50-1. 

This  is  the  portion  of  the  Inquiry  on  which  the 
younger  Edwards  founds  his  conclusion,  that  his  father 
did  not  regard  motive  as  the  efficient  cause  of  volition,  but 
only  as  the  occasion,  or  condition,  or  antecedent  of  voli- 
tion. He  finds  this  language  in  the  Essays  of  Dr.  West ; 
"  We  cannot  agree  with  Mr.  Edwards  in  his  assertion, 
that  motive  is  the  cause  of  voUtion;"  and  he  replies, 
"  Mr.  Edwards  has  very  particularly  informed  us  in  what 
sense  he  uses  the  term  cause  ;^^  and,  in  proof  of  this,  he 
proceeds  to  quote  a  portion  of  the  above  extracts  from  the 
Inquiry.  Having  done  this,  he  triumphantly  demands, 
"  Now,  does  Dr.  West  deny,  that  motive  is  an  antecedent, 
on  which  volition,  either  in  whole  or  in  part  depends  ?  or 
that  it  is  a  ground  or  reason,  either  in  whole  or  in  part, 
either  by  positive  influence  or  not,  why  it  is  rather  than 
not  ?  Surely,  he  cannot  with  consistency  deny  this,  since 
he  says,  *  By  motive  we  understand  the  occasion,  end  or 


24  EXAMINATION   OF 

design,  which  an  agent  has  in  view  when  he  acts.'  So 
that,  however  desirous  Dr.  West  maybe  to  be  thought  to 
differ,  in  this  point,  from  President  Edwards,  it  appears 
that  he  most  exactly  agrees  with  him,"  p.  65. 

Now,  if  Edwards  really  believed  that  motive  is  merely 
the  occasion  on  which  the  mind  acts,  agreeing  herein  most 
perfectly  with  Dr.  West,  why  did  he  not  say  so  ?  Why 
adhere  to  the  term  cause,  which  can  only  obscure  such 
an  idea,  instead  of  adopting  the  word  occasion,  or  condi- 
tion, or  antecedent,  which  would  have  clearly  expressed 
it  ?  Surely,  if  Edwards  maintained  the  doctrine  ascribed 
to  him,  he  has  been  most  unfortunate  in  his  manner  of 
setting  it  forth ;  it  is  a  great  pity  he  did  not  give  it  a  more 
conspicuous  place  in  his  system.  It  is  to  be  regretted, 
that  he  has  not  once  told  us  that  such  was  his  doctrine,  in 
order  that  we  might  see  for  ourselves  his  agreement  with 
Dr.  West  in  this  respect,  instead  of  leaving  it  to  the  ini- 
tiated few  to  enhghten  us  on  this  subject. 

He  has,  we  are  told,  "  very  particularly  informed  us  in 
what  sense  he  uses  the  word  cause,"  p.  64.  Now  is  this 
so  ?  Has  he  informed  us  that  by  cause  he  means  occa- 
sion? He  has  done  no  such  thing,  and  his  language 
admits  of  no  such  construction.  He  merely  tells  us,  that 
he  sometimes  uses  the  term  cause  to  signify  an  occasion 
only ;  but  when  and  where  he  so  employs  it,  he  has  not 
explained  at  all.  He  has  not  once  said,  that  when  he 
appHes  it  to  motive  he  uses  it  in  the  sense  of  an  occasion, 
or  antecedent ;  and,  if  he  had  said  so,  it  would  not  have 
been  true.  The  truth  is,  that  he  has  used  the  word  in 
question  with  no  httle  vagueness  and  indistinctness  of 
meaning ;  for  he  sometimes  employs  it  to  signify  merely 
an  occasion,  which  exerts  no  positive  influence,  and  some- 
times to  signify  a  producing  cause.     This  is  the  manner 


EDWARDS    ON   THE    WELL.  25 

in  which  he  uses  it,  when  he  applies  it  to  motive.  In  his 
definition  of  motive,  as  the  younger  Edwards  truly  says, 
he  includes  "  every  cause  or  occasion  of  volition ;"  every 
thing  which  has  a  "tendency  to  voHtion;"  &c.,  p.  104. 
Thus,  according  to  the  younger  Edwards  himself,  the 
elder  Edwards  has,  in  his  definition  of  motive,  included 
every  conceivable  cause  of  volition ;  and  yet,  when  Dr. 
West  objects  that  he  makes  motive  the  producing  cause 
of  volition,  the  very  same  writer  repHes  that  he  has  done 
no  such  thing :  that  he  has  "  very  particularly  explained 
in  what  sense  he  uses  the  word  cause"  when  applied  to 
motive,  and  that  he  means  "  by  cause,  no  other  than  occa- 
sion, reason,  or  previous  circumstance  necessary  for 
volition;  and  that  in  this  Dr.  West  entirely  agrees  with 
him,"  p.  65.  If  we  may  believe  the  younger  Edwards, 
then,  when  the  author  of  the  Inquiry  says,  that  motive  is 
the  cause  of  volition,  he  means  that  it  is  no  other  than 
the  occasion  or  previous  circumstance  necessary  to  voli- 
tion, and  not  that  it  is  the  cause  thereof  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word ;  and  yet  that  it  is  the  cause  thereof  in 
every  conceivable  sense  of  the  word !  Now,  he  agrees 
with  Dr.  West  himself;  and  again,  he  teaches  precisely 
the  opposite  doctrine  !  Let  those  who  so  fondly  imagine 
that  they  are  the  only  men  who  understand  the  Inquiry, 
and  that  the  most  elaborate  replies  to  it  may  be  sufficiently 
refuted  by  raising  the  cry  of  "  misconstruction ;"  let  them, 
I  say,  take  some  little  pains  to  understand  the  work  for 
themselves,  instead  of  merely  giving  echo  to  the  blunders 
of  the  younger  Edwards. 

President  Edwards  says,  that  the  term  cause  is  often 

used  in  so  restrained  a  sense  as  to  signify  that  which  has 

"  a  positive  efficiency  or  influence  to  produce  a  thing,  or 

bring  it  to  pass."    It  is  in  this  restrained  sense  that  I  use 

3* 


26  EXAMINATION   OF 

the  word,  when  I  say  that  President  Edwards  regarded 
motive  as  the  cause  of  volition ;  and  it  is  in  this  sense  that 
I  intend  to  make  the  charge  good.  I  intend  to  show  that 
he  regarded  motive,  not  merely  as  the  occasion  or  condi- 
tion of  volition,  but  as  that  which  produces  it.  This  posi- 
tion, as  we  have  seen,  has  bepn  denied  by  high  authority ; 
and  therefore  it  becomes  necessary  to  establish  it,  in  order 
that  I  may  not  be  charged  with  disputing  only  about 
words  ;  and  that  although  I  may  be  exceedingly  "  desirous 
of  being  thought  to  differ  with  President  Edwards"  on  this 
subject,  yet  I  do  "  most  exactly  agree  with  him." 

To  begin  then ; — if  motive  is  merely  the  condition  on 
which  the  mind  acts,  and  exerts  no  influence  in  the  pro- 
duction of  volition,  it  is  certainly  improper  to  say,  that  it 
gives  rise  to  volition.  This  clearly  implies  that  it  is 
the  efiicient,  or  producing  cause  of  volition.  On  this  point, 
let  the  younger  Edwards  himself  be  the  judge.  "  That 
self-determination  gives  rise  to  volition,"  is  an  expression 
which  he  quotes  from  Dr.  Chauncey,  and  italicizes  the 
words  "  gives  rise  to,"  as  showing  that  the  author  of  them 
regarded  the  mind  as  the  efficient  cause  of  volition.  Now, 
President  Edwards  says,  that  the  "  strongest  motive  ex- 
cites the  mind  to  volition  ;"  and  he  adds,  that  "  the  notion 
of  exciting,  is  exerting  influence  to  cause  the  effect  to 
arise  and  come  forth  into  existence,^  p.  96.  Surely,  if 
to  give  rise  to  a  thing,  is  efficiently  to  cause  it,  no  less  can 
be  said  of  exerting  influence  *'  to  cause  it  to  arise  and 
come  forth  into  existence^  And  if  so,  then,  according 
to  the  younger  Edwards  himself,  the  author  of  the  Inquiry 
regarded  motive  as  the  efficient  cause  of  vohtion  ;  and  yet, 
on  p.  66  he  declares,  that  President  Edwards  did  not  hold 
"motive  to  be  the  efficient  cause  of  volition ;"  and  that  if 
he  has  dropped  any  expression  which  implies  such  a  doc- 


EDWARDS   ON   THE   WILL.  27 

trine,  it  must  have  been  an  inadvertency.  I  intend  to 
show,  before  I  have  done,  that  there  are  many  such  in- 
advertencies in  his  work ;  the  younger  Edwards  himself 
being  the  judge. 

Now,  it  will  not  be  denied,  that  that  which  produces  a 
thing,  is  its  efficient  cause.  The  younger  Edwards  him- 
self has  spoken  of  an  "  efficient^  producing  cause,"  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  show  that  he  regarded  them  as  con- 
vertible terms,  p.  46.  He  being  judge,  then,  that  which 
produces  a  thing,  is  its  efficient  cause.  I  might  easily 
show,  if  it  were  necessary,  that  he  himself  frequently 
speaks  of  motive  as  the  efficient,  or  producing  cause  of 
volition ;  but,  at  present,  I  am  only  concerned  with  the 
doctrine  of  President  Edwards.  "  It  is  true,"  says  Pre- 
sident Edwards,  "  I  find  myself  possessed  of  my  volitions 
before  I  can  see  the  effectual  power  of  any  cause  to  pro^ 
duce  them,  for  the  power  and  efficacy  of  the  cause  is  not 
seen  but  by  the  effect,"  p.  277.  Here,  from  the  volition, 
from  the  effect,  he  infers  the  operation  of  the  cause  or 
power  which  produces  it.  Now  this  cause  is  motive,  the 
strongest  motive ;  for  this  is  that  which  operates  to  induce 
a  choice.  Motive,  then,  produces  volition,  according  to 
the  Inquiry ;  it  is  not  merely  the  condition  on  which  it  is 
produced.  ^ 

The  younger  Edwards  declares,  that  President  Edwards 
did  not  regard  "  motive  as  the  efficient  cause  of  volition," 
p.  66,  but  only  as  the  "  occasion  or  previous  circum- 
stances necessary  to  volition ;"  in  this  respect  "  most 
exactly  agreeing  with  Dr.  West"  himself;  and  yet  he 
tells  us,  in  another  place,  that  "  every  cause  of  volition  is 
included  in  President  Edwards'  definition  of  motive,"  p. 
104.  Now,  does  not  every  cause  of  volition  include  the 
efficient  cause  thereof?    Does  not  this  expression  include 


28  EXAMINATION   OF 

that  which  is  the  cause  of  volition  in  the  real,  in  the  only- 
proper,  sense  of  the  word  ? 

To  save  the  consistency  of  the  author,  will  it  be  said, 
that  "  every  cause"  does  not  include  the  efficient  cause  in 
his  estimation,  since  in  his  opinion  there  is  no  such 
cause  ?  If  this  should  be  said,  it  would  not  be  true ;  for 
the  younger  Edwards  did,  as  it  is  well  known,  regard  the 
influence  of  the  Divine  Being  as  the  efficient  cause  of  voli- 
tion. He  regarded  the  Deity  as  the  sole  fountain  of  all 
efficiency  in  heaven  and  in  earth.  Hence,  if  the  definition 
of  President  Edwards  included  "  every  cause"  of  volition ; 
it  must  have  included  this  divine  influence,  this  efficient 
cause.  Indeed,  the  younger  Edwards  expressly  asserts, 
l)iat  this  "  divine  influence"  is  included  in  President  Ed- 
wards' "explanation  of  his  idea  of  motive,"  p.  104.  He 
tells  us,  then,  that  President  Edwards  regards  motive  as 
merely  the  occasion  of  volition ;  and  yet  that  he  considered 
motive  as  including  the  efficient  cause  of  volition !  At  one 
time,  motive  is  merely  the  antecedent,  which  exerts  no 
influence  ;  at  another,  it  embraces  the  efficient  cause  !  At 
one  time,  the  author  of  the  Inquiry  "  most  exacdy  agrees" 
with  the  libertarian  in  regard  to  this  all-important 
point ;  and,  at  another,  he  most  perfectly  disagrees  with 
him  !  It  is  to  be  hoped,  that  President  Edwards  is  not 
quite  so  glaringly  inconsistent  with  himself,  on  this  sub- 
ject, as  he  is  represented  to  be  by  his  distinguished  son. 

Again.  President  Edwards  has  written  a  section  to 
prove,  that  "  volitions  are  necessarily  connected  with  the 
influence  of  motives ;"  which  clearly  implies  that  they  are 
brought  to  pass  by  the  influence  of  motives.  In  this  sec- 
tion, he  says,  "  Motives  do  nothing,  as  motives  or  induce- 
ments, but  by  their  influence.  And  so  much  as  is  done  by 
their  influence  is  the  effect  of  them.     For  that  is  the 


EDWARDS  ON  THE   WILL.  29 

notion  of  an  effect,  something  that  is  brought  to  pass  by 
the  influence  of  something  else."  Here  motives  are  said 
to  be  the  causes  of  vohtions,  and  to  bring  them  to  pass 
by  their  influence.  Is  this  to  make  motive  merely  the 
condition  on  which  the  mind  acts  ?  Is  this  to  consider  it 
as  merely  an  antecedent  to  volition,  which  exerts  no  in- 
fluence ?  On  the  contrary,  does  it  not  strongly  remind 
one  of  that  "  restrained  sense  of  the  word  cause,"  in  which 
it  signifies,  that  which  "  has  an  influence  to  produce  a 
thing,  or  bring  it  to  pass  ?" 

Once  more.  In  relation  to  the  acts  of  the  will,  he 
adopts  the  following  language  to  show  that  they  are  ne- 
cessarily dependent  on  the  influence  of  motives :  "  For  an 
event  to  have  a  cause  and  ground  of  its  existence,  and  yet 
not  be  connected  with  its  cause,  is  an  inconsistency.  For 
if  the  event  be  not  connected  with  the  cause,  it  is  not  de- 
pendent on  its  cause ;  its  existence  is  as  it  were  loose  from 
its  influence ;  and  it  may  attend  it,  or  it  may  not ;  its 
being  a  mere  contingency,  whether  it  follows  or  attends 
the  influence  of  the  cause,  or  not ;  and  that  is  the  same 
thing  as  not  to  be  dependent  on  it.  And  to  say  the  event 
is  not  dependent  on  its  cause,  is  absurd;  it  is  the  same 
thing  as  to  say,  it  is  not  its  cause,  nor  the  event  the  effect 
of  it ;  for  dependence  on  the  influence  of  a  cause  is  the 
very  notion  of  an  effect.  If  there  be  no  such  relation 
between  one  thing  and  another,  consisting  in  the  connexion 
and  dependence  of  one  thing  on  the  influence  of  another, 
then  it  is  certain  there  is  no  such  relation  between  them 
as  is  signified  by  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,"  p.  77-8. 
Now,  here  we  are  told,  that  it  is  the  very  notion  of  an 
effect,  that  it  owes  its  existence  to  the  influence  of  its 
cause ;  and  that  it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  an  effect  which 
is  loose  from  the  influence  of  its  cause.     It  is  this  influ- 


30  EXAMINATION   OF 

ence,  "  which  causes  vohtion  to  arise  and  come  forth  into 
existence."  Any  other  notion  of  cause  and  effect  is  ab- 
surd and  unmeaning.  And  yet,  President  Edwards  informs 
us,  that  he  sometimes  uses  the  term  cause  to  signify  any 
antecedent,  though  it  may  exert  no  influence;  and  that  he 
so  employs  it,  in  order  to  prevent  caviUing  and  objecting. 
Now,  what  is  all  this  taken  together,  but  to  inform  us, 
that  he  sometimes  uses  the  word  in  question  very  absurdly^ 
in  order  to  keep  us  from  finding  fault  with  him  1  The 
truth  is,  that  whatever  apparent  concession  President 
Edwards  may  have  made,  he  does  habitually  bring  down 
the  term  cause  to  its  narrow  and  restrained  sense,  to  its 
strict  and  proper  meaning,  when  he  says,  that  motive  is 
the  cause  of  volition.  He  loses  sight  entirely  of  the  idea, 
that  it  is  only  the  occasion  on  which  the  mind  acts. 
!■  I  might  multiply  extracts  to  the  same  effect  almost 
without  end ;  but  it  is  not  necessary.  It  must  be  evident 
to  every  impartial  reader  of  the  Inquiry,  that  even  if  the 
author  really  meant  by  the  above  extracts,  that  motive  is 
merely  the  antecedent  to  volition ;  this  was  only  a  mo- 
mentary concession  made  to  his  opponents,  with  the  vague 
and  ill-defined  hope,  perhaps,  that  it  would  render  his 
system  less  obnoxious  to  them.  It  had  no  abiding  place 
in  his  mind.  It  was  no  sooner  uttered  than  it  was  re- 
pelled and  driven  away  by  the  whole  tenor  of  his  system. 
We  soon  hear  him,  as  if  no  such  thing  had  ever  been 
dreamed  of  in  his  philosophy,  asking  the  question,  and 
that  too,  in  relation  to  motives,  "  What  can  be  meant  by 
a  cause,  but  something  that  is  the  ground  and  reason  of  a 
thing  by  its  influence,  an  influence  that  is  prevalent 
AND  EFFECTUAL,"  p.  97.  Will  it  be  pretended,  that  this 
does  not  come  up  to  his  definition  of  an  eflScient  cause,  as 
that  which  brmgs  something  to  pass  by  "  a  positive  influ- 


EDWARDS  ON  THE    WILL.  31 

ence  ?"  Such  a  pretext  would  amount  to  nothing ;  for 
Edwards  has  said,  that "  motives  excite  voUtion ;"  and 
"  to  excite,  15  to  be  a  cause  in  the  most  proper  sense,  not 
merely  a  negative  occasion,  but  a  ground  of  existence 
by  positive  influence,''^  p.  96. 

An  efficient  cause  is  properly  defined  by  the  Edwardses 
themselves.  "  Does  not  the  man  talk  absurdly  and  in- 
consistently," says  the  younger  Edwards,  "  who  asserts, 
that  a  man  is  the  efl5cient  cause  of  his  own  volitions,  yet 
puts  forth  no  exertion  in  order  to  cause  it  ?  If  any  other 
way  of  efficiently  causing  an  efiect,  be  possible  or  con- 
ceivable, let  it  be  pointed  out,"  p.  49.  President  Edwards 
evidently  entertained  the  same  idea;  for  he  repeatedly 
says,  that  if  the  mind  be  the  cause  of  its  own  volitions,  it 
must  cause  them  by  a  preceding  act  of  the  mind.  The 
objection  which  he  urges  against  the  self-determining 
power,  is  founded  on  this  idea  of  a  cause.  It  is  what  he 
means,  when  he  says,  that  the  term  cause  is  "  often  used 
in  so  restrained  a  sense  as  to  signify  only  that  which  has 
2l  positive  efficiency  or  influence  to  produce  a  thing,  or 
bring  it  to  pass^ 

That  President  Edwards  regarded  motive  as  the  efiicient 
or  producing  cause  of  volition,  according  to  his  own  notion 
of  it,  is  clear  not  only  from  numerous  passages  of  the 
Inquiry ;  it  is  also  wrought  into  the  very  substance  and 
structure  of  his  whole  argument.  It  is  involved  in  his 
very  definition  of  the  strongest  motive.  The  strongest 
motive,  says  he,  is  the  whole  of  that  which  "  operates  to 
induce  a  particular  choice."  Now,  to  say  that  one  thing 
operates  to  induce  another,  or  bring  it  into  existence,  is, 
according  to  the  definition  of  the  younger  Edwards  him- 
self, to  say  that  it  is  the  efiicient  cause  of  the  thing  so  pro- 
duced. If  there  be  any  meaning  in  words,  or  any  truth  in 


32  EXAMINATION   OF 

the  definition  of  the  Edwardses,  then  to  say  that  one  thing 
operates  to  produce  another,  is  to  say  that  it  is  its  efficient 
cause.  President  Edwards,  as  we  have  seen,  holds  that 
motive  is  "  the  eflfectual  power  and  efficacy"  which  pro- 
duces volition." 

Again.  Edwards  frequendy  says,  that  "  if  this  great 
principle  of  common  sense,  that  every  effect  must  have  a 
cause,  be  given  up,  then  there  will  be  no  such  thing  as 
reasoning  from  effect  to  cause.  We  cannot  even  prove  the 
existence  of  Deity.  If  any  thing  can  begin  to  be  without 
a  cause  of  its  existence,  then  we  cannot  know  that  there 
is  a  God."  Now,  the  sense  in  which  this  maxim  is  here 
used  is  perfectly  obvious;  for  nothing  can  begin  to  be 
without  an  efficient  cause,  by  which  it  is  brought  into  ex- 
istence. When  we  reason  from  those  things  which  begin 
to  be  up  to  God,  we  clearly  reason  from  effects  to  their 
efficient  causes.  Hence,  when  this  maxim  is  applied  by 
Edwards  to  volitions,  he  evidently  refers  to  the  efficient 
causes  of  them.  If  he  does  not,  his  maxim  is  misapplied ; 
for  it  is  established  in  one  sense,  and  applied  in  another. 
If  it  proves  any  thing,  it  proves  that  volition  must  have  an 
efficient  cause ;  and  when  motive  is  taken  to  be  that  cause, 
it  is  taken  to  be  the  efficient  cause  of  volition. 

This  is  not  all.  Edwards  undertakes  to  point  out  the 
difference  between  natural  and  moral  necessity.  In  the 
case  of  moral  necessity,  says  he,  "  the  cause  with  which 
the  effect  is  connected  is  of  a  particular  kind:  viz.,  that 
which  is  of  a  moral  nature  ;  either  some  previous  habitual 
disposition,  or  some  motive  presented  to  the  understanding. 
And  the  effect  is  also  of  a  particular  kind,  being  likewise 
of  a  moral  nature ;  consisting  in  some  inclination  or  voli- 
tion of  the  soul,  or  voluntary  action."  But  the  difference, 
says  he,  "  does  not  lie  so  much  in  the  nature  of  the 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  33 

connection,  as  in  the  two  terms  connected."  Now,  let 
us  suppose  that  any  effect,  the  creation  of  the  world,  for 
example,  is  produced  by  the  power  of  God.  In  this  case, 
the  connection  between  the  effect  produced,  the  creation 
of  the  world,  and  the  act  of  the  divine  omnipotence  by 
which  it  is  created,  is  certainly  the  connection  between  an 
effect  and  its  efficient  cause.  The  two  terms  are  here 
connected  by  a  natural  necessity.  But  we  are  most  ex- 
plicitly informed,  that  the  connection  between  motives  and 
volitions,  differs  from  this  in  the  nature  of  the  two  terms 
connected,  rather  than  in  the  nature  of  the  connection. 
How  could  language  more  clearly  or  precisely  convey  the 
meaning  of  an  author?  To  say  that  President  Edwards 
does  not  make  motive  the  efficient  cause  of  volition,  is,  in- 
deed, not  so  much  to  interpret,  as  it  is  to  new-model,  his 
philosophy  of  the  will. 

The  connection  between  the  strongest  motive,  he  de- 
clares, and  the  corresponding  volition,  is  "absolute,"  just 
as  absolute  as  any  connection  in  the  world.  If  the  strongest 
motive  exists,  the  volition  is  sure  to  follow ;  it  necessarily 
follows  ;  it  is  absurd  to  suppose,  that  it  may  attend  its 
cause  or  not.  To  say  that  it  may  follow  the  influence  of 
its  cause,  or  may  not,  is  to  say  that  it  is  not  dependent 
on  that  influence,  that  it  is  not  the  effect  of  it.  In  other 
words,  it  is  to  say  that  a  volition  is  the  effect  of  the 
strongest  motive,  and  yet  that  it  is  not  the  effect  of  it ; 
which  is  a  plain  contradiction.  Such,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  the  clear  and  unequivocal  teaching  of  the  Inquiry. 

In  conclusion,  if  Edwards  really  held,  that  motive  does 
not  produce  volition,  but  is  merely  the  occasion  on  which 
it  is  put  forth,  where  shall  we  find  his  doctrine  ?  Where 
shall  we  look  for  it  ?  We  hear  him  charged  with  destroy- 
ing man's  free-agency,  by  making  motive  the  producing 
4 


34  EXAMINATION   OF 

cause  of  volition ;  and  we  see  him  labouring  to  repel  this 
charge.  Truly,  if  he  held  the  doctrine  ascribed  to  him, 
we  might  have  expected  to  find  some  allusion  to  it  in  his 
attempts  to  refute  such  a  charge.  If  such  had  been  his 
doctrine,  with  what  ease  might  he  have  repelled  the 
charge  in  question,  and  shown  its  utter  futility,  by  simply 
alleging  that,  according  to  his  system,  motive  is  the  occa- 
sion, and  not  the  producing  cause,  of  volition  ?  Instead  of 
the  many  pages  through  which  he  has  so  laboriously 
struggled,  in  order  to  bring  our  ideas  of  free-agency  and 
virtue  into  harmony  with  his  scheme ;  with  what  infinite 
ease  might  a  single  word  have  brought  his  scheme  into  har- 
mony with  the  common  sentiments  of  mankind  in  regard 
to  free-agency  and  virtue !  Indeed,  if  Edwards  really 
believed  that  motive  is  merely  the  condition  on  which  the 
mind  acts,  nothing  can  be  more  wonderful  than  his  pro- 
found silence  in  regard  to  it  on  such  an  occasion ;  except 
the  great  pains  which,  on  all  occasions,  he  has  taken  to 
keep  it  entirely  in  the  back-ground.  If  the  younger  Ed- 
wards is  not  mistaken  as  to  the  true  import  of  his  father's 
doctrine,  then,  instead  of  setting  it  forth  in  a  clear  light, 
so  that  it  may  be  read  of  all  men,  the  author  of  the  Inquiry 
has,  indeed,  enveloped  it  in  such  a  flood  of  darkness,  that 
it  is  no  wonder  those  who  have  been  so  fortunate  as  to 
find  it  out,  should  be  so  frequently  called  upon  to  com- 
plain that  his  opponents  do  not  understand  bira.  Indeed, 
if  such  be  the  doctrine  of  the  Inquiry,  I  do  not  see  how 
any  man  can  possibly  understand  it,  unless  he  has  in- 
herited some  peculiar  power,  unknown  to  the  rest  of  man- 
kind, by  which  its  occult  meaning  may  be  discerned,  not- 
withstanding all  the  outward  appearances  by  which  it  is 
contradicted  and  obscured. 

The  plain  truth  is,  as  we  have  seen,  that  President  Ed- 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  35 

wards  holds  motive  to  be  the  producing  cause  of  vohtion. 
According  to  his  scheme,  "  Vohtions  are  necessarily  con- 
nected with  the  influence  of  motives  ;'*  they  "  are  brought 
to  pa€s  by  the  prevaiUng  and  effectual. influence"  of, mo- 
tives. Motive  is  "  the  effectual  power  and  efl[icacy"  bjP 
which  they  are  "  produced."  They  are  not  merely  caused 
to"  be  thus,  and  not  otherwise,  by  motive  ;  they  are  "  caused 
to  arise  and  come  forth  into  existence."  This  is  the  great 
doctrine  for  which  Ed\Yards  contends ;  and  this  ^s  pre- 
cisely the  doctrine  which  I  deny.  /  contend  against  no 
other  kind  of  necessity  but  this  moral  necessity,  just 
as  it  is  explained  by  Edwards  himself. 

Here  the  issue  with  President  Edwards  is  joined ;  and 
I  intend  to  hold  him  steadily  to  it.  No  ambiguity  of  words 
shall,  for  a  moment,  divert  my  mind  from  it.  If  his  argu- 
ments, when  thoroughly  sifted  and  scrutinized,  establish 
this  doctrine ;  then  shall  I  lay  down  my  arms  and  sur- 
render at  discretion.  But  if  his  assumptions  are  unsound, 
or  his  deductions  false,  I  shall  hold  them  for  naught.  If 
he  reconciles  his  scheme  of  moral  necessity  with  the 
reahty  of  virtue,  with  the  moral  agency  and  accountability 
of  man,  and  with  the  purity  of  God ;  then  I  shall  lay  aside 
my  objections  ;  but  if,  in  reality,  he  only  reconciles  it  with 
the  semblance  of  these  things,  whilst  he  denies  their  sub- 
stance, I  shall  not  be  diverted  from  an  opposition  to  so 
monstrous  a  system,  by  the  fair  appearances  it  may  be 
made  to  wear  to  the  outward  eye. 


36  EXAMINATION   OF 


SECTION  III. 

THE    INQUIRY  INVOLVED    IN   A  VICIOUS   CIRCLE. 

The  great  doctrine  of  the  Inquiry  seems  to  go  round  in 
a  vicious  circle,  to  run  into  an  insignificant  truism.  This 
is  a  grave  charge,  I  am  aware,  and  I  have  ventured  to 
make  it  only  after  the  most  mature  reflection :  and  the 
justness  of  it  may  be  shown  by  a  variety  of  considera- 
tions. 

In  the  first  place,  when  we  ask, ""  what  determines  the 
will?"  the  author  replies,  "it  is  the  strongest  motive;" 
and  yet,  according  to  his  definition,  the  strongest  motive 
is  that  which  determines  the  will.  Thus,  says  Edwards, 
"  when  I  speak  of  the  strongest  motive,  I  have  respect  to 
the  whole  that  operates  to  induce  a  particular  act  of  voli- 
tion, whether  that  be  the  strength  of  one  thing  alone,  or  of 
many  together."  If  we  ask,  then,  what  produces  any 
particular  act  of  volition,  we  are  told,  it  is  the  strongest 
motive  ;  and  if  we  inquire  what  is  the  strongest  motive, 
we  are  informed,  it  is  the  whole  of  that  which  operated 
to  produce  that  particular  act  of  volition.  What  is  this 
but  to  inform  us,  that  an  act  of  volition  is  produced  by  that 
which  produces  it? 

It  is  taken  for  granted  by  President  Edwards,  that  voli- 
tion is  an  effect,  and  consequently  has  a  cause.  The  great 
question,  according  to  his  work,  is,  what  is  this  cause  ? 
He  says  it  is  the  strongest  motive ;  in  the  definition  of 
which  he  includes  every  thing  that  in  any  way  contributes 
to  the  production  of  voUtion  ;  in  other  words,  the  strongest 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  87 

motive  is  made  to  embrace  every  thing  that  acts  as  a  cause 
of  volition.  This  is  the  way  in  which  he  explains  him- 
self, as  well  as  the  manner  in  which  he  is  understood  by 
others.  Thus,  says  the  younger  Edwards,  "  in  his  expla- 
nation of  his  idea  of  motive,  he  mentions  all  agreeable 
objects  and  views,  all  reasons  and  arguments,  and  all  in- 
ternal biases  and  tempers,  which  have  a  tendency  to  voli- 
tion ;  i.  e.  every  cause  or  occasion  of  volition,"  p.  104. 
Every  reader  of  President  Edwards  must  be  satisfied  that 
this  is  a  correct  account  of  his  definition  of  motive  ;  and 
this  being  the  case,  the  whole  amounts  to  just  this  propo- 
sition, that  volition  is  caused  by  that  which  causes  it ! 
He  admits  that  it  would  be  hard,  if  not  impossible,  to  enu- 
merate all  those  things  and  circumstances  which  aid  in 
the  production  of  vohtion ;  but  still  he  is  quite  sure,  that 
the  whole  of  that  which  operates  to  produce  a  volition 
does  actually  produce  it !  Though  he  may  have  failed 
to  show  wherein  consists  the  strength  of  motives ;  yet  he 
contends  that  the  strongest  motive,  or  the  cause  of  voli- 
tion, is  really  and  unquestionably  the  cause  of  volition ! 
Such  is  the  great  doctrine  of  the  Inquiry. 

If  this  is  what  the  Inquiry  means  to  establish,  surely  it 
rests  upon  unassailable  ground.  Well  may  President  Day 
assert,  that  "  to  say  a  weaker  motive  prevails  against  a 
stronger  one  is  to  say,  that  that  which  has  the  least  influ- 
ence has  the  greatest  influence,"  p.  66.  Now  who  would 
deny  this  position  of  the  learned  president  ?  Who  would 
say,  that  that  which  has  the  greatest  influence  has  not  the 
greatest  influence  ?  Surely,  this  great  doctrine  is  to  the 
full  as  certain  as  the  newly  discovered  axiom  of  professor 
Villant,  that  "  a  thing  is  equal  to  itself." 

President  Day,  following  in  the  footsteps  of  Edwards, 
informs  us  that  the  will  is  determined  by  the  strongest 
4* 


38  EXAMINATION   OF 

motive ;  but  how  shall  we  know  what  is  the  strongest 
motive  ?  "  The  strength  of  a  motive,"  says  he,  "  is  not 
its  prevailing,  but  the  power  by  which  it  prevails.  Yet 
we  may  very  properly  measure  this  power  by  the  actual 
result  1'^  Thus  are  we  gravely  informed  that  the  will  is 
determined  by  that  which  determines  it. 

Again.  If  we  suppose  there  is  a  real  strength  in  mo- 
tives, that  they  exert  a  positive  influence  in  the  production 
of  volitions,  then  we  concede  every  thing  to  President 
Edwards.  For,  if  motives  are  so  many  forces  acting  upon 
the  will,  to  say  that  the  strongest  Avill  prevail,  is  simply 
to  say  that  it  is  the  strongest.  But  if  motives  exert  no 
positive  influence,  then  when  we  say  that  one  is  stronger 
than  another,  we  must  be  understood  to  use  this  expres- 
sion in  a  metaphorical  sense ;  we  must  refer  to  some 
property  of  motives  which  we  figuratively  call  their 
strength,  and  of  which  we  suppose  one  motive  to  possess 
a  greater  degree  than  another.  If  this  be  so,  what  is 
this  common  property  of  motives,  which  we  call  their 
strength  ?  If  they  do  not  possess  a  real  strength,  if  they 
do  not  exert  an  efficient  influence ;  but  are  merely  said, 
metaphorically  speaking,  to  possess  such  power  and  to 
exert  such  influence ;  then  what  becomes  of  the  self-evi- 
dence which  President  Edwards  claims  for  his  funda- 
mental proposition  ?  'If  motives  exert  a  real  force,  of 
course  the  strongest  must  prevail;  but  if  they  only  have 
something  else  about  them,  \vhich  we  call  their  strength, 
it  is  not  self-evident  that  the  motive  which  possesses  this 
something  else  in  the  highest  degree  must  necessarily 
prevail.  Hence,  the  great  doctrine  of  President  Edwards 
is  either  a  proposition  whose  truth  arises  out  of  the  very 
definition  of  the  terms  in  which  it  is  expressed,  or  it  is 
utterly  destitute  of  that  axiomatical  certainty  which  he 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  39 

claims  for  it.  In  other  words,  he  has  settled  his  great 
doctrine  of  the  will  by  the  mere  force  of  a  definition ;  or 
he  has  left  its  foundations  quite  unsettled. 

Motives,  as  they  are  called,  are  different  from  each 
other  in  nature  and  in  kind ;  and  hence,  it  were  absurd  to 
compare  them  in  degree.  "  The  strongest  motive,"  there- 
fore, is  a  mode  of  expression  which  can  have  no  intelligi- 
ble meaning,  unless  it  be  used  with  reference  to  the  influ- 
ence which  motives  are  supposed  to  exert  over  the  mind. 
This  is  the  sense  in  which  it  clearly  seems  to  be  used  by 
Edwards.  The  distinguishing  property  of  a  motive,  ac- 
cording to  his  definition,  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  the 
motive  itself;  it  consists  in  its  adaptedness  "to  move  or 
excite  the  mind  to  volition;"  nor  indeed  could  he  find  any 
other  way  of  measuring  or  determinmg  what  he  calls  the 
strength  of  motives,  since  they  are  so  diverse  in  their  own 
nature  from  each  other.  He  could  not  have  given  any 
plausible  definition  of  the  strength  of  motives,  if  he  had 
looked  at  them  as  they  are  in  themselves ;  and  hence,  he 
was  under  the  necessity  of  defining  it,  by  a  reference  to 
the  "  degree  of  tendency  or  advantage  they  have  to  move 
or  excite  the  will."  Thus,  according  to  the  Inquiry,  the 
will  is  determined  by  the  strongest  motive ;  and  yet  we 
can  form  no  intelligible  idea  of  what  is  meant  by  the 
strongest  motive,  unless  we  conceive  it  to  be  that  which 
determines  the  will.  The  matter  will  not  be  mended,  by 
alleging  that  the  strongest  motive  is  not  defined  to  be  that 
which  actually  determines  the  will,  but  that  which  has  the 
greatest  degree  of  previous  tendency  or  advantage,  to  ex- 
cite or  move  it ;  for  we  cannot  know  what  motive  has  this 
greatest  degree  of  previous  tendency  or  advantage,  except 
by  observing  what  motive  actually  does  determine  the 

wm. 


40  EXAMINATION    OF 

This  leads  us  to  another  view  of  the  same  subject. 
The  strength  of  a  motive,  as  President  Edwards  properly 
remarks,  depends  upon  the  state  of  the  mind  to  which  it 
is  addressed.  Hence,  in  a  great  majority  of  cases,  we 
can  know  nothing  about  the  relative  strength  of  motives, 
except  from  the  actual  influence  which  they  exert  over  the 
mind  of  the  individual  upon  whom  they  are  brought  to  bear. 
This  shows  that  the  universal  proposition,  that  the  will  is 
always  determined  by  the  strongest  motive,  can  be  known 
to  be  true,  only  by  assuming  that  the  strongest  motive  is 
that  by  which  the  will  is  determined. 

The  same  thing  may  be  made  to  appear  from  another 
point  of  view.  It  has  been  well  said  by  the  philosopher 
of  Malmsbury,  "  that  experience  concludeth  nothing  uni- 
versally." From  experience  we  can  pronounce  only  in 
so  far  as  we  have  observed,  and  no  farther.  But  the  pro- 
position, that  the  will  is  always  determined  by  the  strongest 
motive,  is  a  universal  proposition ;  and  hence,  if  true  at  all, 
its  truth  could  not  have  been  learnt  from  observation  and 
experience.  It  must  depend  upon  the  very  definition  of 
the  terms  in  which  it  is  expressed.  We  cannot  say  that 
the  will  is  in  all  cases  determined  by  the  strongest  motive, 
unless  we  include  in  the  very  idea  and  definition  of  the 
strongest  motive,  that  it  is  such  that  it  determines  the  will. 
President  Edwards  not  only  does,  but  he  must  necessarily, 
go  around  in  this  circle,  in  order  to  give  any  degree  of 
clearness  and  certainty  to  his  doctrine. 

That  President  Edwards  goes  around  in  this  vicious 
circle,  may  be  shown  in  another  way.  "  It  appears  from 
these  things,"  says  he,  "that  in  some  sense,  the  will 
always  follows  the  last  dictate  of  the  understanding. 
But  then  the  understanding  must  be  taken  in  a  large 
sense,  as  including  the  whole  faculty  of  perception  or  ap- 


^  EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  41 

prehension,  and  not  merely  what  is  called  reason  or  judg- 
ment. IF  by  the  last  dictate  of  the  understanding  is  meant 
what  reason  declares  to  be  best,  or  most  for  the  person's 
happiness,  taking  in  the  whole  of  its  duration,  it  is  not 
true,  that  the  will  always  follows  the  last  dictate  of  the 
understanding,"  p.  25.  In  this  place.  President  Edwards 
gives  no  distinct  idea  of  what  he  means  by  the  last  dic- 
tate of  the  understanding,  which  the  will  is  said  to  follow 
in  all  cases.  But  in  the  eighth  volume  of  his  works,  that 
dictate  of  the  understanding  which  the  will  is  said  to  fol- 
low, is  called  the  "  practical  judgment ;"  and  this  is  de- 
fined to  be,  "that  judgment  which  men  make  of  things 
that  prevail,  so  as  to  determine  their  actions  and  govern 
their  practice."  Here  again  are  we  informed,  that  the  will 
always  follows  the  practical  judgment,  and  that  the  prac- 
tical judgment  is  that  which  men  make  of  things  that  pre- 
vail, so  as  to  determine  the  will. 

The  Inquiry  itself  furnishes  abundant  evidence,  that  I 
have  done  its  author  no  injustice.  "  I  have  chosen,"  says 
he,  "  rather  to  express  myself  thus,  that  the  will  always 
is  as  the  greatest  apparent  good,  or  as  what  appears 
most  agreeable,  than  to  say  the  will  is  determined  by  the 
greatest  apparent  good,  or  by  what  seems  most  agreeable  ; 
because  an  appearing  most  agreeable  to  the  mind,  and  the 
mind's  preferring,  seem  scarcely  distinct.  If  strict  pro- 
priety of  speech  be  insisted  on,  it  may  more  properly  be 
said,  that  the  voluntary  action,  which  is  the  immediate 
consequence  of  the  mind's  choice,  is  determined  by  that 
which  appears  most  agreeable,  than  the  choice  itself.'* 
After  all,  then,  it  seems  that  choice  itself,  or  volition,  is 
not  determined  by  that  which  appears  the  most  agreeable ; 
because,  in  reality,  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable  and 
volition  are  one  and  the  same  thing.     But  surely,  if  we 


42  EXAMINATION   OF  ^ 

cannot  distinguish  between  choice  and  the  sense  of  the 
most  agreeable,  then  to  say  that  the  one  always  is  as  the 
other,  is  only  to  say  that  a  thing  is  always  as  it  is.  Ed- 
wards saw  the  absurdity  of  saying  that  a  thing  is  deter- 
mined by  itself;  but  he  does  not  seem  to  have  seen,  how 
insignificant  is  the  proposition,  that  a  thing  is  always  as 
it  is,  and  not  otherwise ;  and  hence  this  is  the  form  in 
which  he  has  chosen  to  present  the  great  leading  idea  of 
his  work  on  the  will.  And  henceforth  we  are  to  under- 
stand, that  the  preference  of  the  mind  is  always  as  that 
which  appears  most  agreeable  to  the  mind  ;  or,  in  other 
words,  that  the  preference  or  choice  of  the  mind  is  always 
as  the  choice  of  the  mind. 

•  This  is  not  all.  President  Edwards  himself  has  fre- 
quently reduced  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  the  Inquiry 
to  an  identical  proposition.  It  is  well  known,  that  "  to  be 
determined  by  the  strongest  motive,"  "  to  follow  the 
greatest  apparent  good,"  "  to  do  what  is  most  agreeable," 
or  "  what  pleases  most,"  are  all  different  modes  of  ex- 
pression employed  by  him  to  set  forth  the  same  funda- 
mental doctrine.  In  speaking  of  this  doctrine,  he  says : 
"  There  is  scarcely  a  plainer  and  more  universal  dictate 
of  the  sense  and  experience  of  mankind,  than  that,  when 
men  act  voluntarily,  and  do  what  they  please,  then  they 
do  what  suits  them  best,  or  what  is  most  agreeable  to 
them.  To  say,  that  they  do  what  pleases  them,  but  yet 
not  what  is  agreeable  to  them,  is  the  same  thing  as  to  say, 
they  do  what  they  please,  but  do  not  act  their  pleasure ; 
and  that  is  to  say,  that  they  do  what  they  please,  and  yet 
do  not  what  they  please."  Most  assuredly,  if  to  deny  the 
leading  proposition  of  the  Inquiry,  is  to  deny  that  men  do 
what  they  please  when  they  do  what  they  please ;  then 
to  affirm  it,  is  only  to  advance  the  insignificant  truism. 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  4S 

that  men  do  what  they  please  when  they  do  what  they 
please.  It  seems  to  me,  that  after  President  Edwards  had 
reduced  his  fundamental  proposition  to  such  a  truism,  he 
might  very  well  have  spared  himself  the  three  hundred 
pages  that  follow. 

Again,  he  says  :  "  It  is  manifest  that  no  acts  of  the  will 
are  contingent,  in  such  sense  as  to  be  without  all  neces- 
sity, or  so  as  not  to  be  necessary  with  a  necessity  of  con- 
sequence and  connection ;  because  every  act  of  the  will  is 
some  way  connected  with  the  understanding,  and  is  as  the 
greatest  apparent  good  is,  in  the  manner  which  has  already 
been  explained ;  namely,  that  the  soul  always  wills  or 
chooses  that,  which  in  the  present  view  of  the  mind,  con- 
sidered in  the  whole  of  that  view,  and  all  that  belongs  to 
it,  appears  most  agreeable.  Because,  as  we  observed 
before,  nothing  is  more  evident  than  that,  when  men  act 
voluntarily,  and  do  what  they  please,  then  they  do  what 
appears  most  agreeable  to  them ;  and  to  say  otherwise 
would  be  as  much  as  to  affirm,  that  men  do  not  choose 
what  appears  to  suit  them  best,  or  what  seems  most 
pleasing  to  them  ;  or  that  they  do  not  choose  what  they 
prefer,  which  brings  the  matter  to  a  contradiction.''^ 

Thus,  the  great  fundamental  doctrine  of  the  Inquiry  is 
reduced  by  Edwards  himself  to  the  barren  truism,  that 
men  do  actually  choose  what  they  choose ;  a  proposition 
which  the  boldest  advocate  of  free-agency  would  hardly 
dare  to  call  in  question.  After  labouring  through  a  whole 
section  to  establish  this  position,  the  author  concludes  by 
saying,  "  These  things  may  serve,  I  hope,  in  some  mea- 
sure to  illustrate  and  confirm  the  position  laid  down  in 
the  beginning  of  this  section :  viz.  That  the  will  is  always 
determined  by  the  strongest  motive,  or  by  the  view  of  the 
mind  which  has  the  greatest  previous  tendency  to  excite 


44  EXAMINATION   OF 

volition.  But  whether  I  have  been  so  happy  as  rightly 
to  explain  the  thing  wherein  consists  the  strength  of  mo- 
tives, or  not,  yet  my  failing  in  this  will  not  overthrow  the 
position  itself ;  which  carries  much  ofitsoivn  evidence 
along  with  it^and  is  a  point  of  chief  importance  to  the 
purpose  of  the  ensuing  discourse  :  and  the  truth  of  it  I 
hope  will  appear  with  great  clearness,  before  I  have 
finished  what  I  have  to  say  on  the  subject  of  human 
liberty."  Truly  the  position  in  question,  as  it  is  explained 
by  the  author  himself,  carries  not  only  much,  but  all,  of 
its  own  evidence  along  with  it.  Who  can  deny  that  a  man 
always  does  what  he  pleases,  when  he  does  what  he 
pleases  ?  This  truth  appears  witli  just  as  great  clearness 
at  the  beginning,  as  it  does  at  the  conclusjon,  of  the  cele- 
brated Inquiry  of  the  author.  It  is  invested  in  a  flood  of 
light,  which  can  neither  be  increased  by  argument,  nor 
obscured  by  sophistry. 

From  the  foregoing  remarks,  it  appears,  I  think,  that 
the  fundamental  doctrine  of  the  Inquiry  is  a  barren  truism, 
or  a  vicious  circle.  If  Edwards  understood  the  import  of 
his  own  doctrine,  when  he  reduced  it  to  the  form  that  a 
man  does  what  he  pleases  when  he  does  what  he  pleases, 
it  is  certainly  a  truism  ;  and  if  this  is  all  his  famous  doc- 
tine  amounts  to,  it  can  have  no  bearing  whatever  upon  the 
question  as  to  the  cause  of  volition ;  for  whether  the  mind 
be  the  cause  of  its  own  volitions,  or  whether  the  strongest 
motive  always  causes  them,  or  whether  they  have  no 
causes  at  all,  it  is  equally  and  unalterably  true,  that  every 
man  does  what  he  pleases  when  he  does  what  he  pleases. 
There  is  no  possible  form  of  the  doctrine  of  free-agency 
or  contingency,  however  wild,  which  is  at  all  inconsistent 
with  such  a  truism. 

Edwards  is  not  always  consistent  with  himself.     He 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  45 

sometimes  represents  the  greatest  apparent  good,  or  sense 
of  the  most  agreeable,  as  the  cause  of  volition ;  and  then 
his  doctrine  assumes  the  form,  that  the  will  is  determined 
by  the  strongest  motive,  or  the  greatest  apparent  good. 
And  yet  he  sometimes  identifies  a  sense  of  the  most  agree- 
able with  the  choice  itself;  and  then  his  doctrine  assumes 
the  form  that  the  choice  of  the  mind  is  always  as  the 
choice  of  the  mind  ;  and  to  deny  it  is  a  plain  contradiction 
in  terms. 

From  the  fact  that  Edwards  has  gone  round  in  a  circle, 
it  has  been  concluded  that  he  has  begged  the  question ; 
but  how,  or  wherein  he  has  begged  it,  is  a  point  which 
has  not  been  sufficiently  noticed.  The  very  authors  who 
have  uttered  this  complaint,  have  granted  him  the  very  thing 
for  which  he  has  begged.  If  volition  is  an  efftct^  if  it 
has  a  cause,  then  most  unquestionably  the  cause  of  voli- 
tion is  the  cause  of  volition.  Admit  that  voUtion  is  an 
efiect,  as  so  many  libertarians  have  done,  and  then  his 
definition  of  motive,  which  includes  every  cause  of  voli- 
tion, places  his  doctrine  upon  an  immutable  foundation. 
We  might  as  well  heave  at  the  everlasting  mountams  as 
to  try  to  shake  it. 

Admit  that  volition  is  an  effect,  and  what  can  we  say  ? 
Can  we  say,  that  the  strongest  motive  may  exist,  and  yet 
no  vohtion  may  follow  from  it?  To  this  the  necessitarian 
would  instantly  reply,  that  if  any  thing  exists,  and  no 
volition  follows  thereupon,  it  is  evidently  not  the  cause  of 
volition,  and  consequently  is  not  the  strongest  motive  ;  for 
this,  according  to  the  definition,  includes  every  cause  of 
volition :  it  is  indeed  absurd,  to  suppose  that  an  effect 
should  not  proceed  from  its  cause.  This  is  the  ground 
taken  both  by  President  Edwards  and  President  Day.  It 
is  absHrd,  says  the  latter,  to  suppose  that  a  weaker  mo- 
5 


k 


46  EXAMINATION   OF 

tive,  or  any  thing  else,  can  prevail  over  the  stronger — and 
why  ?  Because  the  strongest  motive  is  that  which  pre- 
vails. "  If  it  be  said,"  he  continues,  "  that  something 
else  gives  the  weaker  motive  a  superiority  over  the 
stronger ;  then  this  something  else  is  itself  a  m,otive, 
and  the  united  influence  of  the  two  is  greater  than  that  of 
the  third,"  p.  66.  Thus,  say  what  we  will,  we  can 
never  escape  this  admirable  net  of  words,  that  the  will  is 
determined  by  that  which  determines  it. 

I  do  not  intend,  then,  to  engage  in  the  hopeless  task,  of 
admitting  volition  to  be  an  effect,  and  yet  striving  to  ex- 
tricate it  from  "  the  mechanism  of  cause  and  efliect."  This 
ground  has  long  since  been  occupied  by  much  abler  per- 
sons than  myself;  and  if  they  have  failed,of  success,  fall- 
ing into  innumerable  inconsistencies,  it  is  because,  on  such 
ground,  success  is  impossible ;  and  that  notwithstanding 
their  transcendant  abilities,  they  have  been  fated  to  contra- 
dict themselves. 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  47 


SECTION  IV. 


VOLITION   NOT   AN   EFFECT. 


The  argument  of  the  Inquiry,  as  I  have  shown,  as- 
sumes that  a  volition  is  an  effect  in  the  proper  sense  of 
the  word  ;  that  it  is  the  correlative  of  an  efficient  cause. 
If  it  were  necessary,  this  point  might  be  established  by  a 
great  variety  of  additional  considerations ;  but,  I  presume 
that  every  candid  reader  of  the  Inquiry  is  fully  satisfied 
in  relation  to  it. 

If  we  mean  by  an  effect,  every  thing  that  comes  to 
pass,  of  course  a  volition  is  an  effect ;  for  no  one  can 
deny  that  it  comes  to  pass.  Or,  if  we  include  in  the 
definition  of  the  term,  every  thing  which  has  a  sufficient 
reason  and  ground  of  its  existence,  we  cannot  deny  that 
it  embraces  the  idea  of  a  volition.  For,  under  certain 
circumstances,  the  free  mind  will  furnish  a  sufficient 
reason  and  ground  of  the  existence  of  a  volition.  All 
that  I  deny  is,  that  a  volition  does  proceed  from  the  mind, 
or  from  motive,  or  from  anything  else,  in  the  same  man- 
ner that  an  effect,  properly  so  called,  proceeds  from  its 
efficient  cause. 

This  is  a  point  on  which  I  desire  to  be  distinctly  un- 
derstood. I  put  forth  a  volition  to  move  my  hand.  The 
motion  of  the  hand  follows.  Now,  here  I  observe  the 
action  of  the  mind,  and  also  the  motion  of  the  hand. 
The  effect  exists  in  the  body,  in  that  which  is  by  nature 
passive  ;  the  cause  in  that  which  is  active,  in  the  mind. 
The  effect  produced  in  the  body,  in  the  hand,  is  the 


k 


48  EXAMINATION   OF 

passive  result  of  the  prior  direct  action  of  the  mind.  It 
is  in  this  restricted  sense,  that  I  use  the  term  in  question, 
when  I  deny  that  a  volition  is  an  effect.  I  do  not  deny- 
that  it  depends  for  its  production  upon  certain  circum- 
stances, as  the  conditions  of  action,  and  upon  the  powers 
of  the  mind,  by  which  it  is  capable  of  acting  in  view  of 
such  circumstances.  All  that  I  deny  is,  that  volition  re- 
sults from  the  prior  action  of  mind,  or  of  circumstances, 
or  of  any  thing  else,  in  the  same  manner  that  the  motion 
of  body  results  from  the  prior  action  of  mind.  Or,  in 
other  words,  I  contend  that  action  is  the  invariable  ante- 
cedent of  bodily  motion,  but  not  of  volition  ;  that  what- 
ever may  be  its  relations  to  other  things,  a  volition  does 
not  sustain  the  same  relation  to  anything  in  theunivferse, 
that  an  effect  sustains  to  its  efficient  cause,  that  a  passive 
result  sustains  to  the  direct  prior  action  by  which  it  is 
produced.  I  hope  I  maybe  always  so  understood,  when 
I  affirm  that  a  volition  is  not  an  effect. 

It  is  in  this  narrow  and  restricted  sense  that  Edwards 
assumes  a  volition  to  be  an  effect.  He  does  not  say,  in 
fio  many  words,  that  the  mind  cannot  put  forth  a  volition, 
except  in  the  way  of  producing  it  by  a  preceding  volition 
or  act  of  the  will ;  but  he  first  assumes  a  volition  to  be 
an  effect ;  and  then  he  asserts,  that  the  mind  can  be  the 
cause  of  no  effect^  (italicising  the  term  effect,)  except  by 
the  prior  action  of  the  mind.  Thus,  having  assumed  a 
volition  to  be  an  effect,  he  takes  it  for  granted  that  it 
cannot  proceed  from  the  mind  in  any  way,  except  that 
in  which  any  effect  in  the  outer  world  proceeds  from  the 
mind  ;  that  is  to  say,  except  it  be  produced  by  the  direct 
prior  action  of  the  mind,  by  a  preceding  volition.  Thus 
he  brings  the  idea  of  a  volition  under  the  above  narrow 
and  restricted  notion  of  an  effect ;  and  thereby  confounds 


EDWARDS   ON  THE    WILL.  49 

the  relation  which  subsists  between  mind  and  its  voli- 
tions, with  the  relation  which  subsists  between  mind  and 
its  external  effects  in  body.  In  other  words,  on  the  sup- 
position that  our  volitions  proceed  from  the  mind,  he 
takes  it  for  granted  that  they  must  be  produced  by  the 
preceding  action  of  the  mind;  just  as  an  effect,  in  the 
limited  sense  of  the  term,  is  produced  by  the  prior  ac- 
tion of  its  cause.  It  is  in  this  assumption,  that  Edwards 
lays  the  foundation  of  the  logic,  by  which  he  reduces 
the  self-determining  power  of  the  mind  to  the  absurdity 
of  an  infinite  series  of  volitions. 

It  is  evident  that  such  is  the  course  pursued  by  Ed- 
wards ;  for  he  not  only  calls  a  volition  an  effect,  but  he 
also  says,  that  the  mind  can  "  bring  no  effects  to  pass, 
but  what  are  consequent  upon  its  acting,"  p.  56.  And 
again  he  says,  *'  The  will  determines  which  way  the 
hands  and  feet  shall  move,  by  an  act  of  choice;  and 
there  is  no  other  way  of  the  will's  determining,  direct- 
ing, or  commanding  any  thing  at  all."  This  is  very  true, 
if  a  volition  is  such  an  effect  as  requires  the  prior  action 
of  something  else  to  account  for  its  production,  just  as 
the  motion  of  the  "hands  and  feet"  requires  the  action 
of  the  mind  to  account  for  its  production ;  but  it  is  not 
true,  if  a  volition  is  such  an  effect,  that  its  existence  may 
be  accounted  for  by  the  presence  of  certain  circumstances 
or  motives,  as  the  conditions  of  action,  in  conjunction 
with  a  mind  capable  of  acting  in  view  of  such  motives. 
In  other  words,  his  assertion  is  true,  if  we  allow  him  to 
assume,  as  he  does,  that  a  volition  is  an  effect,  in  the 
above  restricted  meaning  of  the  term  ;  but  it  is  not  true, 
if  we  consider  a  volition  as  an  effect  in  a  larger  sense  of 
the  word.  Hence,  the  whole  strength  of  Edwards'  po- 
5* 


50  EXAMINATION  OF 

sition  lies  in  the  sense  which  he  arbitrarily  attaches  to 
the  term  effect,,  when  he  says  that  a  volition  is  an  effect. 

Now,  is  a  volition  an  effect  in  such  a  sense  of  the 
word?  Is  it  brought  into  existence,  like  the  motion  of 
body,  by  the  prior  action  of  any  thing  else  ?  We  an- 
swer, No.  But  how  shall  this  point  be  decided  ?  The 
necessitarian  says,  a  moment  before  the  volition  did  not 
exist,  now  it  does  exist;  and  hence,  it  necessarily 
follows,  that  there  must  have  been  a  cause  by  which 
it  was  brought  into  existence.  That  is  to  say,  it  must 
be  an  effect.  True,  it  must  be  an  effect,  if  you  please ; 
but  in  what  sense  of  the  word  ?  Is  volition  an  effect,  in 
the  same  sense  that  the  motion  of  the  body  is  an  effect  ? 
This  is  the  question. 

And  this  question,  I  contend,  is  not  to  be  decided  by 
abstract  considerations,  nor  yet  by  the  laying  of  words 
together,  and  drawing  conclusions  from  them.  It  is  a 
question,  not  of  logic,  but  of  psychology.  By  whatever 
name  you  may  please  to  call  it,  the  true  nature  of  a  voli- 
tion is  not  to  be  determined  by  reference  to  abstractions, 
nor  by  the  power  of  words  ;  but  hy  simply  looking  at  it 
and  seeing  what  it  is.  If  we  would  really  understand 
its  nature,  we  must  not  undertake  to  reason  it  out ;  we 
must  open  our  eyes,  and  look^  and  see.  The  former 
course  would  do  very  well,  no  doubt,  if  the  object  were 
to  construct  a  world  for  ourselves;  but  if  we  would  be- 
hold the  glory  of  that  which  God  has  constructed  for 
us,  and  in  us,  we  must  lay  aside  the  proud  syllogistic 
method  of  the  schools,  and  betake  ourselves  to  the 
humble  task  of  observation — of  patient,  severe,  and  scru- 
tinizing observation.  There  is  no  other  condition  on 
which  we  can  "  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  man,  which  is 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  61 

founded  in  the  sciences."  There  is  no  other  course 
marked  out  for  us  by  the  immortal  Bacon:  and  if  we 
pursue  any  other  we  may  wander  in  the  dazzling  light 
of  a  thousand  abstractions,  and  behold  whatever  fleeting 
images  of  grandeur  and  of  beauty  we  may  be  pleased  to 
conjure  up  for  ourselves ;  but  the  pure  light  of  nature 
and  of  truth  will  be  hid  from  us. 

What  then  is  a  volition  just  as  it  is  revealed  to  us  in 
the  light  of  consciousness  ?  Does  it  result  from  the  prior 
action  of  mind,  or  of  motive,  or  of  any  thing  else  ?  In 
other  words,  is  it  an  effect^  as  the  motion  of  body  is  an 
efl'ect ! 

We  always  conceive  of  the  subject  in  which  such  an 
eflect  resides,  as  being  wholly  passive.  President  Ed- 
wards himself  has  repeatedly  said,  that  it  is  the  very 
notion  of  an  effect,  that  it  results  from  the  action  or  in- 
fluence of  its  cause;  and  that  nothing  is  any  further  an 
effect,  than  as  it  proceeds  from  that  action  or  influence. 
The  subject  in  which  it  is  produced,  is  always  passive 
as  to  its  production ;  and  just  in  so  far  as  it  is  itself 
active,  it  is  not  the  subject  of  an  effect,  but  the  author  of 
an  action.  Such  is  the  idea  of  an  effect  in  the  true  and 
proper  sense  of  the  word. 

Now  does  our  idea  of  a  volition  correspond  with  this 
idea  of  an  effect  ?  Is  it  produced  in  the  mind,  and  is  the 
mind  passive  as  to  its  production?  Is  it,  like  the  mo- 
tion of  a  body,  the  passive  result  of  the  action  of  some- 
thing else?  No.  It  is  not  the  result  of  action;  it  is 
action  itself.  The  mind  is  not  passive  as  to  its  produc- 
tion ;  it  is  in  and  of  itself  an  action  of  the  mind.  It  is 
not  determined  ^  it  is  a  determination.  It  is  not  a  pro- 
duced effect,  like  the  motion  of  body ;  it  is  itself  an  ori- 
ginal producing  cause.     It  does  seem  to  me,  that  if  any 


52  EXAMINATION   OF 

man  will  only  reflect  on  this  subject,  he  must  see  that 
there  is  a  clear  and  manifest  difference  between  an  act 
and  an  effect. 

Although  the  scheme  of  Edwards  identifies  these  two 
things,  and  his  argument  assumes  them  to  be  one  and 
the  same ;  yet  his  language,  it  appears  to  me,  frequently 
betrays  the  fact,  that  his  consciousness  did  not  work  in 
harmony  with  his  theory.  While  speaking  of  the  acts 
of  the  will  as  effects,  he  frequently  says,  that  it  is  the 
very  idea  of  an  effect  that  it  results  from,  and  is  necessa- 
rily connected  with,  the  action  of  its  cause,  and  that  it  is 
absurd  to  suppose  that  it  is  free  or  loose  from  the  influ- 
ence of  its  cause. 

And  yet,  in  reference  to  volitions,  he  often  uses  the 
expression,  ^^  this  sort  of  effects,"  as  if.it  did  not  ex- 
actly correspond  with  the  *'  very  idea  of  an  effect,'* 
from  which  it  is  absurd  to  depart  in  our  conceptions. 
When  he  gives  fair  play  to  consciousness,  he  speaks  of 
different  kinds  of  effects  ;  and  yet,  when  he  returns  to 
his  theory  and  his  reasoning,  all  this  seems  to  vanish; 
and  there  remains  but  one  clear,  fixed,  and  definite  idea 
of  an  effect,  and  to  speak  of  any  thing  else  as  such  is 
absurd.  He  now  and  then  pays  a  passing  tribute  to  the 
power  of  consciousness,  by  admitting  that  the  soul  exerts 
its  own  volitions,  that  the  soul  itself  acts ;  but  he  no 
sooner  comes  to  the  work  of  argument  and  refutation, 
than  it  is  motive  that  *'  causes  them  to  be  put  forth  or 
exerted,"  p.  96.  Ever  and  anon,  he  seems  to  catch  a 
whisper  from  the  voice  of  consciousness  ;  and  he  con- 
cedes that  he  sometimes  uses  the  term  cause  to  designate 
that  which  has  not  a  positive  or  productive  influence, 
p.  50-1.  But  this  is  not  when  he  is  engaged  in  the 
energy  of  debate.     Let  Mr.  Chubb  cross  his  path  ;  let 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  53 

him  hear  the  voice  of  opposition  giving  utterance  to  the 
sentiment,  that  **  in  motive  there  is  no  causality  in  the 
production  of  action;"  and  that  moment  the  voice  of 
consciousness  is  hushed  in  the  most  profound  silence. 
He  rises,  like  a  giant,  in  the  defence  of  his  system,  and 
he  declares,  that  "to  excite,"  as  motives  do,  "is  posi- 
tively to  do  something,"  and  "certainly  that  which  does 
something,  is  the  cause  of  the  thing  done  by  it."  Yea, 
"  to  excite,  is  to  cause  in  the  most  proper  sense,  not 
merely  a  negative  occasion,  but  a  ground  of  existence 
by  positive  influence,''^  p.  96. 

These  passages,  which  are  scattered  up  and  down 
through  the  Inquiry,  in  which  the  doctrine  of  liberty 
seems  to  be  conceded,  I  cannot  but  regard  as  highly  im- 
portant concessions.  They  have  been  used  to  show  that 
we  misconceive  the  scheme  of  Edwards,  when  we  ascribe 
to  him  the  doctrine  of  fate.  But  when  they  are  thus 
adduced,  to  show  that  we  misrepresent  his  doctrine,  I 
beg  it  may  be  remembered  that  such  evidence  can  prove 
only  one  of  two  things ;  either  that  we  do  not  understand 
what  he  teaches,  or  that  he  is  not  always  consistent  with 
himself. 

If  he  really  held  the  doctrine  of  fatalism,  we  ought  not 
to  be  surprised  that  he  has  furnished  such  evidence 
against  himself.  It  is  not  in  the  nature  of  the  human 
mind  to  keep  itself  always  deaf  to  the  voice  of  conscious- 
ness. It  is  not  in  the  power  of  any  system  always  to 
counteract  the  spontaneous  workings  of  nature.  Though 
the  mind  should  be  surrounded  by  those  deep-seated, 
all-pervading,  and  obstinate  illusions,  by  which  the 
scheme  of  fatalism  is  made  to  wear  ihe  appearance  of 
self-evident  truth  ;  yet  when  it  loses  sight  of  that  system, 
it  will,  at  times,  speak  out  in  accordance  with  the  dic- 
tates of  nature.     The  stern  and  unrelenting  features  of 


54  EXAMINATION   OF 

fatalism  cannot  always  be  so  intimately  present  to  the 
mind,  as  entirely  to  exclude  it  from  the  contemplation  of 
a  milder  and  more  captivating  system  of  philosophy. 
Notwithstanding  the  influence  of  system,  how  rigid 
soever  may  be  its  demands,  the  human  mind  will,  in  its 
moments  of  relaxation,  recognize  in  its  feelings  and  in 
its  utterance,  those  great  truths  which  are  inseparable 
from  its  very  nature. 

Let  it  be  borne  in  mind,  then,  that  there  is  more  than 
one  process  in  the  universe.  Some  things  are  produced, 
it  is  most  true,  by  the  prior  action  of  other  things  ;  and 
herein  we  behold  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  pro- 
perly so  called ;  but  it  does  not  follow,  that?  all  things  are 
embraced  by  this  one  relation.  This  appears  to  be  so 
only  to  the  mind  of  the  necessitarian ;  from  which  one 
fixed  idea  has  shut  out  the  light  of  observation.  He  no 
longer  sees  the  rich  variety,  the  boundless  diversity, 
there  is  in  the  works  of  God ;  all  things  and  all  modes  and 
all  processes  of  the  awe-inspiring  universe,  are  made  to 
conform  to  the  narrow  and  contracted  methods  of  his  own 
mind.  Look  where  he  will,  he  sees  not  the  *'  free  and 
flowing  outline"  of  nature's  true  lineaments ;  he  every 
where  beholds  the  image  of  the  one  fixed  idea  in  his 
mind,  projected  outwardly  upon  the  universe  of  God ; 
behind  which  the  true  secrets  and  operations  of  nature 
are  concealed  from  his  vision.  Even  when  he  contem- 
plates that  living  source  of  action,  that  bubbling  fountain 
of  volitions,  the  immortal  mind  of  man  itself,  he  only  be- 
holds a  thing,  which  is  made  to  act  by  the  action  of 
something  else  upon  it;  just  as  a  body  is  made  to 
move  by  the  action  of  force  upon  it.  His  philosophy  is, 
therefore,  an  essentially  shallow  and  superficial  philoso- 
phy. The  great  name  of  Edwards  cannot  shield  it  from 
such  condemnation. 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  66 


SECTION  V. 

OF    THE    CONSEQUENCES    OF    REGARDING   VOLITION   AS   AN 
EFFECT. 

It  has  been  frequently  conceded  that  a  volition  is  an 
effect;  but  to  make  this  concession,  without  explanation 
or  qualification,  is  to  surrender  the  whole  cause  of  free 
agency  into  the  hand  of  the  enemy.  For  if  a  volition  is 
an  effect,  properly  speaking,  the  only  question  is  as  to 
its  efficient  cause :  it  is  necessarily  produced  by  its 
cause. 

To  make  this  matter  clear,  let  us  consider  what  is  pre- 
cisely meant  by  the  term  cause  when  it  is  thus  used  ? 
An  effect  is  necessarily  connected,  not  with  the  thing 
which  is  sometimes  called  its  cause,  but  with  the  action 
or  positive  influence  of  that  thing.  Thus,  the  mind,  or 
the  power  of  the  mind,  is  sometimes  said  to  be  the  cause 
of  motion  in  the  body ;  but  this  is  not  to  speak  with  phi- 
losophical precision.  No  motion  of  the  body  is  neces- 
sarily connected,  either  with  the  mind  itself,  or  with  the 
power  of  the  mind.  In  other  words,  if  these  should  lie 
dormant,  or  fail  to  act,  they  would  produce  no  bodily 
motion.  But  let  the  mind  act,  or  will  a  particular  mo- 
tion, and  the  body  will  necessarily  move  in  consequence 
of  that  action.  Hence,  it  is  neither  with  the  mind,  nor 
with  the  power  of  the  mind,  that  bodily  motion,  as  an 
effect,  is  necessarily  connected ;  it  is  with  an  act  of  the 
mind  or  volition  that  this  necessary  connection  subsists. 


56  EXAMINATION    OF 

A  cause  is  said  to  imply  its  effect:  it  is  not  the  mind,  but 
an  act  of  the  mind,  that  implies  motion  in  the  body. 

'JThis  is  evidently  the  idea  of  Edwards,  when  he  says, 
as  he  frequently  does,  that  an  effect  is  necessarily  con- 
nected with  the  influence  or  action  of  its  cause.  The 
term  cause  is  ambiguous ;  and  when  he  says,  that  an 
effect  is  necessarily  connected  with  its  cause,  he  should 
be  understood  to  mean,  in  accordance  with  his  own  doc- 
trine, that  the  cause  referred  to  is  the  influence  or  action 
by  which  it  is  produced,  and  not  the  thing  which  exerts 
that  inHuence  or  action.  Thus,  although  motives  are 
said  to  be  causes  of  action,  he  contends,  they  can  do 
nothing  except  by  their  influence ;  and  so  much  as  results 
from  their  influence  is  the  effect  of  that  influence,  and  is 
necessarily  connected  with  it. 

Now,  if  a  volition  is  an  effect,  if  it  has  an  efficient 
cause,  what  is  that  cause  ?  By  the  action  of  what  is  it 
produced?  It  cannot  be  by  the  act  of  the  mind,  says 
Edwards,  because  the  mind  can  produce  an  effect  only 
by  another  act.  Thus,  on  the  supposition  in  question, 
we  cannot  ascribe  a  volition  to  the  mind  as  its  cause, 
without  being  compelled  to  admit  that  it  results  from  a 
preceding  act  of  the  mind.  But  that  preceding  act,  on 
the  same  supposition,  will  require  still  another  preceding 
act  to  account  forits  production  ;  and  soon  adinjiniium. 
Such  is  the  absurdity  which  Edwards  delighted  to  urge 
against  the  self-determining  power  of  the  mind.  It  is 
triumphantly  based  on  the  concession  that  a  volition  is 
an  effect;  that  as  such  the  iprior  action  of  something  else 
is  necessary  to  account  for  its  existence.  And  if  we  sup- 
pose, in  accordance  with  the  truth,  that  a  volition  is 
merely  a  state  of  the  mind,  which  does  not  sustain  the 


EDWARDS   ON   THE   WILL.  57 

same  relation  to  the  mind  that  an  effect  does  to  its  effi- 
cient cause,  this  absurdity  will  vanish.  The  doctrine  of 
liberty  will  no  longer  be  encumbered  with  it. 

Now,  proceeding  on  the  same  supposition,  let  us  con- 
ceive of  a  volition  as  resulting  from  the  influence  ex- 
erted by  motive.  If  an  act  of  the  mind  is  an  effect, 
surely  we  may  say,  that  the  act  or  productive  influence 
of  motive,  or  of  any  thing  else,  is  likewise  an  effect ; 
and  consequently  must  have  a  cause  to  account  for  its 
existence ;  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  Hence,  the  very 
absurdity  which  Edwards  charges  upon  our  system,  really 
attaches  to  his  own. 

Will  it  be  said  that  this  ad  infinitum  absurdity  does 
not  result  from  the  supposition  in  question,  but  from  the 
fact  that  the  mind  can  do  nothing  except  by  its  action  or 
influence  ?  It  is  very  true,  as  Edwards  repeatedly  de- 
clares, that  the  mind  can  be  the  cause  of  no  effect,  except 
by  a  preceding  act  of  the  mind.  The  truth  of  this  pro- 
position is  involved  in  the  very  idea  which  he  attaches 
to  the  term  effect,  and  it  is  based  upon  this  idea  alone. 
And  we  may  say,  with  equal  propriety,  that  motive  can 
be  the  cause  of  no  effect,  except  by  its  action  or  produc- 
tive influence.  Indeed,  Edwards  himself  expressly  says, 
that  motives  can  do  nothing,  except  by  an  exertion  of 
their  influence,  or  by  operating  to  produce  effects.  Thus, 
the  two  cases  are  rendered  perfectly  parallel ;  and  afford 
the  same  foundation  on  which  to  erect  an  infinite  series 
of  causes. 

To  evade  this,  can  it  be  pretended,  that  motive  just 

exerts  this  influence  of  itself  ?     May  we  not  with  equal, 

nay,  with  infinitely  greater  propriety,  contend  that  mind 

just  exerts  its  own  positive  influence  of  itself  ?     Or,  will 

6 


58  EXAMINATION   OF 

it  be  said,  that  it  is  a  mistake,  to  suppose  that  Edwards 
ascribed  any  real,  productive,  or  causal  influence  to  mo- 
tives ;  that  he  regarded  them  as  the  occasions  on  which 
the  mind  acts,  and  not  properly  as  the  causes  of  its  ac- 
tion ?  If  so,  then  the  whole  scheme  of  moral  necessity 
is  abandoned,  and  the  doctrine  of  liberty  is  left  to  stand 
upon  its  own  foundation,  in  the  undisputed  evidence  of 
consciousness. 

The  truth  is,  if  we  take  it  for  granted,  that  a  volition 
is  an  effect,  properly  so  called,  and  as  such  must  proceed 
from  the  prior  action  of  something  else,  we  cannot  escape 
the  ad  infinitum  absurdity  of  the  Inquiry.  If  we  rise 
from  this  platform,  we  cannot  possibly  ascend  in  any 
direction,  without  entering  upon  an  infinite  series  of 
causes.  Whether  we  ascend  through  the  self-determining 
power  of  the  mind,  or  through  the  determining  power  of 
motives,  or  through  the  joint  action  of  both,  we  can  save 
ourselves  from  such  an  absurd  consequence  only  by  a 
glaring  act  of  inconsistency.  Hence,  we  are  forced  back 
upon  the  conclusion  that  action  may,  and  actually  does 
arise  in  the  world  of  mind,  without  any  efficient  or  pro- 
ducing cause  of  its  existence,  without  resulting  from  the 
prior  action  of  any  thing  whatever.  Any  other  hypothesis 
is  involved  in  absurdity. 

Let  it  be  assumed,  that  a  volition  is,  properly  speak- 
ing, an  effect,  and  every  thing  is  conceded.  On  this 
vantage  ground,  the  scheme  of  necessity  may  be  erected 
beyond  the  possibility  of  an  overthrow.  For,  even  if 
we  "  suppose  that  action  is  determined  by  the  will  and 
free  choice,"  this  "  is  as  much  as  to  say,  that  it  must  be 
necessary,  being  dependent  upon,  and  determined  by 
something  foregoing ;  namely,  a  foregoing  act  of  choice," 


EDWARDS    ON    THE    WILL.  59 

p.  199.  Let  the  above  position  be  conceded,  and  there 
is  no  escape  from  this  conclusion.  Nay,  the  conclusion 
itself  is  but  another  mode  of  stating  the  position  assumed. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  action  must  take  its  rise  some- 
where in  the  world,  without  being  caused  by  prior 
action ;  or  else  there  must  be  an  infinite  series  of  acts. 
I  say  it  takes  its  rise  in  the  mind,  in  that  which  is  essen- 
tially active,  and  not  in  matter.  Edwards  does  not  say, 
that  it  takes  its  rise  in  matter ;  and  hence,  there  is  no  dis- 
pute on  this  point.  It  is  very  remarkable,  that  this 
objection  to  his  scheme,  that  it  runs  into  an  infinite 
series,  seems  never  to  have  occurred  to  President  Ed- 
wards. He  seems  to  have  endeavoured  to  anticipate  and 
reply  to  all  possible  objections  to  his  system;  and  yet 
this,  which  has  occurred  to  so  many  others,  appears  not 
to  have  occurred  to  himself,  for  he  has  not  noticed  it. 

The  younger  Edwards  has  attempted  to  reply  to  it. 
Let  us  see  his  reply.  "  We  maintain,"  says  he,  "  that 
action  may  be  the  effect  of  a  divine  influence  ;  or  that  it 
may  be  the  effect  of  one  or  more  second  causes,  the  first 
of  which  is  immediately  produced  by  the  Deity.  Here 
then  is  not  an  infinite  series  of  causes,  but  a  very  short 
series,  wTiich  terminates  in  the  Deity  or  first  cause,"  p. 
121.  Thus,  according  to  the  younger  Edwards,  the  in- 
finite series  of  causes  is  cut  short,  terminating  in  the 
volition  of  Deity.  What !  does  the  volition  of  God  come 
into  existence  without  a  cause  of  its  existence?  What 
then  becomes  of  '*  that  great  principle  of  common  sense," 
so  often  applied  to  volition,  that  no  event  can  begin  to  be 
without  a  cause  of  its  existence  ?  Is  this  great  principle 
given  up  ?     Has  it  become  obsolete  ? 

It  may  be  contended,  that  although  human  volition  is 
an  effect,  and  so  must  have  a  cause ;  yet  the  divine  voli- 


60  EXAMINATION   OF 

tion  is  not  an  effect.  The  elder  Edwards  could  not  have 
taken  this  ground ;  for  he  contends,  that  the  volition  of 
Deity  is  just  as  necessarily  connected  with  the  strongest 
motive,  or  the  greatest  apparent  good,  as  is  the  volition 
of  man.  According  to  the  Inquiry,  all  volitions,  both 
human  and  divine,  are  necessarily  connected  with  the 
greatest  apparent  good,  and  in  precisely  the  same  man- 
ner. The  above  pretext,  therefore,  could  not  have  been 
set  up  by  him. 

This  ground,  however,  is  taken  by  the  younger  Ed- 
wards. *'It  is  granted,"  says  he,  *'  that  volition  in  the 
Deity  is  not  an  effect,"  p.  122 ;  it  has  no  cause,  and 
here  terminates  the  series.  But  how  is  this  ?  Can  some 
event,  after  all,  begin  to  be  without  having  a  cause  of  its 
existence  ?  without  being  an  effect?  By  no  means.  How 
is  it  then?  Why,  says  the  learned  author,  the  volitions 
of  the  Deity  have  existed  from  all  eternity !  They  have 
no  causes  ;  because  they  have  never  begun  to  be  ! 

*'  I  deny,"  says  he,  "  that  the  operations  and  energies 
of  the  Deity  begin  in  time,  though  the  effects  of  those 
operations  do.  They  no  more  begin  in  time  than  the 
divine  existence  does  ;  but  human  volitions  all  begin  in 
time,"  p.  123.  This  makes  all  the  difference  imagina- 
ble ;  for  as  the  divine  acts  have  existed  from  all  eternity, 
so  they  cannot  be  caused. 

But  there  is  an  objection  to  this  view.  *'  If  it  should 
be  said,"  he  continues,  "  that  on  this  supposition  the 
effects  take  place  not  till  long  after  the  acts,  by  which 
they  are  produced,  I  answer,  they  do  so  in  our  view,  but 
not  in  the  view  of  God.  With  him  there  is  no  time,  no 
before  nor  after  with  respect  to  time,"  p.  124. 

Now,  it  will  not  be  denied,  that  things  appear  to  God 
just  as  they  are  in  themselves  ;  and  hence,  if  his  volitions, 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  61 

which  are  said  to  exist  long  before  their  effects,  even 
from  all  eternity,  appear  to  him  not  to  exist  long  before 
them ;  then  they  do  not  in  reality  exist  long  before  them. 
But  if  the  divine  volitions  do  not  really  exist  long  before 
their  effects,  but  just  before  them,  as  other  causes  do 
before  their  effects,  why  should  they  not  have  causes  as 
well  as  any  other  volitions  ?  If  they  really  exist  just 
before  their  effects  in  time,  and  not  long  before  them, 
why  do  they  not  exist  in  time  just  as  much  as  any  other 
volitions  ?  and  why  do  they  not  as  much  require  causes  to 
account  for  their  existence  ?  If  they  only  seem  to  us  to 
exist  long  before  their  effects,  even  from  all  eternity,  how 
can  this  mere  seeming  make  any  real  difference  in  the 
case  ?  There  is  a  very  short  series,  we  are  told,  the 
volition  of  Deity  constituting  the  first  link.  Has  not  this 
first  link,  this  volition  of  the  Deity,  a  cause  ?  No.  And 
why  ?  Because  it  has  existed  from  all  eternity ;  and  so 
nothing  could  go  before  it  to  produce  it.  Did  it  not  exist 
long  before  the  effect  then,  which  it  produces  in  time  ? 
No.  And  why  ?  Because  in  the  view  of  God  and  in 
reality,  it  existed  just  before  its  effect,  as  all  causes  do, 
and  therefore  there  is  no  real  severance  of  cause  and 
effect  in  the  case  !  It  really  comes  just  before  its  effect 
in  time,  and  therefore  there  is  no  severance  of  cause  and 
effect;  and  yet  it  really  existed  before  all  time,  even 
from  all  eternity,  and  therefore  it  cannot  have  a  cause  ! 
Now  is  this  logic,  or  is  it  legerdemain  ? 

There  is  no  time  with  God,  says  the  author;  then 
there  is  no  time  in  reality ;  it  is  all  an  illusion  arising 
from  the  succession  of  our  own  thoughts.  If  this  be  so, 
then  all  things  do  really  come  to  pass  simultaneously  ; 
and  if  there  were  a  very  long  series,  even  an  infinite 
6*^ 


62  EXAMINATION    OF 

sdfies  of  causes  and  effects,  yet  would  they  all  come  to 
pass  in  the  same  instant.  Indeed,  there  is  very  great 
uncertainty  about  the  speculations  of  philosophers  in  re- 
gard to  time  and  space ;  and  we  hardly  know  what  to 
make  of  them,  except  we  cannot  very  well  understand 
them ;  but  one  thing  is  abundantly  certain  ;  and  that  is, 
that  it  is  not  good  logic,  to  assert  that  a  particular  cause 
cannot  be  produced,  because  it  has  existed  long  before 
its  effect,  even  from  all  eternity;  and  yet  repel  objections 
to  this  assertion,  by  alleging  that  they  only  seem  to  do 
so,  while  in  reality  there  is  no  such  thing.  This  is  to 
turn  from  the  illusion  to  the  reality,  and  from  the  reality 
to  the  illusion,  just  as  it  suits  the  exigency  of  the  mo- 
ment. Such  are  the  poor  shifts  and  shallow  devices,  to 
which  even  gifted  minds  are  reduced,  when  they  refuse 
to  admit  that  action,  that  volition,  may  take  its  rise  in  the 
world,  spontaneously  proceeding  from  mind  itself,  with- 
out being  made  to  do  so  by  the  action  of  any  thing 
upon  it. 

Let  us  suppose,  that  a  man  should  tell  us,  that  a  pro- 
ducing cause  existed  long  before  its  effect;  that  there 
was  nothing  to  prevent  it  from  bringing  its  effect  to  pass ; 
and  yet,  long  after  it  had  existed,  its  effect  sprang  up  and 
came  into  existence  ;  what  should  we  think  ?  Should 
we  not  see  that  it  is  absurd,  in  the  highest  degree,  to  say 
that  an  unimpeded  causative  act  existed  yesterday,  and 
even  from  all  eternity,  unchanged  and  unchangeable ; 
and  yet  its  effect  did  not  come  to  pass  until  to-day  ? 
Surely,  no  man  in  his  right  mind  can  be  made  to  believe 
this,  unless  it  be  forced  upon  him  by  the  desperate  ne- 
cessities of  a  false  system  ;  and  if  any  person  were  told, 
that  although. such  a  thing  may  seem  absurd  to  us,  inas- 


EDWARDS  ON   THE    WILL.  68 

much  as  the  cause  seems  to  exist  in  full  operation  long 
before  its  effect,  yet  it  is  not  so  in  the  view  of  God,  with 
whom  there  is  no  time,  should  he  not  be  pardoned  if  he 
doubted  the  infallibility  of  his  informant  ? 

The  truth  is,  we  must  reason  about  cause  and  effect 
as  they  appear  to  us  ;  and  whether  time  be  an  illusion  or 
not,  we  must,  in  all  our  reasonings,  conceive  of  cause 
and  effect  as  conjoined  in  what  we  call  time,  or  we  can- 
not reason  at  all.  According  to  the  younger  Edwards, 
the  act  of  creation,  not  the  mere  purpose  to  create,  but 
the  real  causative  act  of  creation,  existed  in  the  divine 
mind  from  all  eternity.  Why  then  did  the  world  spring 
up  and  come  into  existence  at  one  point  of  time  rather 
than  another?  How  happened  it,  that  so  many  ages 
rolled  away,  and  this  mighty  causative  act  produced  no 
effect?  In  view  of  such  a  case,  how  could  the  author 
have  said,  as  he  frequently  does,  that  a  cause  necessarily 
implies  its  effect?  How  can  this  be,  if  a  causative  act 
of  the  Almighty  may  exist,  and  yet,  for  millions  of  ages, 
its  omnipotent  energy  produce  no  effect?  Indeed,  such 
a  doctrine  destroys  all  our  notions  of  cause  and  effect ;  it 
overthrows  "the  great  principle  of  common  sense"  that 
cause  and  effect  necessarily  imply  each  other ;  and  in- 
volves all  our  reasoning  from  cause  to  effect,  and  vice 
versa,  in  the  utmost  perplexity  and  confusion.  It  throws 
clouds  and  darkness  over  the  whole  field  of  inquiry. 

Since  the  time  of  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke,  it  has  been 
frequently  objected  to  the  scheme  of  moral  necessity, 
that  it  is  involved  in  the  great  absurdity  of  an  infinite 
series  of  causes.  President  Edwards  urged  this  objec- 
tion against  the  doctrine  of  the  self-determining  power ; 
he  did  not  perceive  that  it  lay  against  his  own  scheme 


64  EXAMINATION   OF 

of  the  motive-determining  power ;  and  hence,  he  has 
not  even  attempted  to  answer  it.  This  was  reserved  for 
the  younger  Edwards  ;  and  aUhough  he  has  deservedly- 
ranked  high  as  a  logician,  I  cannot  but  regard  his  at- 
tempt to  answer  the  objection  in  question,  as  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  abortions  in  the  history  of  philosophy. 


EDWARDS  ON   THE    WILL.  65 


SECTION  VI. 

OF   THE    MAXIM   THAT   EVERY    EFFECT   MUST   HAVE   A 
CAUSE. 

In  a  former  section,  I  referred  to  some  of  the  false  as- 
sumptions which  have  been  incautiously  conceded  to  the 
necessitarian,  and  in  which  he  has  laid  the  foundations 
of  his  system  ;  but  I  have  not,  as  yet,  alluded  to  the  argu- 
ment or  deduction  in  which  he  is  accustomed  to  triumph. 
This  argument,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  is  a  deduction, 
not  from  any  principle  or  general  fact  which  has  been 
ascertained  by  observation  or  experience,  but  from  a  self- 
evident  and  universal  truth. 

That  every  effect  must  have  a  cause,  is  the  maxim 
upon  which  the  necessitarian  takes  his  stand,  and  from 
which  he  delights  to  draw  his  favourite  conclusion.  It 
may  be  well,  therefore,  to  examine  the  argument  which 
has  been  so  frequently  erected  upon  the  maxim  in  question. 
Although  from  various  considerations,  it  has  been  very 
justly  concluded,  that  there  is  somewhere  a  lurking  fal- 
lacy in  the  argument,  yet  it  has  not  been  precisely  shown 
where  the  fallacy  lies.  Suspicion  has  been  thrown  over 
it:  nay,  abundant  reason  has  been  shown  why  it  should 
be  rejected  ;  but  yet  the  fallacy  of  it  should  be  dragged 
from  the  place  of  its  concealment,  and  laid  open  in  a 
clear  light,  so  as  to  render  it  apparent  to  every  eye.  If 
it  is  a  sophism,  it  certainly  can  be  exposed,  and  it  should 
be  done. 

In  order  to  do  this,  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider  the 


L 


66  EXAMINATION   OF 

nature  and  use  of  the  maxim,  that  every -effect  must  have 
a  cause.  I  am  aware,  that  no  necessitarian  of  the  pre- 
sent day,  would  choose  to  express  this  maxim  as  I  have 
expressed  it ;  for  in  such  a  form  Mr.  Hume  has  shown 
that  it  contains  no  information,  and  is  indeed  a  most  in- 
significant proposition.  And,  in  truth,  what  does  it 
amount  to  ?  Cause  and  effect  are  correlative  terms ;  and 
when  we  speak  of  an  effect,  we  mean  something  that  is 
produced  by  a  cause ;  and  hence,  the  famous  proposition, 
that  every  effect  has  a  cause,  amounts  only  to  this,  that 
every  effect  is  an  effect ! 

After  Mr.  Hume  had  caused  the  subject  to  be  viewed 
in  this  light,  the  usual  mode  of  expression  was  dropped ; 
and  it  has  now  become  the  common  practice  to  say,  that 
there  is  no  change  in  nature  without  a  cause.  But  I  do 
not  see  how  this  mends  the  matter  in  the  least:  it  may 
disguise,  but  it  does  not  alter  the  nature  or  real  import 
of  the  maxim  in  question.  For  when  it  is  said  that  every 
change  has  a  cause,  it  is  evident  that  a  change  is  con- 
ceived of  under  the  idea  of  an  effect.  It  is  supposed  to 
be  produced  by  a  cause,  and  therefore  it  must  be  consi- 
dered as  an  effect ;  and  if  the  idea  remains  precisely  the 
same,  I  do  not  see  that  giving  it  a  new  name,  can  pos- 
sibly make  any  difference  in  the  meaning  of  the  proposi- 
tion. 

The  maxim,  that  every  effect  must  have  a  cause,  is  a 
self-evident  and  universal  proposition.  Its  truth  is  in- 
volved in  the  very  definition  of  the  terms  of  which  it  is 
composed.  In  this  respect  it  is  like  the  axioms  of 
geometry.  When  it  is  said,  for  example,  that  "the 
whole  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  parts,"  we  at  once  per- 
ceive the  truth  of  the  axiom ;  because  the  *'  whole"  is 
merely  another  name  for  "  the  sum  of  the  parts."     It  is 


[ 


EDWARDS    ON   THE    WILL.  67 

intuitively  certain  that  they  are  equal,  because  they  are 
but  different  expressions  of  the  same  thing.  So,  like- 
wise, when  it  is  affirmed,  that  every  effect  or  every 
change  in  nature  has  a  cause,  we  instantly  perceive  the 
truth  of  the  proposition;  inasmuch  as  an  effect  is  that 
which  is  produced  by  a  cause.  The  very  idea  of  an 
effect  implies  its  relation  to  a  cause  ;  and  to  say,  that  it 
has  one,  is  only  to  say,  that  an  effect  is  an  effect.  For 
if  it  were  not  produced  by  a  cause,  it  would  not  be  an 
effect. 

The  maxim  under  consideration  is  as  unquestionably 
true  as  any  axiom  in  Euclid.  It  does  not  depend  for 
the  evidence  of  its  truth  upon  observation,  or  experience, 
or  reasoning;  it  carries  its  own  evidence  along  with  it. 
No  sooner  are  the  terms  in  which  it  is  expressed  under- 
stood, than  it  rivets  irresistible  conviction  on  the  mind. 
It  is  a  fundamental  law  of  belief;  and  it  is  impossible  for 
the  imagination  of  man  to  conceive,  that  an  effect,  or  that 
which  is  produced  by  a  cause,  should  be  without  a  cause. 
And  it  were  just  as  idle  an  employment  of  one's  time,  to 
undertake  to  prove  such  a  proposition,  as  it  would  be  to 
attempt  to  refute  it. 

Now,  one  of  the  fallacies  of  the  argument  of  the  neces- 
sitarian is,  that  it  is  an  attempt  to  draw  a  conclusion 
from  the  axiomatical  truth  above  referred  to,  as  from  the 
major  of  a  syllogism.  Every  such  attempt  must  neces- 
sarily be  vain  and  fruitless.  "  Axioms,"  justly  remarks 
Mr.  Locke,  *'  are  not  the  foundations  on  which  any  of  the 
sciences  are  built."  And  again,  "It  was  not  the  influ- 
ence of  those  maxims  which  are  taken  for  principles  in 
mathematics,  that  hath  led  the  masters  of  that  science 
into  the  wonderful  discoveries  they  have  made.  Let  a 
man  of  good  parts  know  all  the  maxims  generally  made 


68  EXAMINATION    OF 

use  of  in  mathematics  never  so  perfectly,  and  contem- 
plate their  extent  and  consequences  as  much  as  he 
pleases,  he  will,  by  th^ir  assistance,  I  suppose,  scarce 
ever  come  to  know,  that  <  the  square  of  the  hypothe- 
nuse  in  a  right-angled  triangle,  is  equal  to  the  squares 
of  the  two  other  sides.'  The  knowledge  that  *  the 
whole  is  equal  to  the  parts,'  and,  'if  you  take  equals 
from  equals,  the  remainder  will  be  equal,'  helped  him 
not,  I  presume,  to  this  demonstration.  And  a  man 
may,  I  think,  pore  long  enough  on  those  axioms, 
without  ever  seeing  one  jot  the  more  of  mathematical 
truths." 

The  same  doctrine  is  still  more  distinctly  stated  by 
Dugald  Stewart.  "  If  by  the  first  principles  of  a  science," 
says  he,  *'be  meant  those  fundamental  propositions  from 
which  its  remoter  truths  are  derived,  the  axioms  cannot, 
with  any  consistency,  be  called  the  first  principles  of 
mathematics.  They  have  not,  (it  will  be  admitted,)  the 
most  distant  analogy  to  what  are  called  the  first  princi- 
ples of  natural  philosophy : — to  those  general  facts,  for 
example,  of  the  gravity  and  elasticity  of  the  air,  from 
which  may  be  deduced,  as  consequences,  the  suspension 
of  the  mercury  in  the  Torricellian  tube,  and  its  fall  when 
carried  up  to  an  eminence.  According  to  this  meaning 
of  the  word,  the  first  principles  of  mathematical  science 
are,  not  the  axioms  but  the  definitiona  ;  which  defini- 
tions hold,  in  mathematics,  precisely  the  same  place  that 
is  held  in  natural  philosophy  by  such  general  facts  as 
have  now  been  referred  to." 

But  the  doctrine  in  question  rests  upon  a  firmer  basis 
than  that  of  human  authority.  Let  any  man  examine 
the  demonstrations  in  geometry,  and  attentively  consider 
the  principles  from  which  the  conclusions  of  that  science 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL. 


are  deduced,  and  lie  will  find  that  they  are  definitions, 
and  not  axioms.  He  will  find,  that  the  properties  of  the 
triangle  are  derived  from  the  definition  of  a  triangle,  and 
those  of  a  circle  from  the  definition  of  a  circle.  And  then 
let  him  try  his  own  skill  upon  the  axioms  of  that  science ; 
let  him  arrange  them  and  combine  them  in  all  possible 
ways;  let  him  compare  them  together  as  long  as  he 
pleases,  and  determine  for  himself,  whether  they  can  be 
made  to  yield  a  single  logical  inference.  If  the  question 
is  thus  brought  to  the  test  of  an  actual  experience,  I 
think  it  is  not  difficult  to  foresee,  that  the  decision  must 
be  in  favour  of  the  doctrine  of  Stewart,  and  that  it  will  be 
seen,  that  no  such  proposition  as  that  whatever  is,  is,  can 
even  constitute  the  postulate,  or  first  principle,  in  any 
sound  argument ;  and  that  it  is  only  from  general  facts, 
such  as  are  ascertained  by  observation  and  experience, 
that  we  can  derive  logical  consequences  of  any  kind 
whatever,  either  in  relation  to  matter  or  to  mind. 

If  there  is  any  truth  in  the  foregoing  remarks,  or  cor- 
rectness in  the  position  of  Locke  and  Stewart,  it  is  cer- 
tainly one  of  the  capital  errors  of  Edwards,  as  well  as  of 
other  necessitarians,  that  he  has  undertaken  to  deduce  his 
doctrine  from  a  metaphysical  axiom,  or  identical  propo- 
sition. ^. 

Supposing  this  to  be  the  case,  how  has  it  happened,  it 
may  be  asked,  that  the  argument  of  the  necessitarian  has 
appeared  so  conclusive  to  himself,  as  well  as  unanswer- 
able to  others  ?  The  reason  is  plain.  Having  set  out 
with  a  proposition,  which  is  barren  of  all  consequences, 
as  the  basis  of  his  argument,  it  became  necessary,  in 
order  to  arrive  at  the  destined  conclusion,  to  assume, 
somewhere  and  somehow,  in  the  course  of  his  reasoning, 
the  very  point  which  he  had  undertaken  to  prove.  Ac- 
7 


70  EXAMINATION   OF 

cordingly,  this  has  been  done  ;  and  the  tacit  assumption 
of  the  point  in  dispute  seems  not  to  have  been  suspected 
by  him. 

The  justice  of  this  remark  may  be  shown,  by  a  refer- 
ence to  the  argument  of  the  necessitarian.  When  this 
is  reduced  to  the  form  of  a  syllogism,  it  stands  thus : 
Every  effect  has  a  cause  ;  a  volition  is  an  effect;  and, 
therefore,  a  volition  has  a  cause.  In  the  middle  term, 
which  assumes  that  a  volition  is  an  effect,  the  point  in 
dispute  is  taken  for  granted,  the  whole  question  is  com- 
pletely begged. 

If  we  take  the  words  in  any  sense,  yet  as  they  are 
correlative  terms,  the  maxim  that  every  effect  must  have 
a  cause  is  self-evident ;  and  hence,  no  conclusion  can  be 
drawn  from  it,  unless  the  conclusion  intended  to  be 
drawn  is  assumed  in  the  middle  term  of  the  syllogism. 
It  either  begs  the  question,  or  it  decides  nothing  to  the 
purpose.  It  is  true,  that  every  change  in  nature  must 
have  a  cause ;  that  is  to  say,  it  is  in  some  sense  of  the 
word  an  effect,  and  consequently  must  have  a  correspond- 
ing cause ;  but  in  what  sense  does  every  act  of  the  mind 
come  under  the  idea  and  definition  of  an  effect  ?  This 
is  the  question.  Is  it  brought  to  pass  by  the  prior  action 
of  motive?  Is  it  necessitated  ?  Upon  this  precise  ques- 
tion, the  maxim  that  every  change  must  have  a  cause 
can  throw  no  light;  it  only  seems  to  refer  to  this  point, 
by  means  of  the  very  convenient  ambiguity  of  the  terms 
in  which  it  is  expressed.  The  necessitarian  never  fails 
to  avail  himself  of  this  ambiguity.  He  seems  both  to 
himself  and  to  the  spectator  to  be  carrying  on  a  *' great 
demonstration ;"  and  this  is  one  reason,  perhaps,  why 
the  mind  is  diverted  from  the  sophistical  tricks,  the  meta- 
physical jugglery,  by  which  both  are  deceived.     Let  us 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  71 

look  a  little  more  narrowly  at  this  pretended  demonstra- 
tion. 

The  maxim  in  question  is  applied  to  volition ;  every 
change  in  nature,  even  the  voluntary  acts  of  the  mind, 
must  have  a  cause.  Now  according  to  Edwards'  expla- 
nation of  the  term,  this  is  a  proposition  which,  I  will 
venture  to  say,  no  man  in  his  right  mind  ever  ventured 
to  deny.  It  is  true,  that  President  Edwards  tells  us  of 
those,  who  "  imagine  that  a  volition  has  no  cause,  or 
that  it  produces  itself  ;^^  and  he  has  very  well  compared 
this  to  the  absurdity  of  supposing,  *'  that  I  gave  myself 
my  own  being,  or  that  I  came  into  being  without  a 
cause,"  p.  277.  But  who  ever  held  such  a  doctrine  ? 
Did  any  man,  in  his  right  mind,  ever  contend  that  **  a 
volition  could  produce  itself,"  can  arise  out  of  nothing, 
and  bring  itself  into  existence  ?  If  so,  they  were  cer- 
tainly beyond  the  reach  of  logic ;  they  stood  in  need  of 
the  physician.  I  have  never  been  so  unfortunate  as  to 
meet  with  any  advocate  of  free-agency,  either  in  actual 
life  or  in  history,  who  supposed  that  a  volition  arose  out 
of  nothing,  without  any  cause  of  its  existence,  or  that  it 
produced  itself.  They  have  all  maintained,  with  one 
consent,  that  the  mind  is  the  cause  of  volition.  Is  the 
mind  nothing  ?  If  a  man  should  say,  as  so  many  have 
said,  that  the  mind  produces  its  own  volitions,  is  that 
equivalent  to  saying,  that  nothing  produces  it;  that  it 
comes  "  into  being  accidentally,  without  any  cause  of  its 
being?"  Such  is  the  broad  caricature  of  their  doctrine, 
which  is  repeatedly  given  by  President  Edwards. 

It  is  freely  admitted,  and  the  advocates  of  free-agency 
have  always  admitted,  that  volition  has  a  cause,  as  that 
word  is  frequently  used  by  Edwards.  He  tells  us,  that 
by  cause  he  sometimes  means  any  antecedent,  whether  it 


72  EXAMINATION   OF 

exerts  any  positive  influence  or  no.  Now,  in  this  sense, 
it  is  conceded  by  the  advocates  of  free-agency,  that  mo- 
tive itself  is  the  cause  of  vohtion.  This  is  the  question  : 
Is  motive  the  efficient,  or  producing  cause  of  volition  ? 
This  is  the  question,  I  say;  but  Edwards  frequently 
loses  sight  of  it  in  a  mist  of  ambiguities ;  and  he  lays 
around  him  in  the  dark,  with  such  prodigious  strength, 
that  if  his  adversaries  were  not  altogether  imaginary  be- 
ings, and  therefore  impassible  to  his  ponderous  blows,  I 
have  no  doubt  he  would  have  slain  more  of  them  than 
ever  Samson  did  of  the  Philistines. 

The  manner  in  which  the  necessitarian  speak; j  of 
cause  in  his  maxims,  and  reasonings,  and  pretended 
demonstrations,  is  of  very  great  service  to  him.  It  in- 
cludes, as  we  are  told,  every  condition  or  cause  of  voli- 
tion ;  (what  a  heterogeneous  mass  !)  every  thing  without 
which  volition  could  not  come  to  pass.  Yea,  it  is  used 
in  this  sense,  when  it  is  said  that  motive  is  the  cause  of 
volition.  What  shall  we  do,  then,  with  this  broad,  this 
most  ambiguous  proposition  ?  Shall  we  deny  it  ?  If  so, 
then  we  deny  that  volition  has  any  cause  of  its  existence, 
and  fall  into  the  great  absurdity  of  supposing  **  volition 
to  produce  itself."  Shall  we  assent  to  it,  then  ?  If  so, 
we  really  admit  that  motive  is  the  efficient  cause  of  voli- 
tion ;  and  thus,  by  denying,  we  are  made  to  reject  our 
own  doctrine,  while,  by  affirming,  we  are  made  to  re- 
ceive that  of  our  opponents.  This  way  of  proposing 
the  doctrine  of  necessity  very  strongly  reminds  one  of  a 
certain  trick  in  legislation,  by  which  such  things  are 
forced  into  a  bill,  that  in  voting  upon  it,  you  must  either 
reject  what  you  most  earnestly  desire,  or  else  sanction 
and  support  what  you  most  earnestly  detest.  We  should, 
therefore,  neither  affirm  nor  deny  the  whole  proposition 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  73 

as  it  is  set  forth  by  the  necessitarian  ;  we  should  touch  it 
with  the  dissecting  knife,  and  cure  it  of  its  manifold  in- 
firmities. 

The  ambiguity  of  the  term  cause  is,  indeed,  one  of  the 
most  powerful  weapons,  both  of  attack  and  defence,  in 
the  whole  armory  of  the  necessitarian.  Do  you  affirm 
the  mind  to  be  the  cause  of  volition  ?  Then,  forthwith, 
as  if  the  word  could  have  only  one  meaning,  it  is  alleged, 
that  if  the  mind  is  the  cause  of  volition,  it  can  cause  it 
only  by  a  preceding  volition ;  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 
Hence,  your  doctrine  must  needs  be  absurd ;  because  the 
word  is  understood,  yea,  and  will  be  understood,  in  its 
most  restrained  and  narrow  sense.  But  do  you  deny  mo- 
tive to  be  the  cause  of  volition  ?  Then,  how  absurd  are  you 
again  ;  you  are  no  longer  understood  to  use  the  word  in 
the  same  sense  ;  you  now  mean,  not  only  that  motive  is 
not  the  producing  cause  of  volition,  but  that  there  is  ab- 
solutely nothing  upon  which  it  depends  for  its  existence, 
and  that  "  it  produces  itself."  Does  Edwards  affirm  that 
motive  is  the  cause  of  volition;  that  motive  causes  voli- 
tion to  arise  and  come  forth  into  existence  ;  that  it  is  not 
merely  "  the  negative  occasion"  thereof,  but  the  cause  in 
the  most  proper  sense  of  the  word ;  that  it  is  "  the  effectual 
power  which  produces  volition?"  What  then?  Dare 
you  assert,  in  the  face  of  such  teaching,  that  motive  is 
not  the  cause  of  volition  ?  If  so,  then  you  are  a  most 
obstinate  and  perverse  caviller ;  and  you  are  silenced  by 
the  information  that  he  sometimes  uses  the  word  cause 
to  signify  any  antecedent,  whether  it  has  any  positive 
influence  or  no.  Yea,  he  gives  this  information,  he 
declares,  to  "  cut  off  occasion  from  any  that  might  seek 
occasion  to  cavil  and  object  against  his  doctrine,"  p. 
51.  These,  and  many  other  things  of  the  same  kind, 
7* 


74  EXAMINATION   OF 

are  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Day,  and  Edwards, 
and  Collins,  and  Hobbes ;  and  whosoever  may  be  pleased 
to  follow  them,  through  all  the  doublings  and  windings 
of  their  logic,  may  do  so  at  his  leisure.  It  is  sufficient 
for  my  present  purpose  to  remark,  that  Edwards  has  in- 
cluded a  number'  of  different  ideas  in  his  definition  of 
cause ;  and  that  he  turns  from  the  one  to  the  other  of 
these  ideas,  just  as  it  suits  the  exigencies  of  his  argument. 
It  is  in  this  way,  as  we  have  seen,  that  the  famous  maxim, 
that  every  change  in  nature  must  have  a  cause,  has  been 
made  to  serve  his  purpose. 

He  did  not  look  at  a  volition  and  an  effect,  so  as  to 
mark  their  differences  narrowly,  and  to  proceed  in  his 
reasonings  according  to  them  ;  he  set  out  with  the  great 
and  universal  truth,  that  every  change  in  the  universe 
must  have  a  cause ;  from  which  lofty  position  the  differ- 
ences of  things  in  this  nether  world  were  invisible. 
Having  secured  this  position  to  his  entire  satisfaction, 
being  firmly  persuaded  in  his  own  mind,  that  **  nonentity 
could  not  bring  forth,"  he  supposed  he  had  gained  a 
strong  foothold ;  and  from  thence  he  proceeded  to  reason 
downward  to  what  actually  takes  place  in  this  lower 
world  ! 

We  are  but  "  the  humble  servants  and  interpreters  of 
nature,"  and  we  "  can  understand  her  operations  only  in 
so  far  as  we  have  observed  them."  The  necessitarian 
takes  higher  ground  than  this.  He  disdains  the  humble 
and  patient  task  of  observation.  He  plants  his  foot  upon 
an  eternal  and  immutable  axiom ;  and,  turning  away 
from  the  study  of  what  is,  he  magisterially  pronounces 
what  7nust  be. 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  he  constructs  his  system.  Every 
change  in  nature  must  have  a  cause,  says  he ;  this  is  very 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  75 

true  ;  there  is  no  truth  in  the  world  more  certain,  accord- 
ing to  the  sense  in  which  he  frequently  understands  it. 
If  he  means  to  assert,  that  nothing,  whether  it  be  an  entity, 
or  an  attribute,  or  a  mode,  can  bring  itself  into  existence, 
no  one  disputes  his  doctrine.  It  is  most  true,  that  there 
can  be  no  choice  without  a  mind  that  chooses,  or  an  object 
in  view  of  which  it  chooses ;  a  mind,  an  object,  and  a 
desire,  (if  you  please,)  are  the  indispensable  prerequi- 
sites, the  invariable  antecedents,  to  volition  ;  but  there  is 
an  immense  chasm  between  this  position  and  the  doc- 
trine, that  the  mind  cannot  put  forth  a  volition,  unless  it 
is  made  to  do  so  by  the  action  of  something  else  upon  it. 
This  immense  chasm,  the  necessitarian  can  cross  only 
by  stepping  over  from  one  branch  of  his  ambiguous  pro- 
position to  another ;  he  either  does  this,  or  he  does  not 
reach  the  point  in  controversy  at  all. 


76  EXAMINATION    OF 


SECTION  VII. 

OF  THE  APPLICATION  OF  THE  MAXIM  THAT  EVERY   EFFECT 
MUST  HAVE  A  CAUSE. 

In  the  last  section  I  considered  the  application  of  the 
maxim,  "  that  every  effect  must  have  a  cause,"  to  the 
question  of  necessity.  This  maxim  figures  so  largely  in 
every  scheme  of  necessity,  and  it  is  relied  upon  with  so 
much  confidence,  that  I  shall  present  some  further  views 
respecting  its  true  nature  and  application.  The  neces- 
sitarian may  see  the  truth  of  this  maxim  clearly,  but  he 
applies  it  vaguely. 

He  is  always  saying,  "  that  if  we  give  up  this  great 
principle  of  common  sense,  then  there  is  no  reasoning 
from  effect  to  cause;  and  we  cannot  prove  the'existence 
of  a  God."  Now  I  propose  to  show  that  we  need  not 
give  up  "  this  great  principle  of  common  sense ;"  that  we 
may  continue  to  reason  from  effect  to  cause,  and  so  reach 
the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  God,  by  one  of  the  most 
incontrovertible  of  all  our  mental  processes ;  and  yet  we 
may,  with  perfect  consistency,  refuse  to  apply  the  maxim 
in  question  to  human  actions  or  volitions.  In  other 
words,  that  we  may  freely  admit  the  principle  in  ques- 
tion, and  yet  reject  the  application  which  the  necessi- 
tarian is  accustomed  to  make  of  it. 

In  order  to  do  this  in  a  perspicuous  and  satisfactory 
manner,  let  us  consider  the  occasion  on  which  we  first 
became  acquainted  with  the  truth  of  the  principle,  that 
every  effect  must  have  a  cause.     Let  us  consider  the  cir- 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  ^^7 

cumstances  under  which  it  is  first  suggested  to  the  mind. 
Whence,  then,  do  we  derive  the  ideas  of  cause  and  effect, 
and  of  the  necessary  connection  between  them? 

Locke,  it  is  well  known,  supposed  that  we  might  de- 
rive the  idea  of  causation  by  reflecting  on  the  changes 
which  take  place  in  the  external  world.  The  fallacy  of 
this  supposition  has  been  fully  shown  by  Hume,  and 
Brown,  and  Consin.  In  the  refutation  of  Locke's  no- 
tion, these  celebrated  philosophers  were  undoubtedly 
right ;  but  the  two  first  were  wrong  in  the  conclusion 
that  we  have  no  idea  of  power  at  all.  Because  the  ideas 
of  power  and  causation  are  not  suggested  by  the  changes 
of  the  material  world,  it  does  not  follow  that  we  have  no 
such  ideas  in  reality ;  that  the  only  notion  we  have  of 
causation  is  that  of  an  invariable  antecedence. 

The  only  way  in  which  the  mind  ever  comes  to  be 
furnished  with  the  ideas  of  cause  and  effect  at  all  is  this : 
we  are  conscious  that  we  will  a  certain  motion  in  the 
body,  and  we  discover  that  the  motion  follows  the  voli- 
tion. It  is  this  act  of  the  mind,  this  exertion  of  the  will, 
that  gives  us  the  idea  of  a  cause ;  and  the  change  which 
it  produces  in  the  body,  is  that  from  which  we  derive 
the  idea  of  an  effect.  If  we  had  never  experienced  a 
volition,  we  should  never  have  formed  the  idea  of  causa- 
tion. The  idea  of  positive  efficiency,  or  active  power, 
would  never  have  entered  into  our  minds. 

The  two  terms  of  the  sequence,  with  which  we  are 
thus  furnished  by  an  actual  experience,  is  an  act  of  the 
mind,  or  a  volition,  on  the  one  hand,  which  we  call  an 
efficient  cause ;  and  a  modification  or  change  in  inert, 
passive  matter,  on  the  other,  which  we  call  an  effect. 
It  is  easy  to  see  how  we  rise  from  this  single  experience 
to  the  universal  maxim  in  question.     We  are  so  made 


78  EXAMINATION   OF 

and  constituted,  by  the  Author  of  our  nature,  that  we 
eannot  help  believing  in  the  uniformity  of  nature's  laws, 
or  sequences.  Hence,  whenever  we  see  either  term  of 
the  above  sequence,  we  are  necessarily  compelled,  by  a 
fundamental  law  of  belief,  to  infer  the  existence  of  the 
other. 

This  fundamental  law  of  belief,  by  which  we  repose 
the  most  implicit  confidence  in  the  uniformity  of  nature's 
sequences,  has  been  recognized  by  many  distinguished 
writers  in  modern  times.  It  is  well  stated  and  illustrated 
by  Dr.  Chalmers.  "  The  doctrine  of  innate  ideas  in  the 
mind,"  says  he,  "is  wholly  different  from  the  doctrine 
of  innate  tendencies  in  the  mind — which  tendencies  may 
lie  undeveloped  till  the  excitement  of  some  occasion 
have  manifested  or  brought  them  forth.  In  a  newly- 
formed  mind,  there  is  no  idea  of  nature,  or  of  a  single 
object  in  nature  ;  yet,  no  sooner  is  an  object  presented, 
or  is  an  event  observed  to  happen,  than  there  is  elicited 
the  tendency  of  the  mind  to  presume  on  the  constancy  of 
nature.  At  least  as  far  back  as  our  observation  extends, 
the  law  of  the  mind  is  in  full  operation.  Let  an  infant, 
for  the  first  time  in  his  life,  strike  on  the  table  with  a 
spoon;  and,  pleased  with  the  noise,  it  will  repeat  that 
stroke  with  every  appearance  of  a  confident  expectation 
that  the  noise  will  be  repeated  also.  It  counts  on  the 
invariableness  wherewith  the  same  consequent  will  fol- 
low the  same  antecedent.  In  the  language  of  Dr.  Tho- 
mas Brown,  these  two  terms  make  up  a  sequence,  and 
there  seems  to  exist  in  the  spirit  of  man  not  an  underived, 
but  an  aboriginal  faith  in  the  uniformity  of  nature's  se- 
quences."— Nat.  Theo.  p.  121. 

Now,  the  two  terms  which  we  find  connected  in  the 
case  before  us,  is  an  act  of  the  mind,  and  a  change  or 


EDWARDS  ON  THE   WILL.  79 

modification  of  the  body.  The  volition  is  the  antecedent, 
and  the  motion  of  body  is  the  consequent.  And  these 
two,  by  virtue  of  the  law  of  belief  above  stated,  we  shall 
always  expect  to  find  conjoined.  Wherever  we  dis- 
cover a  change  or  modification,  for  example,  in  the  cor- 
poreal system  of  any  other  person,  similar  to  that  which 
results  from  our  own  volitions,  we  shall  necessarily 
infer  the  existence  of  a  prior  act  by  which  it  was  pro- 
duced. 

Hence,  when  we  witness  a  change  in  the  world  oj 
matter,  we  are  authorized  to  apply  the  maxim  we  have 
derived  in  the  manner  above  explained.  We  have  really 
no  idea  of  an  efficient  cause,  except  that  which  we  have 
derived  from  the  phenomena  of  action.  Hence,  if  we 
would  not  suflfer  ourselves  to  be  imposed  upon  by  words 
without  meaning,  when  we  see  any  change  or  effect  in 
the  material  world,  we  should  conclude  that  it  proceeds 
from  an  action  of  spirit.  When  we  see  the  same  conse- 
quent, we  should  infer  the  existence  of  the  same  ante- 
cedent; and  not  suffer  our  minds  to  be  confused  and 
misled  by  the  manifold  ambiguities  of  language,  as  well 
as  by  the  innumerable  illusions  of  the  fancy.  Wherever 
we  see  a  change  in  matter,  we  should  infer  an  act  by 
which  it  is  produced ;  and  thus,  through  all  the  changes 
and  modifications  of  the  material  universe,  we  shall  be- 
hold the  sublime  manifestations  of  an  ever-present  and 
all-pervading  agency  of  spirit. 

By  a  similar  process,  we  are  made  acquainted  with 
the  existence  of  an  intelligent  and  designing  First  Cause, 
We  learn  the  connection  between  the  adaptation  of  means 
to  an  end,  and  the  operations  of  a  designing  mind,  by 
reflecting  on  what  passes  within  ourselves  when  we  plan 
and  execute  a  work  of  skill  and  contrivance.     And,  as 


80  EXAMINATION   OF 

we  are  so  made  as  to  rely  with  implicit  confidence  on 
the  uniformity  of  nature's  sequences ;  so,  without  further 
experience  or  induction,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  con- 
ceive of  any  contrivance  whatever,  without  conceiving 
of  it  as  proceeding  from  the  hand  of  a  contriver.  Thus, 
we  necessarily  rise  from  the  innumerable  and  wonderful 
contrivances  in  nature,  to  a  belief  in  the  existence  of  an 
intelligent  and  designing  mind.  In  like  manner  may  we 
establish  the  other  attributes  of  God. 

But  to  return  to  our  maxim.  We  can  only  infer,  from 
a  change  or  modification  in  matter,  the  existence  of  an 
act  by  which  it  is  produced.  The  former  is  the  only 
idea  we  have  of  an  eflfect ;  the  latter  is  the  only  idea  we 
have  of  an  efficient  cause.  Hence,  in  reasoning  from 
effect  to  cause,  we  can  only  reason  from  a  change  or 
modification  in  matter,  or  in  that  what  is  passive,  to  the 
act  of  some  active  power.  This  lays  a  sufficient  foun- 
dation on  which  to  rest  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  God, 
as  well  as  the  existence  of  other  minds. 

But  the  case  is  very  different  when  we  turn  from  the 
contemplation  of  a  passive  result  to  consider  an  efficient 
caw5C— -when  we  turn  from  the  motion  of  body  to  con- 
sider the  activity  of  mind.  In  such  a  case,  the  conse- 
quent ceases  to  be  the  same ;  and  hence  we  have  no 
right  to  infer  that  the  antecedent  is  the  same.  We  are 
conscious  of  an  act ;  we  perceive  that  it  is  followed  by  a 
change  in  the  outward  world ;  and  henceforth,  whenever 
we  observe  another  change  in  the  outward  world,  we  are 
compelled  to  ascribe  it,  also,  to  a  similar  cause.  This 
conviction  results  from  the  constitution  of  our  minds — 
from  a  fundamental  law  of  belief.  But  when  we  con- 
template, not  a  change  in  the  outward  world,  in  that 
which  is  passive,  but  an  act  of  the  mind  itself,  the  case 


EDWARDS   ON   THE   WILL.  81 

is  entirely  different.  We  have  some  experience  that 
certain  changes  in  matter  are  the  results  of  certain  acts; 
and  hence,  whenever  we  observe  similar  phenomena, 
we  are  under  a  necessity  of  our  nature  to  refer  them  to 
similar  causes.  We  merely  rely  upon  our  veritable  be- 
lief in  the  uniformity  of  nature's  sequences,  without  a 
reliance  upon  which  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  rea- 
soning, when  we  ascend  from  the  changes  in  the  out- 
ward world  to  a  belief  in  the  agency  of  an  efficient 
Cause.  But  we  have  no  experience  that  an  act  of  the 
mind  is  produced  by  a  preceding  act  of  the  mind,  or  by 
the  prior  action  of  any  thing  else.  President  Edwards 
himself  admits  that  our  experience  is  silent  on  this  sub- 
ject. And  hence,  when  we  witness  an  act  of  the  mind, 
or  when  we  are  conscious  of  a  volition,  our  instinctive 
belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature's  sequences  does  not 
require  us  to  believe  that  it  has  an  efficient  cause ;  or,  in 
other  words,  that  it  is  produced  by  the  prior  action  of 
something  else,  as  the  motion  of  body  is  produced  by  a 
prior  act  of  mind.  A  change  in  body  necessarily  im- 
plies the  prior  action  of  something  else  by  which  it  is 
produced  ;  an  act  of  mind  only  implies  the  existence  of 
an  agent  that  is  capable  of  acting.  Wherever  an  act 
exists,  we  must  believe  that  there  is  a  soul,  or  mind,  or 
agent,  that  is  capable  of  acting.  We  need  not  suppose 
that,  like  a  change  in  body,  it  is  brought  to  pass  by  a 
prior  act.  In  other  words,  a  change  in  that  which  is  by 
nature  passive,  necessarily  implies  an  act  by  which  it  is 
produced.  But  an  act  of  the  mind  itself,  which  is  not 
passive,  does  not  likewise  imply  a  preceding  act  by 
which  it  is  produced.  //  only  implies  the  existence  of 
an  agent  that  is  capable  of  acting,  and  the  circum- 
8 


82  EXAMINATION    OF 

stances    necessary  to  action  as  conditions,  not  as 
causes. 

Herein,  then,  lies  the  error  of  the  necessitarian.  He 
discovers  from  experience  the  connection  between  an  act 
and  a  corresponding  motion  ;  and  his  instinctive  belief 
in  the  uniformity  of  nature's  sequences  authorizes  him 
to  extend  this  connection  to  all  sequences  where  the  two 
terms  are  the  same.  That  is  to  say,  wherever  he  disco- 
vers a  change  in  body,  he  is  authorized  to  infer  the  ex- 
istence of  a  prior  act  by  which  it  was  produced.  But 
he  does  not  confine  himself  to  this  sequence  alone.  He 
does  not  rest  satisfied  with  the  universal  principle,  that 
every  change  in  body,  or  in  that  which  is  passive,  must 
proceed  from  the  prior  action  of  something  else.  He 
makes  a  most  unwarrantable  extension  of  this  principle. 
He  supposes,  not  only  that  every  change  in  body,  but 
also  that  every  act  of  mind,  must  proceed  from  the  prior 
action  of  something  else.  Thus  he  confounds  passion 
and  action.  He  takes  it  for  granted  that  a  volition  is  an 
(effect — an  effect  in  such  a  sense  that  it  cannot  proceed 
from  the  mind,  unless  it  be  produced  by  the  prior  act 
thereof.  He  asserts  that  "  the  mind  cannot  be  the  cause 
of  such  an  effect,"  of  a  volition,  "  except  by  the  pre- 
ceding action  of  the  mind."  Thus,  in  rising  from  a 
single  experience  to  a  universal  maxim,  by  virtue  of  our 
belief  in  the  uniformity  of  nature's  laws,  he  does  not 
confine  himself  to  the  observed  sequences ;  he  does  not 
keep  his  attention  steadily  fixed  on  a  change  in  body 
as  the  consequent,  and  on  an  act  as  the  invariable  ante- 
cedent. On  the  contrary,  from  the  exceedingly  abstruse 
and  subtle  nature  of  the  subject,  as  well  as  from  the  am- 
biguity of  language,  he  treats  a  volition  as  a  consequent, 
which  implies  the  same  kind  of  antecedent  as  does  a 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  88 

change  in  body.  Thus,  by  this  unwarrantable  extension 
or  application  of  his  principle,  he  confounds  the  motion 
of  body  with  the  action  of  spirit ;  than  which  there 
could  hardly  be  a  more  unphilosophical  confusion  of 
ideas. 

From  the  foregoing  remarks,  it  will  be  perceived,  as 
I  have  already  said,  that  the  question  is  not,  whether 
every  effect  must  have  a  cause.  This  is  conceded.  We 
do  not  give  up  '*  this  great  principle  of  common  sense." 
We  insist  upon  it  as  firmly  as  do  our  adversaries  ;  and 
hence,  we  have  as  strong  a  foundation  whereon  to  rest 
our  belief  in  the  being  of  a  God.  But  the  question  is, 
ivhether  every  cause  is  an  effect  ?  Or,  in  other  words, 
whether  an  act  of  mind  can  exist  without  being  produced 
by  the  prior  action  of  something  else ;  just  as  the  motion 
of  body  is  produced  by  the  prior  action  of  mind?  We 
say  that  it  can  exist  without  any  such  producing  cause. 

If  it  were  otherwise,  if  every  cause  were  an  effect  in 
the  sense  in  which  a  volition  is  assumed  to  be  an  effect 
by  the  necessitarian,  what  would  be  the  consequence  ? 
It  is  evident,  that  each  and  every  cause  in  the  universe 
must  itself  have  a  cause — must  itself  result  from  the  pre- 
ceding action  of  something  else ;  and  thus  we  should  be 
involved  in  the  great  absurdity  of  an  infinite  series  of 
causes,  as  well  as  in  the  iron  scheme  of  an  all-pervading 
necessity.  But,  happily,  there  is  nothing  in  our  expe- 
rience, nor  in  any  law  of  our  nature,  nor  in  both  toge- 
ther, which  requires  us  to  believe  that  a  volition  is  an 
eflfect  in  any  such  sense  of  the  word.  Call  it  an  effect, 
if  you  please ;  but  then  it  must  be  conceded  that  it  is 
not,  like  the  motion  of  body,  such  a  consequent  as  ne- 
cessarily requires  the  prior  action  of  something  else  for 
its  production. 


84  EXAMINATION    OF 

Every  effect  must  have  a  cause,  it  is  true;  but  it  is 
purely  a  gratuitous  assumption — a  mere  petitio  prin- 
cipii,  to  take  it  for  granted  that  a  volition  is  an  effect  in 
the  sense  in  which  the  word  should  always  be  under- 
stood in  this  celebrated  maxim.  This  maxim  is  un- 
doubtedly true,  as  we  have  seen,  when  applied  to  the 
changes  of  that  which  cannot  act:  it  is  in  reference  to 
such  effects,  or  consequents,  that  the  conviction  of  its 
truth  is  first  suggested  ;  and  we  cannot  doubt  of  the  pro- 
priety of  its  application  to  all  such  effects,  unless  we  can 
doubt  of  the  uniformity  of  nature's  sequences.  But  when 
we  go  over  from  the  region  of  inert,  passive  matter,  into 
that  which  is  full  af  spiritual  vigour  and  unceasing  ac- 
tivity, and  apply  this  maxim  here  in  all  its  rigour,  we  do 
make  a  most  unwarrantable  extension  of  it.  We  per- 
vert it  from  its  true  meaning  alrf  import ;  we  identify 
volition  with  local  'motion  ;  we  involve  ourselves  in  the 
greatest  of  all  absurdities,  as  well  as  in  the  most  ruinous 
of  all  doctrines. 

As  we  have  already  said,  then,  we  do  not  give  up  the 
great  principle  of  common  sense,  that  every  effect  must 
have  a  cause.  We  recognize  this  principle  when  we 
reason  from  effect  to  cause — when  we  ascend  from  the 
creation  up  to  the  Creator.  We  deny  that  volition  is  an 
effect;  and  what  then ?  If  volition  be  not  an  effect,  are 
there  no  effects  in  the  universe?  Are  we  sunk  in  utter 
darkness  ?  Have  we  no  platform  left  whereon  to  stand, 
and  to  behold  the  glory  of  God,  our  Creator  and  Pre- 
server ?  Surely  we  have.  Every  change  throughout 
inanimate  nature  bespeaks  the  agency  of  Him,  who  "  sits 
concealed  behind  his  own  creation,"  but  is  everywhere 
manifested  by  his  omnipresent  energy.  The  human 
body  is  an  effect,  teeming  with  evidences  of  the  most 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  85 

wonderful  skill  of  its  Great  Cause  and  Contriver.  The 
soul  itself  is  an  effect, — the  soul,  with  all  its  complicated 
and  wonder-working  powers,  is  an  effect ;  and  clearly 
proclaims  the  wisdom,  and  the  goodness,  and  the  holiness 
of  its  Maker.  The  heavens  above  us,  with  all  its  shining 
hosts  and  admirable  mechanism,  proclaims  the  glory  of 
God;  and  the  whole  universe  of  created  intelligences 
shout  for  joy,  as  they  respond  in  their  eternal  anthems 
to  the  **  music  of  the  spheres."  And  is  not  this  enough  ? 
Is  the  whole  psaltery  of  heaven  and  earth  marred,  and 
all  its  sweet  harmony  turned  into  harsh  discord,  if  we 
only  dare  to  assert  that  an  act  is  not  an  effect  ?  No,  no : 
this  too  proclaims  the  glory  of  God  ;  for,  however  great 
may  be  the  mystery,  it  only  shows  that  the  Almighty 
has  called  into  existence  innumerable  creatures,  bearing 
the  impress  of  his  own  glorious  image,  and  that,  in  con- 
sequence thereof,  they  are  capable  of  acting  without 
being  compelled  to  act. 

It  is  the  position  of  Edwards,  and  not  ours,  that  would 
disprove  the  existence  of  a  God.  We  believe  in  action 
which  is  uncaused  by  any  prior  action ;  and  hence,  we 
can  reason  from  effects  up  to  Cause,  and  there  find  a 
resting-place.  We  do  not  look  beyond  that  which  is 
uncaused.  We  believe  there  is  action  somewhere,  un- 
caused by  preceding  action ;  and  if  we  did  not  believe 
this,  we  should  be  constrained  to  adopt  the  doctrine  of 
Edwards,  that  action  itself  must  be  caused  "  by  the  ac- 
tion of  something  else,"  p.  203  ;  which  necessarily  lands 
ns  in  an  infinite  series  of  causes ;  the  very  ground  occu- 
pied by  Atheists  in  all  ages  of  the  world.  It  is  well, 
therefore,  to  hold  on  to  "  this  great  principle  of  common 
sense,  that  every  effect  must  have  a  cause,"  in  order  that 
we  may  rise  from  the  world  and  its  innumerable  wonders 
8* 


86  EXAMINATION   OF 

to  the  contemplation  of  the  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness 
of  God  :  it  is  also  well  that  we  should  hold  it  with  a  dis- 
tinction, and  not  apply  it  to  action,  in  order  that  we  may 
not  be  forced  beyond  the  Great  First  Cause — the  central 
light  of  the  Universe,  into  the  "  outer  darkness"  of  the 
old  atheistic  scheme  of  an  infinite  series  of  causes.  If 
we  give  up  this  principle,  we  cannot  prove  the  existence 
of  a  God,  it  is  most  true  ;  but  yet,  if  we  apply  this  prin- 
ciple as  Edwards  applies  it,  we  are  irresistibly  launched 
upon  an  infinite  series  of  causes,  and  compelled  to  shoot 
entirely  beyond  the  belief  of  a  God.  "We  quarrel  not, 
therefore,  with  his  great  principle ;  but  we  utterly  reject 
his  application  of  it,  as  leading  directly  to  Atheism. 


"^    r  ""  EDWARDS    ON    THE    WILL.  87 


D^' 


SECTION  VIII. 

OF  THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  THE  FEELINGS  AND  THE 
WILL. 

It  is  well  known  that  Edwards  confounds  the  sensi- 
tive part  of  our  nature  with  the  will,  the  susceptibility 
by  which  the  mind  feels  with  the  power  by  which  it 
acts.  He  expressly  declares,  that  '*  the  affections  and 
the  will  are  not  two  faculties  of  the  soul ;"  and  it  is  upon 
this  confusion  of  things  that  much  of  his  argument  de- 
pends for  its  coherency. 

But  although  he  thus  expressly  confounds  them  ;  yet 
he  frequently  speaks  of  them,  in  the  course  of  his  argu- 
ment, as  if  they  were  two  different  faculties  of  the  soul. 
Thus,  he  frequently  asserts  that  the  will  is  determined 
by  "the  strongest  appetite,"  by  "the  strongest  disposi- 
tion," by  "the  strongest  inclination."  Now,  in  these 
expressions,  he  evidently  means  to  distinguish  appetite, 
inclination,  and  disposition,  from  the  will ;  and  if  he  does 
not,  then  he  asserts,  that  the  will  is  determined  by  itself, 
a  doctrine  which  he  utterly  repudiates. 

The  soundness  of  much  of  his  argument  depends,  as 
I  have  said,  upon  the  confusion  or  the  identification  of 
these  two  properties  of  the  mind  ;  the  soundness  of  much 
of  it  also  depends  upon  the  fact  that  they  are  not  identi- 
cal, but  distinct.  From  a  great  number  of  similar  pas- 
sages, we  may  select  the  following,  as  an  illustration  of 
the  justness  of  this  remark:  "Moral  necessity,"  says 
he,  "  may  be  as  absolute,  as  natural  necessity.   That  is, 


S8  EXAMINATION  OF 

the  effect  may  be  as  powerfully  connected  with  its  moral 
cause,  as  a  natural  necessary  effect  is  with  its  natural 
cause.  Whether  the  will  in  every  case  is  necessarily 
determined  by  the  strongest  motive,  or  whether  the  will 
ever  makes  any  resistance  to  such  a  motive,  or  can  ever 
oppose  the  strongest  present  inclination,  or  not ;  if  that 
matter  should  be  controverted,  yet  I  suppose  none  will 
deny,  but  that,  in  some  cases,  a  previous  bias,  or  incli 
nation,  or  the  motive  presented,  may  be  so  powerful, 

THAT  THE  ACT  OF  THE  WILL  MAY  BE  CERTAINLY  AND  IN- 
DISSOLUBLY  CONNECTED  THEREWITH.       When  mOtivCS  OF 

previous  bias  are  very  strong,  all  will  allow  that  there  is 
some  difficulty  in  going  against  them.  And  if  they  were 
yet  stronger,  the  difficulty  would  be  still  greater.  And, 
therefore,  if  more  be  still  added  to  their  strength,  to  a 
certain  degree,  it  would  make  the  difficulty  so  great,  that 
it  would  be  wholly  Impossible  to  surmount  it ;  for  this 
plain  reason,  because  whatever  power  men  may  be  sup- 
posed to  have  to  surmount  difficulties,  yet  that  power  is 
not  infinite ;  and  so  goes  not  beyond  certain  limits.  If  a 
man  can  surmount  ten  degrees  of  difficulty  of  this  kind 
with  twenty  degrees  of  strength,  because  the  degrees  of 
strength  are  beyond  the  degrees  of  difficulty ;  yet  if  the 
difficulty  be  increased  to  thirty,  or  an  hundred,  or  a  thou- 
sand degrees,  and  his  strength  not  also  increased,  his 
strength  will  be  wholly  insufficient  to  surmount  the  dif- 
ficulty. As,  therefore,  it  must  be  allowed,  that  there 
may  be  such  a  thing  as  a  sure  and  perfect  connexion 
between  moral  causes  and  effects  ;  so  this  only  is  what  I 
call  by  the  name  of  moral  necessity,''^ 

Now  he  here  speaks  of  inclination  and  previous  bias, 
as  elsewhere  of  appetite  and  disposition,  as  distinct  from 
volition.     In  this  he  is  right ;  even  the  necessitarian  will 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  89 

not,  at  the  present  day,  deny  that  our  desires,  affections, 
&c.,  are  different  from  volition.  "Between  motive 
and  volition,"  says  President  Day,  '*  there  must  inter- 
vene an  apprehension  of  the  object,  and  consequent  feel' 
ing  excited  in  the  mind.'*''  Thus,  according  to  Presi- 
dent Day,  feeling  is  not  volition;  it  intervenes  between 
the  external  object  and  volition.  But  although  Edwards 
is  right  in  this ;  there  is  one  thing  in  which  he  is  wrong. 
He  is  wrong  in  supposing  that  our  feelings  possess  a  real 
strength,  by  which  they  act  upon  and  control  the  will. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  coherency  and  force  of  the  above 
passage  depends  on  the  idea,  that  there  is  a  real  power 
in  the  strongest  inclination  or  desire  of  the  mind,  which 
renders  it  difficult  to  be  surmounted  or  overcome.  For 
if  we  suppose,  that  our  inclinations  or  desires  are  merely 
the  occasions  on  which  we  act,  and  that  they  themselves 
exert  no  influence  or  efficiency  in  the  production  of  our 
volitions,  it  would  be  absurd  to  speak  of  the  difficulty  of 
overcoming  them,  as  well  as  to  speak  of  this  difficulty  as 
increasing  with  the  increasing  strength  of  the  inclination, 
or  desire.  Take  away  this  idea,  show  that  there  is  no 
real  strength  in  motives,  or  desires  and  inclinations,  and 
the  above  extract  will  lose  all  its  force ;  it  will  fall  to 
pieces  of  itself. 

Indeed,  the  idea  or  supposition  in  question,  is  one  of 
the  strongholds  of  the  necessitarian.  External  objects 
are  regarded  as  the  efficient  causes  of  desire ;  desire  as 
the  efficient  cause  of  volition  ;  and  in  this  way,  the  whole 
question  seems  to  be  settled.  The  same  result  would 
follow,  if  we  should  suppose  that  desire  is  awakened  not 
exclusively  by  external  objects,  but  partly  by  that  which 
is  external,  and  partly  by  that  which  is  internal.  On  this 
supposition,  as  well  as  on  the  former,  the  will  would  seem 


90  EXAMINATION   OF 

to  be  under  the  dominion  of  the  strongest  desire  or  incli- 
nation of  the  soul. 

The  assumption,  that  there  is  a  real  efficiency  exerted 
by  the  desires  and  inclinations  of  the  soul,  has  been,  so 
far  as  I  know,  universally  conceded  to  the  necessitarian. 
He  seems  to  have  been  left  in  the  undisputed  possession  of 
this  stronghold  ;  and  yet,  upon  mature  reflection,  I  think 
we  may  find  some  reason  to  call  it  in  question.  If  I  am 
not  greatly  mistaken,  we  may  see  that  the  necessitarian 
has  some  reason  to  abate  the  loftiness  of  his  tone,  when 
he  asserts,  that  "  we  know  that  the  feelings  do  exert  an 
influence  in  the  production  of  volition."  This  may  ap- 
pear very  evident  to  his  mind ;  nay,  at  first  view,  it  may 
appear  very  evident  to  all  minds ;  and  yet,  after  all,  it 
may  be  only  an  "  idol  of  the  tribe." 

It  is  a  commonly  received  opinion,  among  philoso- 
phers, that  the  passions,  desires,  &c.,  do  really  exert  an 
influence  to  produce  volition.  This  was  evidently  the 
idea  of  Burlamaqui.  He  draws  a  distinction  between 
voluntary  actions  and  free  actions ;  and  as  an  instance  of 
a  voluntary  action  which  is  not  free,  he  cites  the  case  of 
a  man  who,  as  he  supposes,  is  constrained  to  act  from 
fear.  He  supposes  that  such  an  action,  though  volun- 
tary, is  not  free,  because  it  is  brought  about  by  the  irre- 
sistible influence  of  the  passion  of  fear. 

It  is  believed,  also,  by  the  disciples  of  Butler,  that 
there  is  a  real  strength  possessed  by  what  are  called  the 
"  active  powers"  of  the  mind.  "  This  distinction,"  says 
Dr.  Chalmers,  *'  made  by  the  sagacious  Butler  between 
the  power  of  a  principle  and  its  authority,  enables  us  in 
the  midst  of  all  the  actual  anomalies  and  disorders  of  our 
state,  to  form  a  precise  estimate  of  the  place  which  con- 
science naturally  and  rightly  holds  in  man's  constitution. 


EDWARDS  ON  THE    WILL.  91 

The  desire  of  acting  virtuously,  which  is  a  desire  conse- 
quent on  our  sense  of  right  and  wrong,  may  not  be  of 
equal  strength  with  the  desire  of  some  criminal  indul- 
gence, and  so,  practically,  the  evil  may  predominate  over 
the  good.  And  thus  it  is  that  the  system  of  the  inner 
man,  from  the  weakness  of  that  which  claims  to  be  the 
ascendant  principle  of  our  nature,  may  be  thrown  into  a 
state  of  turbulence  and  disorder."— Nat.  The.  p.  313. 

Such  was  the  idea  of  Butler  himself.  He  frequently 
speaks  of  the  supremacy  of  conscience,  in  terms  such  as 
the  following :  "  That  principle  by  which  we  survey, 
and  either  approve  or  disapprove,  our  heart,  temper,  and 
actions,  is  not  only  to  be  considered  as  what  in  its  turn 
is  to  have  some  influence,  which  may  be  said  of  every 
passion,  of  the  basest  appetite ;  but  likewise  as  being 
superior ;  as  from  its  very  nature  manifestly  claiming 
superiority  over  all  others ;  insomuch  that  you  cannot 
form  a  notion  of  this  faculty  conscience,  without  taking 
in  judgment,  direction,  and  superintendency.  This  is  a 
constituent  part  of  the  idea,  that  is  of  the  faculty  itself; 
and  to  preside  and  govern,  from  the  very  economy  and 
constitution  of  man,  belongs  to  it.  Had  it  might,  as  it 
has  right ;  had  it  power y  as  it  has  manifest  authority ;  it 
would  absolutely  govern  the  world." 

This  language,  it  should  be  observed,  is  not  used  in  a 
metaphorical  sense ;  it  occurs  in  the  statement  of  a  philo- 
sophical theory  of  human  nature.  Similar  language  is 
frequently  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  the  most  en- 
lightened advocates  of  free-agency.  Thus,  says  Jouffroy, 
even  while  he  is  contending  against  the  doctrine  of  neces- 
sity :  "  There  are  two  kinds  of  moving  powers  acting 
upon  us  ;  first,  the  impulses  of  instinct,  or  passion  ;  and, 
secondly,  the  conceptions  of  reason That  these 


03  EXAMINATION   OF 

two  kinds  of  moving  powers  can  and  do  act  efficiently 
upon  our  volitions,  there  can  be  no  doubt,"  p.  102.  If  it 
were  necessary,  it  might  be  shown,  by  hundreds  of  ex- 
tracts from  their  writings,  that  the  great  advocates  of 
free-agency  have  held,  that  the  emotions,  desires,  and 
passions,  do  really  act  on  the  will,  and  tend  to  produce 
volitions. 

But  why  dwell  upon  particular  instances?  If  any 
advocate  of  free-agency  had  really  believed,  that  the  pas- 
sions, desires,  affections,  &;c.,  exert  no  influence  over 
the  will,  is  it  not  certain  that  he  would  have  availed  hinj- 
self  of  this  principle  ?  If  the  principle  that  no  desire,  or 
affection,  or  passion,  is  possessed  of  any  power  or  causal 
influence,  had  been  adopted  by  the  advocates  of  free- 
agency,  its  bearing  in  favour  of  their  cause  would  have 
been  too  obvious  and  too  important  to  have  been  over- 
looked. The  necessitarian  might  have  supposed,  if  he 
had  pleased,  that  our  desires  and  affections  are  produced 
by  the  action  of  external  objects ;  and  yet,  on  the  suppo- 
sition that  these  exerted  no  positive  or  causal  influence, 
the  doctrine  of  liberty  might  have  been  most  successfully 
maintained.  For,  after  all,  the  desires  and  affections 
thus  produced  in  the  mind,  would  not,  on  the  supposi- 
tion in  question,  be  the  causes  of  our  volitions.  They 
would  merely  be  the  occasions  on  which  we  act.  There 
would  be  no  necessary  connexion  between  what  are 
called  motives  and  their  corresponding  actions.  Our 
desires  or  emotions  might  be  under  the  influence  and 
dominion  of  external  causes,  or  of  causes  that  are  partly 
external  and  partly  internal ;  but  yet  our  volitions  would 
be  perfectly  free  from  all  preceding  influences  whatever. 
Our  volitions  might  depend  on  certain  conditions,  it  is 
true,  such  as  the  possession  of  certain  desires  or  affec- 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  9S 

tions ;  but  they  would  not  result  from  the  influence  or 
action  of  them.  They  would  be  absolutely  free  and  un- 
controlled. The  reason  why  this  principle  has  not  been 
employed  by  the  advocates  of  free-agency  is,  I  humbly 
conceive,  because  it  has  not  been  entertained  by  them. 

In  short,  if  the  advocates  of  free-agency  had  shaken  off 
the  common  illusion  that  there  is  a  real  efficiency,  or 
causal  influence,  exerted  by  the  desires  of  the  soul,  they 
would  have  made  it  known  in  the  most  explicit  and  une- 
quivocal terms.  Instead  of  resorting  to  the  expedients 
they  have  adopted,  in  order  to  surmount  the  difficulties 
by  which  they  have  been  surrounded,  they  would,  every 
where  and  on  all  occasions,  have  reminded  their  adver- 
saries that  those  difficulties  arise  merely  from  ascribing 
a  literal  signification  to  language,  which  is  only  true  in 
a  metaphorical  sense  ;  and  we  should  have  had  pages,  not 
to  say  volumes,  concerning  this  use  of  language,  where 
we  have  not  had  a  syllable. 

If  the  illusion  in  question  has  been  as  general  as  I 
have  supposed,  it  is  not  difficult  to  account  for  its  preva- 
lence. The  fact  that  a  desire,  or  affection  is  the  indis- 
pensable condition,  the  invariable  antecedent,  of  an  act 
of  the  will,  is  of  itself  sufficient  to  account  for  the  preva- 
lence of  such  a  notion.  Nothing  is  more  common  than 
for  men  to  mistake  an  invariable  antecedent  for  an  effi- 
cient cause.  This  source  of  error,  it  is  well  known,  has 
given  rise  to  some  of  the  most  obstinate  delusions  that 
have  ever  infested  and  enslaved  the  human  mind. 

And  besides,  when  such  an  error  or  illusion  prevails, 

its  hold  upon  the  mind  is  confirmed  and  rendered  almost 

invincible  by  the  circumstance,  that  it  is  interwoven  into 

the  structure  of  all  our  language.     In  this  case  in  par- 

9 


94  EXAMINATION   OF 

ticular,  we  never  cease  to  speak  of  "  the  active  princi- 
ples," of  "  the  ruling  passion,"  of  *'  ungovernable  de- 
sire," of"  the  dominion  of  lust,"  of  being  *'  enslaved  to 
a  vicious  propensity ;" — in  a  thousand  ways,  the  idea  that 
there  is  a  real  efficiency  in  the  desires  and  affections  of 
the  soul,  is  wrought  into  the  structure  of  our  language ; 
and  hence,  there  is  no  wonder  that  it  has  gained  such  an 
ascendency  over  our  thoughts.  It  has  met  us  at  every 
turn  ;  it  has  presented  itself  to  us  in  a  thousand  shapes  ; 
it  has  become  so  familiar,  that  we  have  not  even  stopped 
to  inquire  into  its  true  nature.  Its  dominion  has  become 
complete  and  secure,  just  because  its  truth  has  never 
been  doubted. 

The  illusion  in  question,  if  it  be  one,  has  derived  an 
accession  of  strength  from  another  source.  It  is  a  fact, 
that  whenever  we  feel  intensely,  we  do,  as  a  general 
thing,  act  with  a  proportioned  degree  of  energy  ;  and  vice 
versa.  Hence,  we  naturally  derive  the  impression,  that 
the  determinations  of  the  will  are  produced  by  the  strength 
of  our  feelings.  If  the  passion  or  desire  is  languid,  (since 
we  must  use  a  metaphor,)  the  action  is  in  general  feeble ; 
and  if  it  is  intense,  the  act  is  usually  powerful  and  ener- 
getic. Hence,  we  are  prone  to  conclude,  that  the  mind 
is  moved  to  act  by  the  influence  of  passion  or  desire ; 
and  that  the  energy  of  the  action  corresponds  with  the 
strength  of  the  motive,  or  moving  principle. 

Though  the  principle  in  question  has  been  so  com- 
monly received,  I  think  we  should  be  led  to  question  it 
in  consequence  of  the  conclusions  which  have  been  de- 
duced from  it.  If  our  desires,  affections,  &c.,  operate 
to  influence  the  will,  how  can  it  be  free  in  putting  forth 
volitions?     How  does  Mr.  Locke  meet  this  difficulty? 


EDWARDJ3   ON   THE   WILL.  95 

Does  he  tell  us,  that  it  arises  solely  from  our  mistaking 
a  metaphorical  for  a  literal  mode  of  expression  ?  Far 
from  it. 

He  does  not  place  liberty  on  the  broad  ground,  that 
the  desires  by  which  volitions  are  supposed  to  be  deter- 
mined, are  in  reality  nothing  more  than  the  conditions  or 
occasions  on  which  the  mind  acts ;  and  that  they  them- 
selves can  exert  no  positive  influence  or  efliciency.  The 
liberty  of  the  soul  consists,  according  to  him,  not  in  the 
circumstance  that  its  desires  do  not  operate,  but  in  its 
power  to  arrest  the  operation  of  its  desires.  He  admits 
that  they  operate,  that  they  tend  to  produce  volition ;  but 
the  mind  is  nevertheless  free,  because  it  can  suspend  the 
operation  of  desire,  and  prevent  the  tendency  thereof  from 
passing  into  effect.  "There  being,"  says  he,  "in  us  a 
great  many  uneasinesses  always  soliciting  and  ready  to 
determine  the  will,  it  is  natural,  as  I  have  said,  that  the 
greatest  or  most  pressing  should  determine  the  will  to  the 
next  action ;  and  so  it  does  for  the  most  part,  but  not 
always.  For  the  mind  having  in  most  cases,  as  is  evi- 
dent in  experience,  a  power  to  suspend  the  execution  and 
satisfaction  of  its  desires,  and  so  all,  one  after  another, 
examine  them  on  all  sides,  and  weigh  them  with  others. 
In  this  lies  the  hberty  man  has." 

7'hus  we  are  supposed  to  be  free,  because  we  have  a 
power  to  resist,  in  some  cases  at  least,  the  influence  of 
desire.  But  this  is  not  always  the  case.  Our  desires 
may  be  so  strong  as  entirely  to  overcome  us — and  what 
then  ?  Why  we  cease  to  be  free  agents ;  and  it  is  only 
when  the  storm  of  passion  subs^es,  that  we  are  restored 
to  the  rank  of  accountable  beings.  "  Sometimes  a  bois- 
terous passion  hurries  away  our  thoughts,"  says  Locke, 
"  as  a  hurricane  does  our  bodies,  without  leaving  us  the 


96  EXAMINATION   OP 

liberty  of  thinking  on  other  things,  which  we  would  rather 
choose.  But  as  soon  as  the  mind  regains  the  power  to 
stop  or  continue,  begin  or  forbear,  any  of  these  motives  of 
the  body  without,  or  thoughts  within,  according  as  it 
thinks  fit  to  prefer  either  to  the  other,  we  then  consider  the 
man  as  a  free-agent  again."  This  language  is  employed 
by  Mr.  Locke,  while  attempting  to  define  the  idea  of 
liberty  or  free-agency ;  and  he  evidently  supposed,  as  ap- 
pears from  the  above  passage,  as  well  as  from  some  others, 
that  we  frequently  cease  to  be  free-agents,  in  consequence 
of  the  irresistible  power  of  our  desires  or  passions. 

Dr.  Reid  set  out  from  the  same  position,  and  he  arrived 
at  the  same  conclusion.  He  frequently  speaks  of  the  ap- 
petites and  passions  as  so  many  forces,  whose  action  is 
"  directly  upon  the  will."  "  They  draw  a  man  towards 
a  certain  object,  without  any  further  view,  by  a  sort  of 
violence." — Essays,' p.  18.  "  When  a  man  is  acted  upon 
by  motives  of  this  kind,  he  finds  it  easy  to  yield  to  the 
strongest.  They  are  like  two  forces  pushsng  him  in  con- 
trary directions.  To  yield  to  the  strongest,  he  need  only 
be  passive,"  p.  237.  "  In  actions  that  proceed  from  appe- 
tite and  passion,  we  are  passive  in  part  and  only  in  part 
active.  They  are  therefore  in  part  imputed  to  the  pas- 
sion ;  and  if  it  is  supposed  to  be  irresistible,  we  do  not 
impute  them  to  the  man  at  all.  Even  an  American  savage 
judges  in  this  way ;  when  in  a  fit  of  drunkenness  he  kills 
his  friend ;  as  soon  as  he  comes  to  himself,  he  is  very  sorry 
for  what  he  has  done,  but  pleads  that  drink,  and  not  he, 
was  the  cause,"  p.  14,  15.  Such  is  the  dreadful  conse- 
quence, which  Dr.  Reid  boldly  deduces  from  the  princi- 
ple, that  the  appetites  and  passions  do  really  act  upon  the 
will.  Though  he  was  an  advocate  of  free-agency ;  yet, 
holding  this  principle,  he  could  speak  of  actions  that  are 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  97 

• 

partly  passive  ;  and  that  in  so  far  as  they  are  passive,  he 
maintained  they  should  not  be  imputed  to  the  man  whose 
actions  they  are,  but  to  the  passions  by  which  they  are 
produced.  This  may  appear  to  be  strange  doctrine  for 
an  advocate  of  free-agency  -  and  accountability;  but  it 
seems  to  be  the  natural  and  inevitable  consequence  of  the 
commonly  received  notion  with  respect  to  the  relation 
which  subsists  between  the  passions  and  the  will. 

The  principle  that  our  appetites,  desires,  <fec.,  do  exert 
a  real  influence  in  the  production  of  volition,  was  common 
to  Edwards,  Locke,  and  Reid :  indeed,  so  far  as  I  know, 
it  has  been  universally  received.  In  the  opinion  of  Ed- 
wards, this  influence  becomes  "  so  powerful"  at  times  as 
to  establish  a  moral  necessity  beyond  all  question ;  and 
in  that  of  Locke  and  Reid,  it  is  sometimes  so  great  as  to 
destroy  free-agency  and  accountability.  Is  not  this  infer- 
ence well  drawn  ?  It  seems  to  me  that  it  is  ;  and  this 
constitutes  one  reason,  why  I  deny  the  principle  from 
which  it  is  deduced. 

Is  it  true,  then,  that  any  power  or  efficacy  belongs  to 
the  sensitive  or  emotive  part  of  our  nature  ?  Reflection 
must  show  us,  I  think,  that  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that 
any  desire,  affection,  or  disposition  of  the  mind,  can  really 
and  truly  exert  any  positive  or  productive  influence. 
When  we  speak  of  the  appetites,  desires,  affections,  (fee, 
as  the  "  active  principles"  of  our  nature,  we  must  needs 
understand  this  as  a  purely  metaphorical  mode  of  expres- 
sion. 

Edwards  himself  has  shown  the  impropriety  of  regard- 
ing similar  modes  of  speech  as  a  literal  expression  of  the 
truth.  "  To  talk  of  liberty,"  says  he,  "or  the  contrary, 
as  belonging  to  the  very  will  itself,  is  not  to  speak  good 
sense ;  if  we  judge  of  sense,  and  nonsense,  by  the  original 
9* 


98  EXAMINATION   OF 

and  proper  signification  of  words.  For  the  will  itself  is 
not  an  agent  that  has  a  will :  the  power  of  choosing,  itself, 
has  not  a  power  of  choosing.  That  which  has  the  power 
of  volition  is  the  man,  or  the  soul,  and  not  the  power  of 
volition  itself.  To  be  free  is  the  property  of  an  agent, 
who  is  possessed  of  powers  and  faculties,  as  much  as  to 
be  cunning,  valiant,  bountiful,  or  zealous.  But  these 
qualities  are  the  properties  of  persons,  and  not  the  pro- 
perties of  properties.''^  This  remark,  no  doubt,  is  per- 
fectly just,  as  well  as  highly  important.  And  it  may  be 
applied  with  equal  force  and  propriety,  to  the  practice  of 
speaking  of  the  strength  of  motives,  or  inclinations,  or 
desires  ;  for  power  is  a  "  property  of  the  person,  or  the 
soul ;  and  not  the  property  of  a  property." 

It  appeared  exceedingly  absurd  to  the  author  of  the 
"  Inquiry,"  to  speak  of  "  the  free  acts  of  the  will,"  as 
being  determined  by  the  will  itself;  because  the  will  is 
not  an  agent,  and  "  actions  are  to  be  ascribed  to  agents, 
and  not  properly  to  the  powers  and  properties  of  agents." 
But  he  seemed  to  perceive  no  absurdity,  in  speaking  of 
"  the  free  acts  of  the  will,"  as  being  caused  by  the  strongest 
motives,  by  the  dispositions  and  appetites  of  the  soul. 
Now,  are  the  strongest  motives,  as  they  are  called,  are  the 
strongest  dispositions  and  desires  of  the  soul,  agents,  or 
are  they  merely  the  properties  of  agents  ?  Let  the  neces- 
sitarian answer  this  question,  and  then  determine  whether 
his  logic  is  consistent  with  itself. 

Mr.  Locke,  also,  has  well  said,  that  it  is  absurd  to  in- 
quire whether  "the  will  be  free  or  no;  inasmuch  as 
liberty,  which  is  but  a  power,  belongs  only  to  agents, 
and  cannot  be  an  attribute  or  modification  of  will,  which 
is  also  but  a  power."  Though  Mr.  Locke  applied  this 
remark  to  the  usual  form  of  speech,  by  which  freedom  is 


EDWARDS    ON    THE    WILL.  99 

ascribed  to  the  will,  he  failed  to  do  so  in  regard  to  the 
language  by  which  power,  which  is  a  property  of  the 
mind  itself,  is  ascribed  to  our  desires,  or  passions,  or 
affections,  which  are  likewise  properties  of  the  mind. 
And  hence  have  arisen  many  of  his  difficulties  in  regard 
to  the  freedom  of  human  actions.  Supposing  that  our 
desires  exerted  some  positive  influence  or  efficiency  in 
the  production  of  volitions,  his  views  on  the  subject  of 
free-agency  become  vague,  inconsistent,  fluctuating  and 
unsatisfactory. 

The  hypothesis  that  the  desires  impel  the  will  to 
act,  is  inconsistent  with  observed  facts.  If  this  hypo- 
thesis were  true,  the  phenomena  of  volition  would  be 
very  different  from  what  they  are.  A  man  may  desire 
that  it  should  rain,  for  example ;  he  may  have  the  most 
intense  feeling  on  this  subject  imaginable,  and  there  may 
be  no  counteracting  desire  or  feehng  whatever ;  now  if 
desire  ever  impelled  a  man  to  volition,  it  would  induce 
him,  in  such  a  case,  to  will  that  it  should  rain.  But  no 
man,  in  his  senses,  ever  puts  forth  a  volition  to  make  it 
rain — and  why  ?  Just  because  he  is  a  rational  creature, 
and  knows  that  his  volition  cann6t  produce  any  such 
effect.  In  the  same  manner,  a  man  might  wish  to  fly,  or 
to  do  a  thousand  other  things  which  are  beyond  his  power ; 
and  yet  not  make  the  least  effort  to  do  so,  not  because  he 
has  no  power  to  put  forth  such  eflforts,  but  because  he 
does  not  choose  to  make  a  fool  of  himself.  This  shows 
that  desire,  feeling,  &c.,  is  merely  one  of  the  conditions 
necessary  to  volition,  and  not  its  producing  cause. 

Again.  It  has  been  frequently  observed,  since  the  time 
of  Butler,  that  our  passive  impressions  often  become 
weaker  and  weaker,  while  our  active  habits  become 
stronger  and  stronger.  Thus,  the  feeling  of  pity,  by  being 


160  EXAMINATION   OF 

frequently  excited,  may  become   less    and  less  vivid, 
while  the  active  habit  of  benevolence,  by  which  it  is  sup- 
posed to  be  induced,  becomes  more  and  more  energetic. 
That  is  to  say,  while  the  power,  as  it  is  called,  or  the 
causal  influence,  is  gradually  diminishing,  the  effect,  which 
is  supposed  to  flow  from  it,  is  becoming  more  and  more 
conspicuous.     And  again,  the  feeling  of  pity  is  sometimes 
exceedingly  strong ;  that  is  to  say,  exceedingly  vivid  and 
painful,  while  there  is  no  act  attending  it.     The  passive 
impression  or  susceptibility  is  entirely  dissociated,  in  many 
cases,  from  the  acts  of  the  will.     The  feeling  often  exists 
in  all  its  power,  and  yet  there  is  no  act,  and  no  disposition 
to  act,  on  the  part  of  the  individual  who  is  the  subject  of 
it.  The  cause  operates,  and  yet  the  effect  does  not  follow  1 
All  that  we  can  say  is,  that  when  we  see  the  mind 
deeply  agitated,  and,  as  it  were,  carried  away  by  a  storm 
of  passion,  we  also 'observe  that  it  frequently  acts  with 
great  vehemency.    But  we  do  not  observe,  and  we  do  not 
know,  that  this  increased  power  of  action,  is  the  result  of 
an  increased  power  of  feeling.   All  that  we  know  is,  that 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  when  our  feelings  are  languid,  we  are 
apt  to  act  but  feebly ;  and  that  when  they  are  intense,  we 
are  accustomed  to  act  with  energy.     Or,  in  other  words, 
that  we  do  not  ordinarily  act  with  so  much  energy  in 
order  to  gratify  a  slight  feeling  or  emotion,  as  we  do  to 
gratify  one  of  greater  intensity  and  painfulness.     But  it 
is  wrong  to  conclude  from  hence,  that  it  is  the  increased 
intensity  of  feeling,  which  produces  the  increased  energy 
of  the  action.     No  matter  how  intense  the  feeling,  it  is 
wrong  to  conclude,  that  it  literally  causes  us  to  act,  that  it 
ever  lays  the  will  under  constraint,  and  thereby  destroys, 
even  for  a  moment,  our  free-agency.     Such  an  assump- 
tion is  a  mere  hypothesis,  unsupported  by  observation, 


EDWARDS    ON    THE    WILL.  101 


inconsistent  with  the  dictates  of  reason,  and  irreconcilable 
with  observed  facts. 

I  repeat  it,  such  an  assumption  is  inconsistent  with  ob- 
served facts  ;  for  who  that  has  any  energy  of  will,  has  not, 
on  many  a  trying  occasion,  stood  firm  amid  the  fiercest 
storm  of  passion ;  and,  though  the  elements  of  discord 
raged  within,  remained  himself  unmoved ;  giving  not  the 
least  sign  or  manifestation  of  what  was  passing  in  his 
bosom?  Who  has  not  felt,  on  such  an  occasion,  that 
although  the  passions  may  storm,  yet  the  will  alone  is 
power  ? 

,  It  is  not  uncommon  to  see  this  truth  indirectly  recog- 
nized by  those  who  absolutely  know  that  some  power  is 
exerted  by  our  passions  and  desires,  and  that  the  will  is 
always  determined  by  the  strongest.  Thus,  says  Presi- 
dent Day,  "our  acts  of  choice,  are  always  controlled  by 
those  emotions  which  appear  to  be  most  vivid.  We  often 
find  a  determined  and  settled  purpose,  apparently  calm, 
but  unyielding,  which  carries  a  man  steadily  forward, 
amid  all  the  solicitations  of  appetite  and  passion.  .  ,  .  . 
The  inflexible  determination  of  Howard,  gave  law  to  his 
emotions,  and  guided  his  benevolent  movements,"  p.  65. 
Here,  although  President  Day  holds  that  the  will  is  deter- 
mined by  the  strongest  desire,  passion,  or  emotion,  he 
unconsciously  admits  that  the  will,  "  the  inflexible  deter- 
mination," is  independent  of  them  all. 

Let  it  be  supposed,  that  no  one  means  so  absurd  a 
thing  as  to  say,  that  the  affections  themselves  act  upon  the 
will,  but  that  the  mind  in  the  exercise  of  its  affections 
acts  upon  it,  and  thereby  exerts  a  power  over  its  determi- 
nations ;  let  us  suppose,  that  this  is  the  manner  in  which 
a  real  force  is  supposed  to  bear  upon  the  will ;  and  what 
will  be  the  consequence  ?     Why,  if  the  will  is  not  distin- 


S€«  j^amaXol 


103  EXAMINATION   OF 

guished  from  the  affections,  we  shall  have  the  will  acting 
upon  itself;  a  doctrine  to  which  the  necessitarian  will  not 
listen  for  a  moment.  And  if  they  are  distinguished  from 
the  will,  we  shall  have  two  powers  of  action,  two  forces 
in  the  mind,  each  contending  for  the  mastery.  But  what 
do  we  mean  by  a  will,  if  it  is  not  the  faculty  by  which  the 
mind  acts,  by  which  it  exerts  a  real  force  ?  And  if  this 
be  the  idea  and  definition  of  a  will,  we  cannot  distinguish 
the  will  from  the  affections,  and  say  that  the  latter  exerts 
a  real  force,  without  making  two  wills.  This  seems  to  be 
the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  commonly  received 
notion,  that  the  mind,  in  the  exercise  of  its  affections,  does 
really  act  upon  the  will  with  an  impelling  force.  Indeed, 
there  seems  to  have  been  no  little  perplexity  and  confu- 
sion of  conception  on  this  subject,  arising  from  the  extreme 
subtlety  of  our  mental  processes,  as  well  as  from  the 
ambiguities  of  language. 

The  truth  is,  that  in  feeling  the  mind  is  passive ;  and 
it  is  absurd  to  make  a  passive  impression,  the  active 
cause  of  any  thing.  The  sensibility  does  not  act,  it 
merely  suffers.  The  appetites  and  passions,  which  have 
always  been  called  the  "active  powers,"  the  "moving 
principles,"  and  so  forth,  should  be  called  the  passive 
susceptibilities.  Unless  this  truth  be  clearly  and  fully 
recognized,  and  the  commonly  received  notion  respecting 
the  relation  which  the  appetites  and  passions  sustain  to 
the  will,  to  the  active  power,  be  discarded,  it  seems  to 
me,  that  the  great  doctrine  of  the  liberty  of  the  will,  must 
continue  to  be  involved  in  the  sadest  perplexity,  the  most 
distressing  darkness. 


& 


EDWARDS   ON   THE   WILL.  lOS 


SECTION  IX. 

OF   THE    LIBERTY   OF   INDIFFERENCE. 

If,  as  I  have  endeavoured  to  show,  the  appetites  and 
passions  exert  no  positive  influence  in  the  production 
of  volition,  if  they  do  not  sustain  the  relation  of  cause  to 
the  acts  of  the  will ;  then  is  the  doctrine  of  the  liberty  of 
indiflerence  placed  in  a  clear  and  strong  light.  Having 
admitted  that  the  sensitive  part  of  our  nature  always 
tends  to  produce  volition,  and  in  some  cases  irresistibly 
produces  it,  the  advocates  of  free  agency  have  not  been 
able  to  maintain  the  doctrine  of  a  perfect  liberty  in  re- 
gard to  all  human  actions.  They  liave  been  compelled 
to  retire  from  the  broad  and  open  field  of  the  controverted 
territory,  and  to  take  their  stand  in  a  dark  corner,  in  or- 
der to  contend  for  that  perfect  liberty,  without  which 
there  cannot  be  a  perfect  and  unclouded  accountability. 
Hence,  it  has  been  no  uncommon  thing,  even  for  those 
who  have  been  the  most  disposed  to  sympathize  with 
them,  to  feel  a  dissatisfaction  in  reading  what  they  have 
written  on  the  subject  of  a  liberty  of  indifference. 
This  they  have  placed  in  a  perfect  freedom  to  choose 
between  a  few  insignificant  things,  in  regard  to  which 
we  have  no  feeling ;  while,  in  regard  to  the  great  objects 
which  relate  to  our  eternal  destiny,  we  have  been  sup- 
posed to  enjoy  no  such  freedom. 

The  true  liberty  of  indifference  does  not  consist,  as  I 
have  endeavoured  to  show,  in  a  power  to  resist  the  in- 
fluence of  the  appetites  and  passions  struggling  to  pro- 


104  EXAMINATION   OF 

duce  volition;  because  there  is  no  such  influence  in 
existence.  This  notion  is  encumbered  with  insuperable 
difficulties ;  it  supposes  two  powers  struggling  for  the 
mastery — the  desires  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  will  on 
the  other;  and  that  when  the  desires  are  so  strong  as  to 
prevail,  and  bear  us  away  in  spite  of  ourselves,  we  cease 
to  be  free  agents.  It  supposes  that  at  no  time  we  have 
a  perfect  liberty,  unless  we  are  perfectly  destitute  of 
feeling ;  and  that  at  some  of  the  most  trying,  and  criti- 
cal, and  awful  moments  of  our  existence,  we  have  no 
liberty  at  all ;  the  whole  man  being  passive  to  the  power 
and  dominion  of  the  passions.  What  a  wound  is  thus 
given  to  the  cause  of  free-agency  and  accountability ! 
What  scope  is  thus  allowed  for  the  sophistry  of  the  pas- 
sions !  Every  man  who  can  persuade  himself  that  his 
appetites,  his  desires,  or  his  passions,  have  been  too 
strong  for  him,  may  blind  his  mind  to  a  sense  of  his 
guilt,  and  lull  his  conscience  into  a  fatal  repose. 

The  necessitarian,  like  a  skilful  general,  is  not  slow 
to  attack  this  weak  point  in  the  philosophy  of  free- 
agency.  If  our  emotions  operate  to  produce  volition, 
says  he,  then  the  strongest  must  prevail;  to  say  other- 
wise, is  to  say  that  it  is  not  the  strongest.  This  is  the 
ground  uniformly  occupied  by  President  Day.  And  it 
is  urged  by  President  Edwards,  that  if  a  great  degree  of 
such  influence  destroys  free  agency,  as  it  is  supposed  to 
do,  then  every  smaller  degree  of  it  must  impair  free 
agency;  and  hence,  according  to  the  principles  and 
scheme  of  its  advocates,  it  cannot  be  perfect.  Is  not  this 
inference  well  drawn?  Indeed,  it  seems  to  me,  that 
while  the  notion  that  our  desires  possess  a  real  power 
and  efficacy,  which  are  exerted  over  the  will,  maintains 
its  hold  upon  the  mind,  the  great  doctrine  of  liberty  can 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  105 

never  be  seen  in  the  brightness  of  its  full-orbed  glory  ; 
and  that  it  must,  at  times,  suffer  a  total  eclipse. 

The  liberty  which  we  really  possess,  then,  does  not 
consist  in  an  indifference  of  the  desires  and  affections, 
but  in  that  of  the  will  itself.  We  are  perfectly  free, 
says  the  libertarian,  in  regard  to  all  those  things  about 
which  our  feelings  are  in  a  state  of  indifference ;  such 
as  touching  one  of  two  spots,  or  choosing  one  of  two  ob- 
jects that  are  perfectly  alike.  To  this  the  necessitarian 
replies,  what  does  it  signify  that  a  man  has  a  perfect 
liberty  in  regard  to  the  choice  of  "  one  of  two  pepper- 
corns ?'*  Are  not  such  things  perfectly  insignificant,  and 
unworthy  "the  grave  attention  of  the  philosopher," 
while  treating  of  the  great  questions  of  moral  good 
and  evil  ? 

There  is  some  truth  in  this  reply,  and  some  injustice. 
It  truly  signifies  nothing,  that  we  are  at  perfect  liberty 
to  choose  between  two  pepper-corns,  if  we  are  not  so  to 
choose  between  good  and  evil,  life  and  death.  But  in 
making  this  attack  upon  the  position  of  his  opponent, 
when  viewed  as  designed  to  serve  the  cause  of  free- 
agency,  the  necessitarian  overlooks  its  bearing  upon  his 
own  scheme.  He  contends,  that  the  mind  cannot  act 
unless  it  is  made  to  act  by  some  extraneous  influence : 
this  is  a  universal  proposition,  extending  to  all  our  men- 
tal acts ;  and  hence,  if  it  can  be  shown  that,  in  a  single 
instance,  the  mind  can  and  does  put  forth  a  volition, 
without  being  made  to  do  so,  his  doctrine  is  subverted 
from  its  foundations.  If  this  can  be  shown,  by  a  refer- 
ence to  the  case  of  *'  two  pepper-corns,"  it  may  be 
made  to  serve  an  important  purpose  in  philosophy,  how 
much  soever  it  may  be  despised  by  the  philosopher. 

If  we  keep  the  distinction  between  the  will  and  the 
10 


106  EXAMINATION  OF 

sensibility  in  mind,  it  will  throw  much  light  on  what  has 
been  written  in  regard  to  the  subject  of  indifference.  If 
you  offer  a  guinea  and  a  penny  to  a  man's  choice,  asks 
President  Day,  which  will  he  choose  ?  Will  the  one 
exert  as  great  an  influence  over  him  as  the  other? 
President  Day  may  assert,  if  he  pleases,  that  the  guinea 
will  exert  the  greater  influence  over  his  feelings;  but 
this  does  not  destroy  the  equilibrium  of  the  will.  The 
feelings  and  the  will  are  difTerent.  By  the  one  we  feel, 
by  the  other  we  act ;  by  the  one  we  suffer,  by  the  other 
we  do.  Why,  then,  will  the  man  be  certain  to  choose 
the  guinea,  all  other  things  being  equal  1  Not  because 
its  influence  acts  upon  the  will,  either  directly  or  indi- 
rectly through  the  passions,  and  compels  him  to  choose 
it,  but  because  he  has  a  purpose  to  accomplish ;  and,  as 
a  rational  being,  he  sees  that  the  guinea  will  answer 
his  purpose  better  than  the  penny.  He  is  not  made  to 
act,  therefore,  by  a  blind  impulse ;  he  acts  freely  in  the 
light  of  reason.  The  philosophy  of  the  necessitarian 
overlooks  the  slight  circumstance,  that  the  will  of  man 
is  not  a  ball  to  be  set  a-going  by  external  impulse  ;  but 
that  man  is  a  rational  being,  made  in  the  image  of  his 
Maker,  and  can  act  as  a  designing  cause.  Hence,  when 
we  affirm  that  the  will  of  man  acts  without  being  made 
to  do  so  by  the  action  of  any  thing  upon  the  will  itself, 
he  imagines  that  we  dethrone  the  Almighty,  and  "  place 
chance  upon  the  throne  of  the  moral  universe."  Day 
on  the  Will,  p.  195.  But  I  would  remind  him,  once  for 
all,  that  the  act  of  a  free  designing  cause,  no  less  than 
that  of  a  necessitated  act,  proceeding  from  an  efficient 
cause,  (if  such  a  thing  can  be  conceived,)  is  utterly  in- 
consistent with  the  idea  of  accident.  Choice  in  its  very 
nature  is  opposed  to  chance. 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  107 

The  doctrine  of  the  indifference  of  the  will  has  been 
subjected  to  another  mode  of  attack.  This  doctrine  im- 
plies that  we  have  a  power  to  choose  one  thing  or  an- 
other ;  or,  as  it  is  sometimes  called,  a  power  of  choice 
to  the  contrary.  For,  if  the  will  is  not  controlled  by  any 
extraneous  influence,  it  is  evident  that  we  may  choose  a 
thing,  or  let  it  alone — that  we  may  put  forth  a  volition, 
or  refuse  to  put  it  forth.  This  power,  which  results  from 
the  idea  of  indifference  as  just  explained,  is  regarded  as 
in  the  highest  degree  absurd  ;  and  a  torrent  of  impetuous 
questions  is  poured  forth  to  sweep  it  away.  "  When 
Satan,  as  a  roaring  lion,"  asks  President  Day,  **  goeth 
about,  seeking  whom  he  may  devour,  is  he  equally  in- 
clined to  promote  the  salvation  of  mankind  ?"  &c.  <fec.  &c. 
Now,  I  freely  admit,  that  when  Satan  is  inclined  to  do 
evil,  and  is  actually  doing  it,  he  is  not  inclined  to  the 
contrary.  I  freely  admit  that  a  thing  is  not  different  from 
itself;  and  the  learned  author  is  welcome  to  all  such  tri- 
umphant positions. 

In  the  same  easy  way,  President  Edwards,  as  he 
imagines,  demolishes  the  doctrine  of  indifference.  He 
supposes  that,  according  to  this  doctrine,  the  will  does 
not  choose  when  it  does  choose ;  and,  having  supposed 
this,  he  proceeds  to  demolish  it,  as  if  he  were  contend- 
ing with  a  thousand  adversaries ;  and  yet,  I  will  venture 
to  affirm,  that  no  man  in  his  senses  ever  maintained  such 
a  position.  The  most  contemptible  advocate  of  free- 
agency  that  ever  lived,  has  maintained  nothing  so  absurd 
as  that  the  mind  ever  chooses  without  choosing.  This 
is  the  light  in  which  the  doctrine  of  indifference  is  fre- 
quently represented  by  Edwards,  but  it  is  a  gross  mis- 
representation. 

"The  question  is,"  says  Edwards,  "whether  ever 


108  EXAMINATION   OF 

the  soul  of  man  puts  forth  an  act  of  will,  "while  it 
yet  remains  in  a  state  of  liberty,  viz:  as  implying  a 
state  of  indifference  ;  or  whether  the  soul  ever  exerts  an 
act  of  preference,  while  at  the  very  time  the  will  is  in  a 
perfect  equilibrium,  not  inclining  one  way  more  than 
another,"  p.  72.  If  this  be  the  point  in  dispute,  he  may 
well  add,  that  *'  the  very  putting  of  the  question  is  suffi- 
cient to  show  the  absurdity  of  the  affirmative  answer ;" 
and  he  might  have  added,  the  utter  futility  of  the  negative 
reply.  "  How  ridiculous,"  he  continues,  *'  for  any  body 
to  insist  that  the  soul  chooses  one  thing  before  another, 
when,  at  the  very  same  instant,  it  is  perfectly  indifferent 
with  respect  to  each  !  This  is  the  same  thing  as  to  say, 
we  shall  prefer  one  thing  to  another,  at  the  very  same 
time  that  it  has  no  preference.  Choice  and  preference 
can  no  more  be  in  a  state  of  indifference  than  motion  can 
be  in  a  state  of  rest,"  &c.  p.  72.  And  he  repeats  it  over 
and  over  again,  that  this  is  to  put  **  the  soul  in  a  state  of 
choice,  and  in  a  state  of  equilibrium  at  the  same  time;" 
"  choosing  one  way,  while  it  remains  in  a  state  of  per- 
fect indifference,  and  has  no  choice  of  one  way  more 
than  the  other;"  p.  74.  "  To  suppose  the  will  to  act  at 
all  in  a  state  of  indifference,  is  to  assert  that  the  mind 
chooses  without  choosing,"  p.  64;  and  so  in  various 
other  places. 

Now,  if  the  doctrine  of  the  indifference  of  the  will,  as 
commonly  understood,  amounts  to  this,  that  the  will 
does  not  choose  when  it  chooses,  then  Edwards  was 
certainly  right  in  opposing  it ;  but  how  could  he  have 
expected  to  correct  such  incorrigible  blockheads  as  the 
authors  of  such  a  doctrine  must  have  been,  by  the  force 
of  logic  ? 

Edwards  has  not  always,  though  frequently,  mis-stated 


EDWARDS    ON   THE    WILL.  109 

the  doctrine  of  his  adversaries.  The  liberty  of  indif- 
ference, says  he,  in  one  place,  consists  in  this,  **  that  the 
will,  in  choosing,  is  subject  to  no  prevailing  m^uencBj^* 
p.  64.  Now  this  is  a  fair  statement  of  the  doctrine  in 
question.  Why  did  not  Edwards,  then,  combat  this 
idea  ?  Why  transform  it  into  the  monstrous  absurdity, 
that  "the  will  chooses  without  choosing,"  or  exerts  an 
act  of  choice  at  the  same  lime  that  it  exerts  no  act  of 
choice ;  and  then  proceed  to  demolish  it  ?  Was  it  be- 
cause he  did  not  wish  to  march  up,  fairly  and  squarely, 
in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  and  contend  with  them  in  their 
strongholds  and  fastnesses  ?  By  no  means.  There 
never  was  a  more  honest  reasoner  than  Edwards.  But 
his  psychology  is  false ;  and  hence,  he  has  not  only 
misrepresented  the  doctrine  of  his  opponents,  but  also 
his  own.  He  confounds  the  sensitive  part  of  our  nature 
with  the  will,  expressly  in  his  definitions,  though  he  fre- 
quently distinguishes  them  in  his  arguments.  This  is 
the  reason  why  he  sometimes  asserts,  that  the  choice  of 
the  mind  is  always  as  the  sense  of  the  most  agreeable ; 
and,  at  others,  throws  this  fundamental  doctrine  into  the 
form,  as  we  have  seen  in  our  third  section,  that  the  choice 
of  the  mind  is  always  as  the  choice  of  the  mind ;  and  holds 
that  to  deny  it  is  a  plain  contradiction.  By  reason  of 
the  same  confusion  of  things,  the  doctrine  of  his  oppo- 
nents, that  "  the  will,  in  choosing,  is  subject  to  no  pre- 
vailing influence,"  seemed  to  him  to  mean  that  the  will, 
in  choosing,  does  not  choose.  In  both  cases,  he  con- 
founds the  most  agreeable  impression  upon  the  sensibility 
with  the  choice  of  the  mind ;  and  thus  misrepresents 
both  his  own  doctrine,  and  that  of  his  opponents,  by  re- 
ducing the  one  to  an  insignificant  truism,  and  the  other 
to  a  glaring  absurdity.  President  Day  should  have 
10* 


110  EXAMINATION   OF 

avoided  the  error  of  Edwards,  in  thus  misconceiving  the 
doctrine  of  his  opponents ;  for  he  expressly  distinguishes 
the  sensibility  from  the  will.  But  there  is  this  difference 
between  Edwards  and  Day;  the  first  expressly  con- 
founds these  two  parts  of  our  nature,  and  then  proceeds 
to  reason,  in  many  cases,  as  if  they  were  distinct ;  while 
the  last  most  explicitly  distinguishes  them,  and  then  fre- 
quently proceeds  to  reason  as  if  they  were  one  and  the 
same.  It  is  in  this  way  that  he  also  gravely  teaches  that 
the  mind  chooses  when  it  chooses ;  and  makes  his  ad- 
versaries assert  that  the  mind  chooses  without  choosing, 
or  that  the  will  is  inclined  without  being  inclined.  Start 
from  whatever  point  he  will,  the  necessitarian  never  feels 
so  strong,  as  when  he  finds  himself  securely  intrenched  in 
the  truism,  that  a  thing  is  always  as  itself;  there  manfully 
contending  against  those  who  assert  that  a  thing  is  dif- 
ferent from  itself. 

The  doctrine  of  the  liberty  of  indifference,  as  usually 
held,  is  this — that  the  will  is  not  determined  by  any  pre- 
vailing influence.  This  is  not  a  perfect  liberty,  it  is 
true,  wherever  the  will  is  partially  influenced  by  an 
extraneous  cause ;  but  it  is  not  equivalent  to  the  gross 
absurdity  of  the  position,  that  the  will  chooses  without 
choosing.  Nor  can  we  possibly  reduce  it  to  this  form, 
unless  we  forget  that  the  authors  of  it  did  not  confound 
that  which  is  supposed  to  exert  the  influence  over  the  will, 
with  the  act  of  the  will  itself.  They  contended  for  a  partial 
indifference  of  the  will  only ;  and,  consequently,  they 
could  only  contend  for  a  partial,  and  not  a  perfect  liberty. 
On  the  contrary,  I  think  we  should  contend  for  a  perfect 
indifference,  not  in  regard  to  feeling,  but  in  regard  to  the 
will.  Standing  on  this  high  ground,  we  need  not  retire 
from  the  broad  and  open  field,  in  order  to  set  up  the  em- 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  Ill 

pire  of  a  perfect  liberty  in  a  dark  corner,  extending  to 
a  few  insignificant  things  only :  we  may  establish  it  over 
the  whole  range  of  human  activity,  bringing  out  into  a 
clear  and  full  light,  the  great  fact  of  man's  perfect  ac- 
countability, for  all  his  actions,  under  all  the  circum- 
stances of  his  life. 


112  EXAMINATION   OF 


^  SECTION  X. 


OF   ACTION   AND   PASSION. 

There  are  no  two  things  in  nature  which  are  more 
perfectly  distinct  than  action  and  passion  ;  the  one  neces- 
sarily excludes  the  other.  Thus,  if  an  effect  is  produced 
in  any  thing,  by  the  action  or  influence  of  something 
else,  then  is  the  thing  in  which  the  effect  is  produced 
wholly  passive  in  regard  to  it.  The  effect  itself  is  called 
passion  or  passiveness.  It  is  not  an  act  of  that  in  which 
it  is  produced ;  it  is  an  effect  resulting  wholly  from  that 
which  produces  it.  '  To  say  that  a  thing  acts  then, 
is  to  say  that  it  is  not  passive ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  its 
act  is  not  produced  by  the  action  or  influence  of  any 
thing  else.  To  suppose  that  an  act  is  so  produced,  is  to 
suppose  that  it  is  not  an  act ;  the  object  in  which  it  is  said 
to  be  caused  being  wholly  passive  in  regard  to  it. 

If  this  statement  be  correct,  it  follows  that  an  act  of 
the  mind  cannot  be  a  produced  effect ;  that  the  ideas  of 
action  and  passion,  of  cause  and  effect,  are  opposite  and 
contrary  the  one  to  the  other;  and  hence,  it  is  absurd  to 
assert  that  the  mind  may  be  caused  to  act,  or  that  a  voli- 
tion can  be  produced  by  any  thing  acting  upon  the  mind. 
This  is  a  self-evident  truth.  The  younger  Edwards  calls 
for  proof  of  it;  but  the  only  evidence  there  is  in  the 
case,  is  that  which  arises  from  the  nature  of  the  things 
themselves,  as  they  must  appear  to  every  mind  which 
will  bestow  suitable  reflection  on  the  subject.     But  as 


EDWARDS  ON   THE    WILL.  113 

he  held  the  affirmative,  maintaining  that  the  mind  is 
caused  to  act,  it  would  have  been  well  for  him  to  have 
furnished  proof  himself,  before  he  called  for  it  from  the 
opposite  party. 

It  may  be  said,  that  if  it  were  self-evident  that  the 
mind  cannot  be  caused  to  act,  it  would  appear  so  to  all 
men,  and  there  could  be  no  doubt  on  the  subject ;  that  a 
truth  or  proposition  cannot  be  said  to  be  self-evident, 
unless  it  carries  irresistible  conviction  to  every  mind  to 
which  it  is  proposed.  But  this  does  not  follow.  Pre- 
vious to  the  time  of  Galileo,  it  was  universally  believed 
by  mankind,  that  if  a  body  were  set  in  motion,  it  would 
run  down  of  itself;  though  it  should  meet  with  no  re- 
sistance whatever  in  its  progress.  But  that  great  phi- 
losopher, by  reflecting  on  the  nature  of  matter,  very 
clearly  saw,  that  if  a  body  were  put  in  motion,  and  met 
with  no  resistance,  it  would  continue  to  move  on  in  a 
right  line  forever.  As  matter  is  inert,  so  he  saw  that  it 
could  not  put  itself  in  motion ;  and  if  put  in  motion  by 
the  action  of  any  thing  upon  it,  he  perceived  with  equal 
clearness  that  it  could  not  check  itself  in  its  career.  He 
perceived  that  it  is  just  as  impossible  for  passive,  inert 
matter,  to  change  its  state  from  motion  to  rest,  as  it  is  for 
it  to  change  its  state  from  rest  to  motion.  Thus,  by  sim- 
ply reflecting  upon  the  nature  of  matter,  as  that  which 
cannot  act,  the  mind  of  Galileo  recognized  it  as  a  self- 
evident  and  unquestionable  truth,  that  if  a  body  be  put 
in  motion,  and  there  is  nothing  to  impede  its  career,  it 
will  move  on  in  a  right  line  forever.  This  great  law  of 
motion,  first  recognized  by  Galileo,  and  afterwards 
adopted  by  all  other  philosophers,  is  called  the  law  of 
inertia^  because  its  truth  necessarily  results  from  the 
fact,  that  matter  is  essentially  inert,  or  cannot  act. 


114  EXAMINATION   OF 

I  am  aware  it  has  been  contended  by  Mr.  Whewell, 
in  his  Bridgewater  Treatise,  that  the  law  of  motion  in 
question  is  not  a  necessary  or  self-evident  truth ;  and  the 
reason  he  assigns  is,  that  if  it  were  a  truth  of  this  nature, 
it  would  have  been  recognized  and  believed  by  all  men 
before  the  time  of  Galileo.  But  this  reason  is  not  good. 
For  if  it  did  not  appear  self-evident  to  those  philosophers 
who  lived  before  Galileo,  it  was  because  they  did  not  be- 
stow sufficient  reflection  upon  the  subject,  and  not  be- 
cause it  was  not  a  self-evident  truth.  All  men  had  seen 
bodies  moving  only  in  a  resisting  medium,  amid  counter- 
acting influences;  and  having  always  seen  them  run 
down  in  such  a  medium,  they  very  naturally  concluded 
that  a  body  put  in  motion  would  run  down  of  itself. 
Yielding  to  an  illusion  of  the  senses,  instead  of  rising 
above  it  by  a  sustained  effort  of  reason  and  meditation, 
they  supposed  that  ,the  motion  of  a  body  would  spend 
itself  in  the  course  of  time,  and  so  come  to  an  end  with- 
out any  cause  of  its  extinction.  This  is  the  reason  why 
they  did  not  see,  what  must  have  appeared  to  be  a  self- 
evident  truth,  if  they  had  bestowed  sufficient  reflection 
upon  the  subject,  instead  of  being  swayed  by  an  illusion 
of  the  senses. 

Mr.  Whewell  admits  the  law  in  question  to  be  a 
truth;  he  only  denies  that  it  is  a  necessary  or  self- 
evident  truth.  Now,  if  it  be  not  a  necessary  truth,  I 
should  like  to  know  how  he  has  ascertained  it  to  be  a 
truth  at  all.  Has  any  man  ever  seen  a  body  put  in  mo- 
tion, and  continue  to  move  on  in  a  right  line  forever  ? 
Has  any  man  ever  ascertained  the  truth  of  this  law  by 
observation  and  experiment  ?  It  is  evident,  that  if  it 
be  true  at  all,  it  must  be  a  necessary  truth.  Who  that 
is  capable  of  rising  above  the   associations  of  sense. 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  115 

SO  as  to  view  things  as  they  are  in  themselves,  can  medi- 
tate upon  this  subject,  without  perceiving  that  the  law  of 
inertia  is  a  self-evident  truth,  necessarily  arising  out  of 
the  very  nature  of  matter  ? 

It  does  not  follow,  then,  that  a  truth  is  not  self-evident, 
because  it  does  not  appear  so  to  all  men ;  for  some  may 
be  blinded  to  the  truth  by  an  illusion  of  the  senses.  This 
is  the  case  with  the  necessitarian.  He  has  always  seen 
the  motion  of  body  produced  by  the  action  of  something 
else ;  and  hence,  confounding  the  activity  of  mind  with 
the  motion  of  body,  he  concludes  that  volition  is  produced 
by  the  prior  action  of.  something  else.  All  that  he  needs 
in  order  to  see  the  impossibility  of  such  a  thing,  is  severe 
and  sustained  meditation.  But  how  can  we  expect  this 
from  him  ?  Is  he  not  a  great  reasoner,  rather  than  a  great 
thinker?  Does  he  not  display  his  skill  in  drawing  logi- 
cal conclusions  from  the  illusions  of  the  senses,  and  as- 
sumptions founded  thereon ;  rather  than  in  laying  his 
foundations  and  his  premises  aright,  in  the  immutable 
depths  of  meditation  and  consciousness  ?  We  may  ap- 
peal to  his  reason,  and  he  will  fall  to  reasoning.  We 
may  ask  for  meditation,  and  he  will  give  us  logic.  In- 
deed, he  wants  that  severe  and  scrutinizing  observation 
which  pierces  through  all  the  illusions  and  associations 
of  the  senses,  rising  to  a  contemplation  of  things  as  they 
are  in  themselves ;  which  is  one  of  the  best  attributes  of 
the  great  thinker. 

To  show  that  he  does  this,  I  shall  begin  with  Presi- 
dent Day.  No  other  necessitarian  has  made  so  formal 
and  elaborate  an  attempt  to  prove,  that  the  mind  may  be 
caused  to  act.  He  undertakes  to  answer  the  objection 
which  has  been  urged  against  the  scheme  of  moral  neces- 
sity, that  it  confounds  action  and  passion.     It  is  alleged. 


116  EXAMINATION    OF 

that  a  volition  cannot  be  produced  or  caused  by  the  action 
or  influence  of  any  thing.  To  this  President  Day  replies, 
"  these  are  terms  of  very  convenient  ambiguity,  with 
which  it  is  easy  to  construct  a  plausible  but  fallacious  ar- 
gument. The  word  passive  is  sometimes  used  to  signify 
that  which  is  inactive.  With  this  meaning,  it  must,  of 
course,  be  the  opposite  of  every  thing  which  is  active. 
To  say  that  that  which  is  in  this  sense  passive,  is  at  the 
same  time  active,  is  to  assert  that  that  which  is  active  is 
not  active.  But  this  is  not  the  only  signification  of  the 
term  passive  in  common  use.  It  is  very  frequently  used 
to  express  the  relation  of  an  eflTect  to  its  cause,"  p.  159. 

Now,  here  is  the  distinction,  but  is  it  not  without  a  dif- 
ference ?  If  an  effect  is  produced,  is  it  not  passive  in 
relation  to  its  cause  ?  This  is  not  denied.  Is  it  active 
then  in  relation  to  any  thing  ?  President  Day  says  it  is. 
But  is  this  so  ?  Is  not  an  effect,  which  is  wholly  produced 
in  one  thing  by  the  action  or  influence  of  another,  wholly 
passive?  Is  not  the  thing  which,  according  to  the  sup- 
position, is  wholly  passive  to  the  influence  acting  upon 
it,  wholly  passive  ?  In  other  words,  is  it  made  to  act  ? 
Does  it  not  merely  suffer  ?  If  it  is  endued  with  an  active 
nature,  and  really  puts  forth  an  act,  is  not  this  act  clearly 
different  from  the  passive  impression  made  upon  it? 

One  would  certainly  suppose  so,  but  for  the  logic  of 
the  necessitarian.  Let  us  examine  this  logic.  "  The 
term  passive,"  says  President  Day,  *'  is  sometimes  em- 
ployed to  express  the  relation  of  an  effect  to  its  cause. 
In  this  sense,  it  is  so  far  from  being  inconsistent  with 
activity,  that  activity  may  be  the  very  effect  which  is 
produced.  A  thing  may  be  caused  to  be  active.  A  can- 
non shot  is  said  to  be  passive,  with  respect  to  the  charge 
of  powder  which  impels  it.     But  is  there  no  activity 


EDWARDS    ON    THE   WILL.  117 

given  to  the  ball  ?  Is  not  the  whirlwind  active,  when  it 
tears  up  the  forest?"  &c.  &c.,  p.  160. 

Now,  all  these  illustrations  are  brought  to  show  that 
the  mind  may  be  caused  to  act ; — that  it  may  be  passive 
in  relation  to  the  cause  of  its  volition,  and  active  in  rela- 
tion to  the  effect  of  its  volition.  A  more  striking  in- 
stance could  not  be  adduced  to  prove  the  correctness  of 
the  assertion  already  made,  that  the  necessitarian  con- 
founds the  motion  of  body  with  the  action  of  mind.  *'  A 
thing  may  be  caused  to  act,"  says  President  Day.  But 
how  does  he  show  this  ?  By  showing  that  a  thing  may 
be  caused  to  move  !  "  Is  no  activity  given  to  the  ball? 
Is  not  the  whirlwind  active,  when  it  tears  up  the 
forest  ?"  And  so  he  goes  on,  leaving  the  light  of  rea- 
son and  of  consciousness ;  now  rushing  into  the  dark- 
ness of  the  whirlwind ;  now  riding  *'  on  the  mountain 
wave ;"  and  now  plunging  into  the  depths  of  "  volcanic 
lava ;" — all  the  time  in  quest  of  light  respecting  the  phe- 
nomena of  mind !  We  could  have  wished  him  to  stop 
awhile,  in  the  impetuous  current  of  rhetoric,  and  inform 
us,  whether  he  really  considers,  *'  the  motion  of  a  ball" 
as  the  same  thing  with  the  volition  of  the  mind.  If  he 
does,  then  he  may  suppose  that  his  illustrations  are  to 
the  purpose,  how  great  soever  may  be  his  mistake ;  but 
if  he  supposes  there  is  a  real  difference  between  them, 
how  can  he  ever  pretend  to  show  that  mind  may  be  caused 
to  act,  by  showing  that  body  may  be  caused  to  move  ? 

I  freely  admit,  that  body  may  be  caused  to  move. 
Body  is  perfectly  passive  in  motion ;  and  hence,  its  mo- 
tion may  be  caused.  But  the  mind  is  not  passive  in 
volition ;  and  hence  the  difference  in  the  two  cases.  It 
is  an  error,  as  I  have  already  said,  pervading  the  views 
of  the  necessitarian,  that  he  confounds  the  action  of  mind 
11 


118  EXAMINATION   OF 

with  the  motion  of  body.  Even  Mr.  Locke,  who,  in 
some  places,  has  recognized  the  essential  difference  be- 
tween them,  has  frequently  confounded  them  in  his  rea- 
sonings and  illustrations.  Hence,  it  becomes  necessary 
to  bear  this  distinction  always  in  mind,  in  the  examina- 
tion of  their  writings.  It  should  be  rendered  perfectly 
clear  to  our  minds  by  meditation;  and  never  permitted 
to  grow  dim  through  forgetfulness.  This  is  indispensa- 
bly necessary  to  shut  out  the  illusions  of  the  senses,  in 
order  that  we  may  have  a  clear  and  unclouded  view  of 
the  phenomena  of  nature. 

Is  the  motion  of  body,  then,  one  and  the  same  thing 
with  the  action  of  mind  ?  They  are  frequently  called 
by  the  same  name.  The  motion  of  mind,  and  the  action 
of  body,  are  very  common  modes  of  expression.  Body 
is  said  to  act,  when  it  only  moves ;  and  mind  is  said  to 
move,  when  it  really  acts.  These  metaphors  and  sup- 
posed analogies  are  intimatel}''  and  inseparably  inter- 
woven into  the  very  frame-work  of  our  language ;  and 
hence  the  necessity  of  guarding  against  them  in  our  con- 
ceptions. They  are  almost  as  subtle  as  the  great  adver- 
sary of  truth ;  and  therefore  we  should  be  constantly  on 
the  watch,  lest  we  should  be  deceived  or  misled  by 
them. 

Let  us  look,  then,  at  these  things  just  as  they  arQ  in 
themselves.  When  a  body  moves,  it  simply  passes  from 
one  place  to  another ;  and  when  the  mind  acts  or  chooses, 
it  simply  prefers  one  thing  to  another.  Here,  there  is 
no  real  identity  or  sameness  of  nature.  The  body  suf- 
fers a  change ;  the  mind  itself  acts.  The  one  is  pure 
passion  or  passiveness ;  the  other  is  pure  action — the 
very  opposite  of  passivity.  The  one  is  a  sufferings  and 
the  other  is  a  doing.     There  are  no  two  things  in  the 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  119 

whole  range  of  nature,  which  are  more  perfectly  and 
essentially  distinct;  and  he  who  confounds  them  in  his 
reasonings,  as  philosophers  have  so  often  done,  can  never 
arrive  at  a  clear  perception  of  the  truth. 

President  Day,  if  he  intended  any  thing  to  the  pur- 
pose, undertook  to  show  that  an  act  may  be  produced  in 
mind,  in  that  which  is  active,  by  the  action  or  influence 
of  something  else ;  and  what  has  he  shown  ?  Why, 
that  body  may  be  caused  to  move  !  Let  a  case  be  pro- 
duced in  which  the  mind,  the  active  soul  of  man,  is 
made  to  act :  let  a  case  be  produced  in  which  a  volition 
is  caused  to  exist  in  the  soul  of  man,  by  the  action  or 
influence  of  any  thing  whatever,  and  it  will  be  some- 
thing to  the  purpose :  but  what  does  it  signify  to  tell  us, 
that  a  body,  that  that  which  is  wholly  and  essentially 
passive  in  its  nature,  may  be  made  to  move,  or  suffer  a 
change  of  place?  A  more  palpable  sophism  was  never 
perpetrated ;  and  that  such  a  mind  should  have  recourse 
to  such  an  argument,  only  betrays  the  miserable  weak- 
ness, and  the  forlorn  hopelessness,  of  the  cause  in  which 
it  is  enlisted. 

Indeed,  the  learned  president  seems,  after  all,  to  be  at 
least  half  conscious  that  the  analogies  of  matter  can  throw 
no  light  on  the  phenomena  of  mind ;  and  that  what  he 
has  so  eloquently  said,  amounts  to  just  nothing  at  all. 
For  he  says,  "  It  may  be  objected,  that  these  are  all  ex- 
amples of  inanimate  objects  ;  and  that  they  have  no 
proper  application  to  mental  activity,"  p.  161.  Yes, 
truly,  this  is  the  very  objection  which  we  should  urge 
against  all  the  fine  illustrations  of  President  Day  ;  and  it 
is  a  full  and  complete  answer  to  them.  It  is  the  great 
principle  of  the  inductive  study  of  mind,  that  its  phe- 
nomena can  be  understood  only  in  so  far  as  we  have 


120  EXAMINATION    OF 

observed  them  in  the  pure  light  of  consciousness,  and  no 
farther ;  they  should  never  be  viewed  through  the  dark- 
ening and  confounding  analogies  of  matter. 

No  one,  that  I  know  of,  has  ever  denied  that  a  body- 
may  be  caused  to  move ;  the  only  point  on  which  we 
desire  to  be  enlightened  is,  whether  the  mind  may  be 
caused  to  act.  To  this  point  President  Day  next  directly 
comes.  Leaving  "inanimate  objects,"  he  says,  "take 
the  case  of  deep  and  earnest  thinking.  Is  there  no  ac- 
tivity in  this  ?  And  is  it  without  a  cause  ?  When  reading 
the  orations  of  Demosthenes,  or  the  demonstrations  of 
Newton,  are  our  minds  wholly  inactive ;  or  if  they  think 
intensely,  have  our  thoughts  no  dependence  on  the  book 
before  us?"  p.  161.  Truly,  there  is  activity  in  this,  in 
our  "  deep  and  earnest  thinking"  ;  but  what  is  the  cause 
of  this  activity  ?  Does  the  book  before  us  cause  us  to 
think  ?  This  is  the  point  at  which  the  argument  of  the 
author  is  driving,  and  to  which  it  should  come,  if  it  would 
be  to  the  purpose,  and  yet  he  does  not  seem  to  like  to 
speak  it  out  right  manfully ;  and  hence,  instead  of  saying 
that  the  book  causes  us  to  think,  he  chooses  to  say  that 
our  thoughts  have  a  dependence  on  the  book.  It  is  true, 
that  no  man  can  read  a  book,  unless  he  has  it  to  read  ; 
and,  consequently,  his  thoughts  in  reading  the  book  are 
absolutely  dependent  on  the  possession  of  it.  But  still, 
the  possession  of  a  book  is  the  condition,  and  not  the 
cause,  of  his  reading  it.  The  cause  of  a  thing,  and  the 
indispensable  condition  of  it,  are  perfectly  distinct  from 
each  other;  and  the  argument  of  Day,  in  confounding 
them,  has  presented  us  with  another  sophism. 

The  ideas  of  a  condition  and  of  a  cause,  though  so 
different  in  themselves,  are  always  blended  together  by 
necessitarians ;  and  hence  the  confusion  into  which  they 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  121 

run.  Edwards  has  united  them,  as  we  have  seen,  under 
the  term  cause  ;  and  -then  employed  this  term  to  signify 
the  one  or  the  other  at  his  pleasure.  The  word  "  depen- 
dence," is  the  favourite  of  President  Day ;  and  he  uses  it 
with  fully  as  much  vagueness  and  vacillation  of  meaning, 
as  Edwards  does  the  term  cause.  He  has  undertaken  to 
show  us,  that  the  mind  may  be  caused  to  act ;  and  he  has 
shown  us,  that  a  particular  class  of  thoughts  cannot  come 
to  existence,  except  upon  a  particular  condition !  This 
is  not  to  reason ;  but  to  slip  and  to  slide  from  one  mean- 
ing of  an  ambiguous  word  to  another. 

When  it  is  said  that  the  mind  cannot  be  caused  to  act. 
President  Day  must  have  known  in  what  sense  the  term 
cause  is  used  in  this  proposition.  He  must  have  known, 
that  no  one  meant  to  assert,  that  there  are  no  conditions 
or  antecedents^  on  which  the  action  of  the  mind  depends. 
There  is  not  an  advocate  of  free-agency  in  the  universe, 
who  will  contend,  that  the  mind  can  choose  a  thing,  unless 
there  is  a  thing  to  be  chosen ;  or,  to  take  his  own  illus- 
tration, can  read  a  book,  unless  there  is  a  book  to  be 
read.  The  question  is  not,  whether  there  are  conditions^ 
without  the  existence  of  which  the  mind  cannot  act ;  this 
no  one  denies  ;  but  whether  there  is,  or  can  be,  a  real  and 
efficient  cause  of  the  mind's  action.  The  point  in  dispute, 
relates  not  to  mere  fact  of  dependence,  but  to  the  nature 
of  that  dependence.  The  question  is,  can  the  mind  he 
efficiently  caused  to  act  ?  This  being  the  question,  what 
does  it  signify  to  tell  us,  that  it  cannot  read  a  book,  unless 
it  has  a  book  to  read  ?  Or  what  does  it  signify  to  tell  us, 
that  a  body  may  be  caused  to  move  ?  These  are  mere 
irrelevancies ;  they  fall  short  of  the  point  in  dispute ;  and 
they  only  seem  to  reach  it  by  means  of  a  very  "  convenient 
ambiguity"  of  words. 

11* 


122  EXAMINATION   OF 

But  Still  it  may  be  said,  that  although  a  body  is  passive 
in  motion,  it  may  act  upon  other  bodies,  and  thereby  com- 
municate motion  to  them.  This  is  the  ground  taken  by 
President  Day.  "  The  very  same  thing,"  says  he,  "  may 
be  both  cause  and  effect.  The  mountain  wave,  which  is 
the  effect  of  the  wind,  may  be  the  cause  which  buries  the 
ship  in  the  ocean,"  p.  160.  I  am  aware,  that  one  body 
is  frequently  said  to  act  upon  another ;  but  this  word 
action,  as  President  Day  has  well  said,  is  a  term  "  of 
very|convenient  ambiguity,  with  which  it  is  easy  to  con- 
struct a  plausible  but  fallacious  argument,"  p.  159.  The 
only  cause  in  every  case  of  motion,  is  that  force,  what- 
ever it  may  be,  which  acts  upon  the  body  moved,  and  puts 
it  in  motion.  All  the  rest  is  pure  passion  or  passiveness. 
The  motion  of  the  body  is  not  action ;  it  is  the  most  pure 
passion  of  which  the  mind  can  form  a  conception.  If  a 
body  in  motion  is  said  to  act  upon  another,  this  is  but  a 
metaphor  ;  there  is  no  real  action  in  the  case.  Indeed,  if 
a  body  be  put  in  motion,  and  meets  with  no  resistance,  it 
will  move  on  in  a  right  Une  forever — and  why  ?  just  be- 
cause of  its  inertia,  of  its  inherent  destitution  of  a  power 
to  act.  As  a  mathematician.  President  Day  certainly 
knew  all  this  ;  but  he  seems  to  have  forgotten  it  all,  in  his 
eagerness  to  support  the  cause  of  moral  necessity. 

He  saw  that  motion  is  frequently  called  action ;  he  saw 
that  one  body  is  sometimes  said  to  act  upon  another ;  and 
this  was  sufficient  for  his  purpose.  He  did  not  reflect 
upon  the  natures  of  motion  and  of  volition,  as  they  are 
in  themselves  ;  he  views  them  through  the  medium  of  an 
ambiguous  phraseology.  Nor  did  he  reflect,  that  if  motion 
is  communicated  from  one  body  to  another,  this  is  not 
because  one  body  really  acts  upon  another,  but  because 
it  is  impossible  for  two  bodies  to  occupy  the  same  place 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  123 

at  one  and  the  same  time.  He  did  not  reflect,  that  if 
motion  is  communicated  from  one  body  to  another,  this 
does  not  arise  from  the  activity,  but  from  the  impenetra- 
bihty  of  matter.  In  short,  he  did  not  reflect,  that  there 
is  no  state  or  phenomena  of  matter,  whatever  may  be  its 
name,  that  at  all  resembles  the  state  of  mind  which  we  call 
action  or  volition ;  or  else  he  would  have  seen,  that  all 
his  illustrations  drawn  from  material  objects  can  throw  no 
light  on  the  point  in  controversy. 

We  find  the  same  confusion  of  things  in  the  works  of  the 
Edwardses.  We  do  not  at  all  confound  action  and  pas- 
sion, President  Edwards  contends,  by  supposing  that  acts 
of  the  soul  are  effects,  wherein  the  soul  is  the  object  of 
something  acting  upon  and  influencing  it,  p.  203.  And 
again,  "  It  is  no  more  a  contradiction  to  suppose  that  ac- 
tion may  be  the  eflTect  of  some  other  cause  beside  the 
agent,  or  being  that  acts,  than  to  suppose  that  life  may  be 
the  efl^ect  of  some  other  cause  beside  the  being  that  lives," 
p.  203.  The  younger  Edwards  also  asserts,  that  "  to  say 
that  an  agent  that  is  acted  upon  cannot  act,  is  as  ground- 
less, as  to  say,  that  a  body  acted  upon  cannot  move,"  p. 
181.  We  might  adduce  many  similar  passages  ;  but  these 
are  sufloicient.  What  do  they  prove  ?  If  they  are  any 
thing  to  the  purpose,  they  are  only  so  by  confounding 
motion  with  volition,*  passion  with  action. 

No  one  would  pretend  to  deny,  that  the  mind  may  be, 
and  is,  caused  to  exist,  or  that  the  agent  may  be  caused  to 
live.  In  regard  to  our  being  and  living  we  are  perfectly 
passive  ;  and  hence  we  admit  that  we  may  be  caused  to 
exist  and  to  live.  Living  and  being  are  not  acting. 
We  are  not  passive  in  regard  to  volition ;  this  is  an  act  of 
the  mind  itself.  The  above  assertions  only  overlook  the 
slight  circumstance  that  being  and  doing  are  two  diflferent 


124  EXAMINATION   OF 

things  ;  that  motion  is  not  volition,  that  passion  is  not  ac- 
tion. This  strange  confusion  of  things  is  very  common 
in  the  writings  of  the  Edwardses,  as  well  as  in  those  of  all 
other  necessitarians. 

Edwards  held  volition  to  be  a  produced  effect.  This 
identifies  a  passive  impression  made  upon  the  mind,  with 
an  act  of  the  mind  itself.  In  order  to  escape  this  diffi- 
culty, Edwards  was  bound  to  show  that  action  and  pas- 
sion are  not  opposite  in  their  natures.  "  Action,  when 
properly  set  in  opposition  to  passion  or  passiveness,"  says 
he,  "  is  no  real  existence ;  it  is  not  the  same  with  a7i  ac- 
tion, but  is  a  mere  relation."  And  again,  "  Action  and 
passion  are  not  two  contrary  natures ;"  when  placed  in 
opposition  they  are  only  contrary  relations.  The  same 
ground  is  taken  by  President  Day.  "  Are  not  cause  and 
effect,"  says  he,  "  opposite  in  their  natures  ?  They  are 
opposite  relations,  but  not  always  opposite  things."  They 
contend,  that  an  object  may  be  passive  in  relation  to  one 
thing,  and  active  in  relation  to  another ;  that  a  volition 
may  be  passive  in  relation  to  its  producing  cause,  and  yet 
active  in  relation  to  its  produced  effect. 

Now,  this  is  not  true.  An  act  is  opposite  in  its  na- 
ture to  a  passive  impression  made  upon  the  mind.  This 
every  man  may  clearly  see  by  suitable  reflection,  if  he  will 
not  blind  himself  to  the  truth,  as  the  necessitarian  always 
does,  by  false  analogies  drawn  from  the  world  of  matter, 
and  the  phenomena  of  motion.  We  have  seen  how  Pre- 
sident Day  has  attempted  to  show,  that  an  object  may  be 
passive  in  relation  to  one  thing,  and  yet  active  in  relation 
to  another;  and  that  in  all  these  attempts  he  has  con- 
founded the  motion  of  body  with  the  action  or  choice  of 
mind.  We  have  seen  that  all  the  illustrations  adduced  to 
throw  light  on  this  subject  are  fallacious.  Let  this  subject 


EDWARDS   ON  THE    WILL.  125 

be  studied  in  the  light  of  consciousness,  not  through  the 
darkening  and  confounding  medium  of  false  analogies,  and 
we  may  safely  anticipate  a  verdict  in  our  favour.  For 
who  that  will  closely  and  steadily  reflect  upon  an  action 
of  the  mind,  does  not  perceive  that  it  is  different,  in  nature 
and  in  kind,  from  a  passive  impression  made  upon  the 
mind  from  without  ?  I  do  not  say  action,  which  Presi- 
dent Edwards  seems  to  thmk  does  not  signify  any  thing 
positive,  such  as  an  action,  when  it  is  set  in  opposition 
to  passion ;  but  I  say  that  an  action  itself  is  opposite  in 
its  nature  to  passion,  to  a  produced  effect. 

President  Edwards  cannot  escape  the  absurdity  of  his 
doctrine  by  alleging,  that  when  action  and  passion  are  set 
in  opposition,  they  do  not  signify  opposite  natures,  but 
only  opposite  relations.  For  he  has  confounded  an  act 
of  the  mind  with  a  passive  impression  made  thereon ; 
and  these  things  are  opposite  in  their  natures,  whether  he 
is  pleased  to  say  that  action  and  passion  are  opposite  na* 
tures  or  not. 

This  position  may  be  easily  established.  "  I  hai'dly  ^ 
conceive,"  says  he,  "  that  the  affections  of  the  soul  are 
not  properly  distinguished  from  the  will,  as  though  they 
were  two  faculties  in  the  soul."  .  .  .  .  "  The  affections 
are  no  other  than  the  more  vigorous  and  sensible  exercises 
of  the  inclination  and  will  of  the  soul."  These  passages 
are  referred  to  by  President  Day  to  prove,  that  Edwards 
regarded  our  "  emotions  or  affections  as  acts  of  the  will," 
p.  39.  Having  confounded  the  will  and  the  sensibility,  it 
became  exceedingly  easy  for  Edwards  to  show  that  a  voli- 
tion may  be  produced  or  caused :  all  that  he  had  to  do 
was  to  show,  that  an  emotion  may  be  produced,  which  is 
the  same  thing  with  an  act  of  the  will  or  a  volition.  It  is 
upon  this  confusion  of  things,  that  his  whole  system  rests ; 


^>^  MA<^ 


126  EXAMINATION   OF 

for  if  the  sensibility  is  different  from  the  will,  as  most 
persons,  at  the  present  day,  will  admit  it  is  ;  then  to  ex- 
cite an  emotion,  or  to  make  a  passive  impression  upon  the 
sensibility,  is  very  different  from  producing  a  volition. 

Edwards  has  taken  great  pains  with  the  superstructure 
of  his  system,  while  he  has  left  its  foundations  without 
support.  He  has  not  shown,  nor  can  any  man  show,  that 
the  sensibiUty  and  the  will  are  one  and  the  same  faculty  of 
the  soul.  He  assumes  that  an  emotion  is  an  act  of  the 
will ,  and  then  proceeds  to  build  upon  it,  and  to  argue  from 
it,  as  if  it  were  a  clear  and  unquestionable  truth.  Thus, 
he  repeatedly  says,  that  whatever  pleases  us  most,  or  ex- 
cites the  most  agreeable  sensation,  is  that  which  "  ope- 
rates to  induce  a  volition*,"  and  to  say  otherwise,  is  to 
assert  that  that  which  pleases  us  most,  does  not  please  us 
most.  Such  assertions,  (and  I  have  already  had  occasion 
to  adduce  many  sucl},)  clearly  identify  a  sense  of  the  most 
agreeable,  or  the  most  pleasing  emotion,  with  an  act  of 
the  will.  His  definition,  as  we  have  already  seen,  laid 
the  foundation  for  this,  and  his  arguments  are  based  upon 
it.  The  passive  impression,  or  the  sensation  produced,  is, 
according  to  Edwards,  a  volition !  No  wonder,  then,  that 
he  could  conceive  of  an  action  of  the  mind  as  being  pro- 
duced. The  wonder  is,  how  he  could  conceive  of  it  as 
being  an  action  at  all. 

Let  us  suppose,  now,  that  a  feehng  or  an  emotion  is 
produced  by  an  object  in  view  of  the  mind.  It  will  follow, 
that  the  mind  is  passive  in  feeling,  or  in  experiencing  emo- 
tion. We  are  conscious  of  such  feeling  or  emotion ;  and 
hence  we  infer,  that  we  are  susceptible  of  feeling  or  emo- 
tion. This  susceptibility  we  call  the  sensibility,  the  heart, 
the  affections,  &lc.  But  there  is  another  phenomenon  of 
our  nature,  which  is  perfectly  distinct  in  nature  and  in 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  *         127 

kind  from  an  emotion  or  a  feeling.  We  are  conscious  of 
a  volition  or  choice ;  and  hence  we  infer  that  we  have  a 
power  of  acting,  or  putting  forth  volitions.  This  power 
we  call  the  will. 

Now,  the  phenomena  exhibited  by  these  two  faculties 
of  the  soul,  the  sensibility  and  the  will,  are  entirely  dif- 
ferent from  each  other ;  and  there  is  not  the  least  shadow 
of  evidence  going  to  show  that  the  faculties  themselves 
are  one  and  the  same.  On  the  contrary,  we  are  compelled 
by  a  fundamental  law  of  belief,  to  regard  the  susceptibility 
of  our  nature,  by  which  we  feel,  as  different  from  that 
power  of  the  soul,  by  which  we  act  or  put  forth  volitions. 
The  only  reason  we  have  for  saying  that  matter  is  dif- 
ferent from  mind,  is  that  its  manifestations  or  phenomena 
are  diiferent ;  and  we  have  a  similar  reason  for  asserting, 
that  the  emotive  part  of  our  nature,  or  the  sensibility,  is 
distinct  from  the  will.  And  yet,  in  the  face  of  all  this. 
President  Edwards  has  expressly  denied  that  there  is  any 
difference  between  these  two  faculties  of  the  soul.  It  is 
in  this  confusion  of  things,  in  this  false  psychology,  that 
he  has  laid  the  foundation  of  his  system. 

If  President  Edwards  be  right,  it  is  no  wonder  that  the 
younger  Edwards  should  so  often  assert,  that  it  is  no  more 
absurd  to  say,  that  vohtion  may  be  caused,  than  it  is  to 
say,  that  feeling  or  emotion  may  be  caused.  For,  if  the 
doctrine  in  question  be  true,  a  volition  is  an  emotion  or 
feeling ;  and  to  produce  the  one  is  to  produce  the  other. 
How  short  and  easy  has  the  path  of  the  necessitarian  been 
made,  by  a  convenient  definition  ! 

If  we  only  bear  the  distinction  between  the  sensibility 
and  the  will  in  mind,  it  will  be  exceedingly  easy  to  see 
through  the  cloudy  sophistications  of  the  necessitarian. 
"  How  does  it  appear  to  be  a  fact^  asks  President  Day, 


128        •  EXAMINATION   OF 

"  that  the  will  cannot  act  when  it  is  acted  upon  ?"  I  reply- 
that  the  will  is  not  acted  upon  at  all ;  that  passive  impres- 
sions are  made  upon  the  sensibility,  and  not  upon  the  will. 
This  is  a  fact  which  the  necessitarian  always  overlooks. 

Again ;  the  same  object  may  be  both  passive  and  active ; 
passive  with  respect  to  one  thing,  and  active  with  respect 
to  another.  Thus,  says  President  Day,  "  The  axe  is  pas- 
sive, with  respect  to  the  hand  which  moves  it ;  but  active, 
with  respect  to  the  object  which  it  strikes.  The  cricket 
club  is  passive  in  receiving  motion  from  the  hand  of  the 
player;  it  is  active  in  commwmc«/in^  motion  to  the  ball." 
The  fallacy  of  all  such  illustrations,  in  confounding  motion 
and  action,  I  have  already  noticed,  and  I  intend  to  say 
nothing  more  in  relation  to  this  point.  But  there  is  ano- 
ther less  palpable  fallacy  in  them. 

How  are  such  illustrations  intended  to  be  applied  to  the 
phenomena  of  volition  ?  Is  it  meant,  that  volition  itself 
is  passive  in  relation  to  one  thing,  and  active  in  relation  to 
another  ?  If  so,  I  reply  it  is  absurd  to  affirm,  that  volition, 
or  an  act,  is  passive  in  relation  to  any  thing  ?  Is  it  meant, 
that  not  volition  itself,  but  the  will,  is  passive  to  that  which 
acts  upon  it,  while  it  is  active  in  relation  to  its  effect  ?  If 
so,  I  contend  that  the  will  is  not  acted  upon  at  all ;  that  the 
passive  impression  is  made  upon  the  sensibility,  and  not 
upon  the  will.  Is  it  supposed,  that  it  is  neither  the  voli- 
tion nor  the  will,  which  is  both  active  and  passive  at  the 
same  time ;  but  that  it  is  the  mind  ?  This  may  be  very 
true.  The  mind  may  be  passive,  if  you  please,  in  relation 
to  that  which  acts  upon  its  sensibility,  while  it  is  active 
in  volition  ;  but  how  does  this  prove  the  doctrine,  that  an 
act  may  be  produced  by  something  else  acting  upon  the 
will  ?  How  does  this  show,  that  action  and  passion  are 
not  confounded,  in  supposing  that  an  act  is  caused?   The 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  129 

passive  impression,  the  state  of  the  sensibility  is  produced ; 
but  this  is  not  a  volition.  The  passive  impression  exists 
in  the  sensibihty ;  the  vohtion  exists  in  the  will.  The  first 
is  a  produced  effect ;  the  last  is  an  act  of  the  mind.  And 
the  only  way  in  which  this  act  of  the  mind  itself  has  been 
linked  with  that  which  acts  upon  the  mind,  as  an  effect  is 
linked  with  its  cause,  has  been  by  confounding  the  sensi- 
bility with  the  will;  and  the  light  of  this  distinction  is  no 
sooner  held  up,  than  we  see  that  a  very  important  link  is 
wanting  in  the  chain  of  the  necessitarian's  logic.  Let  this 
light  be  carried  around  through  all  the  dark  corners  of  his 
system,  and  through  all  its  dark  labyrinths  of  words  ;  and 
many  a  lurking  sophism  will  be  detected  and  brought  out 
from  its  unsuspected  hiding  place. 

When  it  is  said,  that  the  same  thing  may  be  active  and 
passive,  this  remark  should  be  understood  with  reference 
to  the  mind  itself.  The  language  of  the  necessitarian,  I 
am  aware,  sometimes  points  to  the  volition  itself,  and 
sometimes  to  the  will ;  but  we  should  always  understand 
him  as  referring  to  the  mind.  He  may  not  have  so  under- 
stood himself;  but  he  must  be  so  understood.  For  it  is 
not  the  will  that  acts  ;  it  is  the  mind.  This  is  conceded 
by  the  necessitarian.  Hence,  when  he  says,  that  the  same 
thing  may  be  both  active  and  passive,  he  must  be  under- 
stood as  applying  this  proposition  to  the  mind  itself;  and 
not  to  the  will  or  to  volition.  It  is  the  mind  that  acts ; 
and  hence  the  mind  must  be  also  passive ;  or  we  cannot 
say  that  the  same  thing  may  be  both  active  and  passive. 

The  mind  then,  it  may  be  said,  is  both  active  and  pas 
sive  at  the  same  time.  But  it  is  passive  in  regard  to  its 
emotions  and  feelings  ;  and  hence,  if  you  please,  these  may 
be  produced.  It  is  active  in  regard  to  its  volitions,  or 
rather  in  its  volitions ;  and  hence  these  cannot  be  pro- 
12 


130  EXAMINATION   OF 

duced  by  the  action  of  any  thing  upon  the  mind.  To 
show  that  they  can,  the  necessitarian,  as  we  have  seen, 
has  confounded  a  passive  impression  with  an  active  voli- 
tion. If  these  be  distinct,  as  they  most  clearly  are,  the 
necessitarian  can  make  his  point  good,  only  by  showing 
that  the  passive  impression  made  upon  the  mind,  is  con- 
nected with  the  volition  of  the  mind,  as  a  producing  cause 
is  connected  with  its  effect.  But  this  he  has  not  shown ; 
and  hence  his  whole  system  rests  upon  gratuitous  and  un- 
founded assumptions.  I  say  his  whole  system ;  for  if  the 
mind  cannot  be  caused  to  act,  if  it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  a 
produced  action,  it  is  not  true,  that  an  action  or  volition 
does  or  can  result  from  the  necessitating  action,  or  influ- 
ence of  motives. 


EDWARDS  ON   THE    WILL.  131 


SECTION  XI. 

OF  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  THE  FOREKNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD. 

The  argument  from  the  foreknowledge  of  God,  is  one 
on  which  the  necessitarian  relies  with  great  confidence. 
Nor  is  this  at  all  surprising ;  since  to  so  many  minds,  even 
among  distinguished  philosophers,  the  prescience  of  Deity 
and  the  free-agency  of  man  have  appeared  to  be  irrecon- 
cilable. 

Thus,  says  Mr.  Stewart,  "  I  have  mentioned  the  attempt 
of  Clarke  and  others  to  show  that  no  valid  argument 
against  the  scheme  of  free-will  can  be  deduced  from  the 
prescience  of  God,  even  supposing  that  to  extend  to  all 
the  actions  of  voluntary  beings.  On  this  point  I  must 
decline  offering  any  opinion  of  my  own,  because  I  con- 
ceive it  as  placed  far  beyond  the  reach  of  our  faculties." 
Dr.  Campbell  also  says,  "  To  reconcile  the  divine  pre- 
science with  the  freedom,  and  even  contingency,  and  con- 
sequently with  the  good  or  ill  desert  of  human  actions,  is 
what  I  have  never  yet  seen  achieved  by  any,  and  indeed 
despair  of  seeing."  And  Mr.  Locke  declares,  "  I  cannot 
make  freedom  in  man  consistent  with  omnipotence  and 
omniscience  in  God,  though  I  am  as  fully  persuaded  of 
both  as  of  any  truth  I  most  firmly  assent  to ;  and  there- 
fore I  have  long  since  given  off  the  consideration  of  that 
subject,  resolving  all  into  this  short  conclusion,  that  if  it 
is  possible  for  God  to  make  a  free-agent,  then  man  is 
free,  though  I  see  not  the  way  of  it." 

Sentiments  Hke  these,  which  are  so  often  met  with  in 


132  EXAMINATION   OF 

the  writings  of  eminent  philosophers,  have  repeatedly  led 
me  to  reconsider  the  conclusion  at  which  I  have  arrived 
on  this  subject;  but  I  have  been  able  to  discover  no  reason 
why  it  should  be  abandoned.  Indeed,  if  authority  were 
a  sufficient  reason  why  the  great  difficulty  in  question 
should  be  regarded  as  incapable  of  being  solved,  I  should 
abandon  it  in  despair,  and  leave  the  necessitarian  to  make 
the  most  of  his  argument ;  but  it  has  only  induced  me  to 
proceed  with  the  greater  caution;  and  this,  instead  of 
having  shaken  my  convictions,  has  settled  them  with  the 
greater  firmness  and  clearness  in  my  mind.  Whether  I 
am  in  the  right,  or  whether  I  labour  under  a  hallucina- 
tion, satisfactory  only  to  myself,  and  perplexing  to  all 
others,  I  must  submit  to  the  candid  consideration  of  the 
reader 

Why  should  it  be  thought  impossible  to  reconcile  the 
free-agency  of  man  with  the  foreknowledge  of  God  ?  No 
one  pretends  that  there  is  any  disagreement  between  the 
things  themselves,  as  they  really  exist ;  if  there  is  any 
discrepancy  in  the  case,  it  must  exist  only  between  our 
ideas  of  foreknowledge  and  free-agency.  Indeed,  we  can- 
not think  of  the  things  themselves,  or  compare  them,  ex- 
cept by  means  of  the  ideas  we  have  formed  of  them  ;  and 
if  our  ideas  of  them  are  really  irreconcilable,  it  is  because 
they  have  not  been  correctly  formed,  and  do  not  corre- 
spond with  the  things  themselves.  What  shall  we  do 
then  ?  Shall  we  set  to  work  to  reform  our  ideas  ?  Shall 
we  explain  away  the  free-agency  of  man,  or  deny  the 
foreknowledge  of  God  ?     No.     We  may  retain  both. 

Edwards  contends,  that  volitions  are  brought  to  pass  by 
the  influence  of  motives,  and  that  it  is  impossible  in  any 
case,  that  a  volition  should  depart  from  the  influence  of 
the  strongest  motive.    This  is  the  great  doctrine  of  moral 


EDWARDS  ON  THE   WILL.  133 

necessity,  which  it  is  the  object  of  President  Edwards  to 
establish.  Now,  if  his  celebrated  argument,  or  "  demon- 
stration," as  it  is  called,  proves  this  point,  then  it  is  to  be 
held  as  true  and  valid ;  but  if  it  only  proves  some  other  thing 
which  is  called  by  the  name  of  necessity,  it  is  not  to  the 
purpose.  And  if  it  can  be  shown,  that  his  argument  does 
not  prove  any  thing  at  all  in  relation  to  the  causation  of 
choice,  it  will  appear  that  it  has  no  relevancy  to  the  point 
at  issue. 

The  foreknowledge  of  God,  I  admit,  infers  the  neces- 
sity of  all  human  actions,  in  one  sense  of  the  word ;  but 
not  that  kind  of  necessity  for  which  any  necessitarian 
pleads,  or  against  which  any  libertarian  is  at  all  concerned 
to  contend.  The  fallacy  of  the  argument  in  question  is, 
that  it  shows  all  human  actions  to  be  necessary  in  a  sense 
in  which  it  is  not  opposed  to  any  scheme  of  liberty  what- 
ever, and  assumes  them  to  be  necessary  in  another  and 
quite  different  sense ;  and  thus  the  great  doctrine  of  free- 
will, otherwise  so  clear  and  unquestionable,  is  oversha- 
dowed and  obscured  by  an  imperfect  and  ambiguous 
phraseology,  rather  than  by  the  inherent  difficulties  of  the 
subject.  This  is  the  position  which  I  shall  endeavour  to 
establish. 

The  first  argument  of  President  Edwards  is  as  follows. 
When  the  existence  of  a  thing  is  infaUibly  and  indissolubly 
connected  with  something  else,  which  has  already  had 
existence,  then  its  existence  is  necessary ;  but  the  future 
volitions  of  moral  agents,  are  infalUbly  and  indissolubly 
connected  with  the  foreknowledge  of  God ;  and  therefore 
they  are  necessary,  p.  114-15.  Now  this  argument  is 
perfectly  sound ;  the  conclusion  is  really  contained  in  the 
premise,  or  definition  of  necessity,  and  it  is  fairly  deduced 
from  it.  It  is  as  perfect  as  any  syllogism  in  Euclid— 
12* 


134  EXAMINATION   OF 

hut  what  does  it  prove  ?  It  proves  that  all  human  ac- 
tions are  necessary — but  in  what  sense  ?  Does  it  prove 
that  they  are  necessary  with  a  moral  necessity  ?  Does 
it  prove  that  they  are  brought  to  pass  by  the  influence  of 
moral  causes?  No  such  thing  is  even  pretended.  "I 
allow  what  Dr.  Whitby  says  to  be  true,"  says  Edwards, 
"  that  mere  foreknowledge  does  not  affect  the  thing  known, 
to  make  it  more  certain  or  future,"  p.  122.  He  admits 
that  foreknowledge  exerts  "  no  influence  on  the  thing 
known  to  make  it  necessary."  He  does  not  even  pre- 
tend that  there  is  any  moral  necessity  shown  to  exist  by 
this  argument ;  and  hence  his  conclusion  has  no  connexion 
with  the  great  doctrine  of  the  Inquiry,  or  the  point  in  dis- 
pute. It  aims  at  the  word,  but  not  at  the  thing.  The  in- 
fallible connexion  it  shows  to  exist,  is  admitted  to  be 
entirely  difierent  from  the  infallible  connexion  between 
moral  causes  and  volitions ;  that  is  to  say,  it  is  admitted 
that  it  does  not  prove  any  thing  to  the  purpose. 

But  is  the  indissoluble  connexion,  or  necessity,  estab- 
lished by  this  argument,  at  all  inconsistent  with  human 
liberty  1  If  it  is  not,  and  if  our  scheme  of  liberty  is  per- 
fectly consistent  and  reconcilable  with  it ;  then  it  infers 
nothing,  and  is  nothing,  that  is  opposed  to  what  we  hold. 

This  question  admits  of  an  easy  solution.  The  fore- 
knowledge of  a  future  event  proves  it  to  be  necessary  in 
precisely  the  same  manner  that  the  knowledge  of  a  pre- 
sent event  shows  it  to  be  necessary.  This  is  conceded  by 
Edwards.  "  All  certain  knowledge,"  says  he,  "  whether 
it  be  foreknowledge,  or  after  knowledge,  or  concomitant 
knowledge,  proves  the  thing  known  now  to  be  necessary, 
by  some  means  or  other;  or  proves  that  it  is  impos- 
sible it  should  now  be  otherwise  than  true^"*  p.  121. 
And  again,  "  All  certain  knowledge  proves  the  necessity 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  135 

of  the  truth  known ;  whether  it  be  before^  or  after y  or  at 
the  same  time,^^  p.  124 ;  and  so  in  other  places. 

In  what  sense  then,  let  us  inquire,  does  the  knowledge 
of  a  present  event  prove  it  to  be  necessary  ?  It  is  neces- 
sary, says  Edwards,  because  it  is  indissolubly  connected 
with  the  knowledge  of  it.  In  other  words,  it  could  not 
possibly  be  known  to  exist,  unless  it  did  exist ;  and  hence, 
its  existence  is  said  to  be  indissolubly  connected  with  the 
knowledge  of  its  existence,  or,  in  other  words,  it  is  said 
to  be  necessary.  This  is  all  true ;  but  is  this  indissoluble 
connexion,  or  necessity,  at  all  inconsistent  with  the  con- 
tingency of  the  event  known  ?  This  is  the  question ; 
and  let  us  not  lose  sight  of  it  in  a  mist  of  words.  Let  it 
be  distinctly  borne  in  mind,  and  it  will  be  easily  settled. 

For  this  purpose,  let  us  suppose,  to  adopt  the  language 
of  President  Edwards,  "  that  nonentity  is  about  to  bring 
forth ;"  and  that  an  event  comes  into  being  without  any 
cause  of  its  existence.  This  event  then  exists  ;  it  is  seen, 
and  it  is  known  to  exist.  Now,  even  on  this  wild  sup- 
position, there  is  an  infallible  and  indissoluble  connexion 
between  the  existence  of  the  event  and  the  knowledge  of 
it ;  and  hence  it  is  necessary,  in  the  sense  above  explained. 
But  what  has  this  necessary  connexion  to  do  with  the 
cause  of  its  existence  ?  This  indissoluble  connexion,  this 
dire  necessity,  is  perfectly  consistent,  as  we  have  seen, 
with  the  supposition  that  the  event  had  no  cause  at  all  of 
its  existence.  How  can  it  conflict,  then,  with  any  scheme 
of  free-agency  that  ever  was  dreamed  of  by  man  ? 

If  this  argument  proves  any  thing  in  regard  to  human 
actions,  it  only  proves  that  a  volition  has  an  efliect,  and  not 
that  it  has  a  cause.  Indeed,  it  has  been  said,  that  the 
knowledge  of  an  event  is  the  effect  of  its  existence  ;  and 
the  same  remark  has  been  extended  to  the  foreknowledge 


136  EXAMINATION   OF 

of  God  with  respect  to  the  future  voHtions  of  human 
beings.  This  position  is  not  denied  by  Edwards  ;  he 
considers,  in  fact,  that  it  strengthens,  rather  than  weakens, 
his  argument.  "  Because  it  shows  the  existence  of  the 
event  to  be  so  settled  and  firm,  that  it  is  as  if  it  had 
already  been;  inasmuch  as  in  effect  it  actually  exists 
already ;"  and  much  more  to  the  same  purpose,  p.  122-3. 
"  It  is  as  strong  arguing,"  says  he,  "  from  the  effect  to  the 
cause,  as  from  the  cause  to  the  effect." 

This  is  all  true;  it  is  as  strong  arguing  from  effect 
to  cause,  as  it  is  from  cause  to  effect.  But  do  the 
arguments  prove  the  same  thing  ?  Let  us  see.  I  know 
a  thing  to  exist ;  and  therefore  it  does  exist.  This  is  to 
reason  from  effect  to  cause.  The  conclusion  is  inevita- 
ble ;  but  what  does  it  prove  ?  Why,  it  proves  that  the 
thing  does  exist — it  proves  the  bare  fact  of  existence. 
The  indissoluble  connexion,  or  the  necessity,  in  this 
case,  exists  between  the  knowledge  and  the  event 
known ;  and  it  has  no  relation  to  the  question  how  the 
event  came  to  exist.  This  argument,  then,  in  regard  to 
human  volitions,  only  proves  that  they  are  indissolubly 
connected  with  their  effects,  and  are  necessarily  im- 
plied by  them;  just  as  every  cause  is  implied  by  its 
effects :  but  no  libertarian  in  the  world  has  ever  ques- 
tioned such  a  position.  For  all  that  such  an  argument 
proves,  all  the  volitions  of  moral  agents  may  come  into 
existence,  without  having  the  least  shadow  of  reason  or 
ground  of  their  existence.  We  admit  that  volitions  are 
efficient  causes  ;  and  that  they  have  effects,  with  which 
they  are  indissolubly  connected.  Edwards  undertook  to 
show,  that  volitions  are  necessary,  because  they  are  in- 
fallibly and  indissolubly  connected  with  their  causes; 
and  he  has  shown  that  they  are  necessary,  because  they 


EDWARDS  ON  THE   WILL.  137 

are  infallibly  and  indissolubly  connected  with  their  ef- 
fects !     This  is  one  branch  of  his  great  argument. 

There  is  another  sense,  in  which  the  knowledge  of  an 
event,  whether  it  be  /ore,  or  after,  or  concomitant, 
knowledge,  proves  it  to  be  necessary.  This  sense  is  not 
clearly  distinguished  from  the  former  by  Edwards.  He 
recognizes  them  both,  however,  although  he  blends  them 
together,  and  frequently  turns  from  the  one  to  the  other 
in  the  course  of  his  argument.  It  is  highly  important, 
and  affords  no  little  satisfaction,  to  keep  them  clearly 
distinct  in  our  minds. 

A  thing  is  said  to  be  necessary,  as  we  have  seen,  be- 
cause it  is  connected  with  the  knowledge  of  it ;  and,  if  a 
thing  does  exist,  or  is  certainly  and  infallibly  known  to 
exist,  it  may  be  said  to  be  necessary,  on  the  principle 
that  it  is  impossible  it  should  exist  and  not  exist  at  one 
and  the  same  time.  These  two  things  are  evidently  dif- 
ferent ;  and,  for  the  sake  of  distinctness  in  our  language, 
as  well  as  in  our  thoughts,  I  shall  call  the  first  a  logical, 
and  the  last  an  axiomatical  necessity.  A  thing,  then, 
which  does  exist,  is  said  to  be  necessary  with  an  ax- 
iomatical necessity ;  because  it  is  impossible  for  it  not 
to  exist  while  it  does  exist :  and  it  is  said  to  be  neces- 
sary, with  a  logical  necessity,  because  it  is  indissolubly 
connected  with  the  knowledge  of  it.  The  former  kind 
of  necessity  is  frequently  presented  in  this  form  of  ex- 
pression, that  if  a  thing  does  exist,  it  is  impossible  it 
should  be  otherwise  than  true  that  it  does  exist.  In  this 
form  of  expression,  it  is  frequently  resorted  to  by  Ed- 
wards. 

Thus,  says  he,  "  I  observed  before,  in  explaining  the 
nature  of  necessity,  that  in  things  which  are  past,  their 
past  existence  is  now  necessary ;  having  alreadj-  made 


138  EXAMINATION    OF 

sure  of  existence,  it  is  now  impossible  that  it  should 
be  otherwise  than  true,  that  the  thing  has  existed,''^  p. 
114-15.  Just  so  we  may  say  in  relation  to  things 
which  now  exist ;  for,  having  already  made  sure  of  ex- 
istence, it  is  impossible  it  should  be  otherwise  than  true, 
that  they  do  now  exist ;  or,  in  other  words,  it  is  impos- 
sible they  should  not  exist  while  they  do  exist.  In  like 
manner,  if  the  future  existence  of  any  thing  is  fore- 
known, "it  is  impossible  it  should  be  otherwise  than 
true,"  that  it  should  exist,  or  come  to  pass :  that  is  to 
say,  if  it  will  exist,  it  will  be  impossible  for  it  not  to  ex- 
ist at  the  time  of  its  existence. 

Foreknowledge,  I  admit,  infers  this  kind  of  necessity ; 
but  is  this  any  thing  to  the  purpose  ?  The  conclusion 
is  the  same,  whether  it  be  deduced  from  foreknowledge, 
or  concomitant  knowledge.  Let  us  suppose,  then,  for 
the  sake  of  clearness  and  convenience,  that  a  thing  is 
now  known  to  exist.  It  follows  from  hence,  by  a  logi- 
cal necessity,  that  it  does  exist ;  for  it  could  not  possibly 
be  known  to  exist,  unless  it  did  exist.  And,  as  it  does 
exist,  "  it  is  impossible  that  it  should  be  otherwise  than 
true  that  it  does  exist;"  or,  in  other  words,  it  is  impossi- 
ble for  it  not  to  exist  now,  while  it  does  exist.  This  is 
all  there  is  in  this  part  of  the  argument. 

And  what  does  it  amount  to  ?  It  is  a  simple  declara- 
tion of  what  no  body  ever  denied^that  if  a  thing  exists, 
or  is  to  exist,  or  has  existed,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive 
of  it  as  not  existing  at  the  time  of  its  existence.  All  this 
is  perfectly  true,  without  the  least  reference  to  the  ques- 
tion, how  it  came  to  exist,  or  how  it  will  come  to  ex- 
ist ?  It  is  wholly  irrelevant  to  the  point  at  issue.  It 
controverts  no  position,  held  by  any  sane  man  that  now 
lives,  or  that  ever  has  lived. 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  139 

In  Other  words,  if  a  thing  is  known  to  exist,  certainly 
and  infallibly,  then  it  does  exist ;  and  if  it  does  exist, 
then  **  it  is  impossible  it  should  be  otherwise  than  true" 
that  it  does  exist ;  and  hence  its  existence  is  said  to  be 
necessary  with  an  axiomatical  necessity.  But  this  does 
not  prove  that  it  is  necessarily  produced.  For,  sup- 
posing it  to  exist,  its  existence  would  be  necessary  in  the 
above  sense,  even  if  it  had  no  cause  of  its  existence. 
The  necessity  here  referred  to,  is  a  necessity  in  the  or- 
der of  our  ideas,  and  not  in  the  course  of  events.  It 
arises  from  the  impossibility  of  a  thing's  not  existing  at 
the  time  it  does  exist ;  and  it  has  no  reference  whatever 
to  the  causation  of  any  thing :  it  is  a  fundamental  law  of 
belief,  and  not  a  causal  necessity.  These  three  things, 
an  axiomatical,  a  logical,  and  a  causal  necessity,  are 
most  strangely  confounded  in  the  argument  of  President 
Edwards. 

Will  it  be  said,  that  in  this  argument,  it  was  not  the 
object  of  Edwards,  to  prove  that  there  is  a  moral  neces- 
sity in  regard  to  our  volitions ;  but  only  that  they  are 
"  not  without  all  necessity  ?"  Suppose  this  to  be  the 
case,  with  whom  has  he  any  controversy,  or  to  what 
purpose  has  he  argued?  No  one  has  ever  held  that 
human  volitions  are  "  without  all  necessity,"  according 
to  Edwards'  use  of  that  term ;  and  no  one  can  hold  it. 
No  one  can  deny,  that  there  is  an  indissoluble  connexion 
between  the  existence  of  a  thing,  and  the  certain  and  in- 
fallible knowledge  of  its  existence ;  or  between  the  effect 
of  a  thing  and  the  thing  itself;  or  that  it  is  impossible 
for  a  thing  not  to  exist  while  it  does  exist.  In  these 
senses  of  the  word,  all  rational  creatures  are  bound  to 
acknowledge  that  human  volitions  are  necessary.  The 
most  strenuous  advocate  of  free-agency  has  not  one  word 


140  EXAMINATION   OF 

to  say  against  them  ;  and  such  being  the  meaning  of  Ed- 
wards, we  must  all  heartily  concur  with  him,  when  he 
says,  "  that  there  is  no  geometrical  theorem  or  proposi- 
tion whatever  more  capable  of  strict  demonstration, 
than  that  God's  certain  prescience  of  the  volition  of  mo- 
ral agents  is  inconsistent  with  such  a  contingency  of 
these  events,  as  is  without  all  necessity,"  p.  125-6. 

If  it  can  be  truly  said,  that  a  thing  is  foreknown,  it 
follows  that  it  will  come  to  pass,  or  the  proposition 
which  affirms  the  future  existence  of  it,  is  necessarily 
true.  In  other  words,  it  is  self-contradictory  and  absurd, 
to  assert  that  a  thing  is  foreknown,  and  yet  that  it  may 
not  come  to  pass;  just  as  it  is  to  assert  that  a  thing  is 
known  to  exist  and  yet  at  the  same  time  does  not  exist. 
Hence,  it  is  frequently  alleged  by  Edwards,  that  to 
deny  his  conclusions,  drawn  from  foreknowledge,  is  self- 
contradictory  and' absurd;  unless  we  deny  foreknow- 
ledge itself.  To  admit  this,  says  he,  and  yet  contend 
that  the  thing  foreknown  may  possibly  not  be,  is  to  fall 
into  a  plain  contradiction,  and  "  to  suppose  God's  fore- 
knowledge to  be  inconsistent  with  itself,"  p.  117.  Is  it 
not  strange,  that  it  did  not  occur  to  Edwards,  that  if  to 
deny  his  position  is  to  deny  that  God  foreknows  what 
he  foreknows  ;  then  to  affirm  it,  is  only  to  affirm  that  he 
foreknows  what  he  foreknows  ?  Indeed,  all  those  rea- 
sonings in  which  he  represents  the  denial  of  his  position 
as  self-contradictory  and  absurd,  should  have  convinced 
him  that  he  could  prove  nothing  to  the  purpose,  by  ar- 
guing from  the  foreknowledge  of  God,  or  else  he  must 
assume  the  very  thing  in  dispute,  by  taking  it  for  granted 
that  it  is  future ;  or,  which  is  the  same  thing  in  effect, 
that  it  is  foreknown.  For  in  admitting  any  premise,  we 
admit  no  more  than  is  contained  in  it;  and  if  we  only 


yUKIVEiibiXI 


*^ 


CAUFf '' 

EDWARDS  ON  THE    WILL.  141 

deny  what  is  not  contained  in  our  admission,  we  are  not 
involved  in  a  self-contradiction,  or  absurdity.  In  alleging 
that  we  have  done  this,  therefore,  in  the  present  case ; 
— in  alleging  that  we  contradict  ourselves  by  admitting 
the  foreknowledge  of  God,  and  in  denying  necessity,  he 
takes  it  for  granted  that  the  very  thing  in  dispute  is  in- 
cluded in  that  foreknowledge.  In  other  words,  if  Ed- 
wards does  not  mean  to  say,  that  the  point  in  dispute  is 
included  in  the  foreknowledge  of  God ;  then  he  cannot 
say,  that  we  contradict  ourselves  by  admitting  that  divine 
prescience ;  and  if  he  does  mean  to  say,  that  the  thing 
which  we  deny  is  included  in  the  foreknowledge  of  God, 
then  he  begs  the  question. 

It  is  freely  conceded,  that  whatever  God  foreknows 
will  most  certainly  and  infallibly  come  to  pass.  He  fore- 
sees all  human  volitions;  and,  therefore,  they  will  most 
certainly  and  infallibly  come  to  pass,  in  some  manner  or 
other:  the  bare  fact  of  their  future  existence  is  clearly 
established^by  God's  foreknowledge  of  them.  And  if  all 
human  volitions  will  be  brought  to  pass,  by  the  operation 
of  moral  causes ;  then  this  manner  of  their  existence  is 
foreknown  to  God,  and  will  all  come  to  pass  in  this  way ; 
but  to  take  this  for  granted,  is  to  beg  the  question.  We 
have  just  as  much  right  to  suppose,  that  God  foreknows 
that  the  volitions  of  moral  agents  are  not  necessitated,  as 
the  necessitarian  has  to  suppose  that  He  foreknows  the 
contrary ;  and  then  it  would  follow  that  our  volitions  are 
necessarily  free,  or  without  any  producing  causes.  If 
God  foreknows  that  our  actions  will  come  to  pass  in  the 
way  we  call  freely,  (and  we  have  as  much  right  to  this 
supposition  as  our  opponents  have  to  the  contrary,)  then, 
as  foreknowledge  infers  necessity,  our  actions  are  neces- 
sarily free.  And  surely,  if  the  necessity  which  is  in- 
13 


142  EXAMINATION  OF 

ferred  from  foreknowledge,  is  predicable  of  freedom 
itself,  it  cannot  be  inconsistent  with  it. 

In  other  words,  if  the  necessity  of  human  volitions,  ac- 
cording to  the  scheme  of  Edwards,  be  a  fact,  then  it  was 
foreknown  to  God  that  such  is  the  fact ;  and,  if  we  please, 
we  may  infer  the  fact  from  his  foreknowledge,  after 
having  inferred  his  foreknowledge  from  the  fact.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  scheme  of  necessity  be  a  mere 
hypothesis,  having  no  corresponding  reality  in  the  uni- 
verse ;  then  God  never  foreknew  that  it  is  according  to 
such  scheme  that  all  human  actions  are  brought  to  pass ; 
unless  he  foreknew  things  to  be  necessitated  which  in 
reality  are  not  necessitated.  Hence,  we  can  prove  no- 
thing by  reasoning  from  the  foreknowledge  of  God; 
except  what  we  first  assume  to  be  true,  and  consequently 
foreknown  to  Him  ;  and,  if  we  choose  to  resort  to  this 
pitiful  way  of  begging  the  question,  we  may  prove  our 
hypothesis  just  as  well  as  any  other. 

The  foreknowledge  of  an  event,  as  I  have  already  said, 
proves  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  hare  certainty  of 
its  future  existence ;  it  decides  nothing  as  to  the  manner 
of  its  coming  into  existence.  The  necessitarian  may  ring 
the  changes  upon  this  subject  as  long  as  he  pleases,  and 
all  he  can  possibly  make  out  of  it  is,  that  if  God  fore- 
knows a  thing,  it  will  certainly  be,  and  to  suppose  other- 
wise, is  a  contradiction.  Thus,  says  Edwards,  "  To 
suppose  the  future  volitions  of  mor^l  agents  not  to  be 
necessary  events ;  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  events 
which  it  is  not  possible  but  that  they  may  come  to  pass ; 
and  yet  to  suppose  that  God  certainly  foreknows  them, 
and  knows  all  things,  is  to  suppose  God's  knowledge  to 
be  inconsistent  with  itself.  For  to  say  that  God  cer- 
tainly, and  without  all  conjecture,  knows  that  a  thing  will 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  143 

infallibly  be,  which  at  the  same  time  he  knows  to  be  so 
contingent  that  it  may  possibly  not  be,  is  to  suppose  his 
knowledge  inconsistent  with  itself;  or  that  one  thing  he 
knows  is  utterly  inconsistent  with  another  thing  he 
knows.  It  is  the  same  as  to  say,  he  now  knows  a  pro- 
position to  be  of  certain  infallible  truth,  which  he  knows 
to  be  of  contingent  uncertain  truth.  If  a  future  volition 
is  so  without  all  necessity,  that  nothing  hinders  but  it 
may  not  be,  then  the  proposition  which  asserts  its  future 
existence  is  so  uncertain,  that  nothing  hinders  but  that 
the  truth  of  it  may  entirely  fail.  And  if  God  knows  all 
things,  he  knows  this  proposition  to  be  thus  uncertain ; 
and  that  is  inconsistent  with  his  knowing  it  to  be  infalli- 
bly true ;  and  so  inconsistent  with  his  knowing  that  it 
is  true."  p.  117.  Now  all  this  going  around  and  around 
amounts  to  just  this,  that  if  God  certainly  and  infallibly 
foreknows  a  thing,  he  certainly  and  infallibly  foreknows 
it,  or  that  if  it  will  certainly  come  to  pass,  it  will  cer- 
tainly come  to  pass. 

We  admit  that  the  certainty  of  aU  future  events  is 
implied  in  God's  foreknowledge  of  them.  Does  the  ar- 
gument in  question  prove  any  more  than  the  bare  fact  of 
the  certainty  of  the  events  foreknown  ?  The  argument, 
so  far  as  we  have  yet  followed  it,  clearly  does  not.  It 
merely  proves  the  bare  fact  of  the  certainty  of  existence. 
Indeed,  Edwards  himself  says,  that  "  metaphysical  or 
philosophical  necessity,"  (and  this  is  the  necessity  for 
which  he  here  contends,)  "  is  nothing  different  from  their 
certainty."  p.  28.  And  the  younger  Edwards  frequently 
says,  "If  a  proposition  asserting  some  future  event,  be 
a  real  and  absolute  truth,  there  is  an  absolute  certainty  of 
the  event ;  such  absolute  certainty  is  all  that  is  implied 
in  the  divine  foreknowledge  ;  and  all  the  moral  neces- 


144  EXAMINATION   OF 

sity  for  which  we  pleads  p.  160.  Now,  if  these  writers 
merely  mean  that  a  thing  is  certain,  when  they  say  it  is 
necessary,  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  they  did  not  use  the 
right  word.  It  would  have  saved  their  works  from  no 
little  confusion. 

But  the  truth  is,  that  the  moral  necessity  for  which 
they  contend  consists  sometimes  in  the  certainty  of  an 
event,  and  sometimes  in  the  ground  of  that  certainty. 
Volitions  are  said  to  be  morally  necessitory  in  their  defi- 
nition, and  in  their  system,  because  they  are  made  cer- 
tain by  the  influence  of  moral  causes.  But  in  their  ar- 
guments, and  the  defence  of  their  system,  the  hare  ab- 
solute certainty  J  without  any  reference  to  the  ground  of 
it,  is  frequently  all  that  is  meant  by  moral  necessity. 
Thus,  they  build  upon  one  idea  of  necessity,  while  they 
attack  and  defend  themselves  upon  another  idea  thereof. 

This  is  our  present  starting  point  then,  agreed  upon 
by  all  sides,  that  the  foreknowledge  of  God  infers  the 
certainty  of  all  future  realities.  Now,  how  can  we  con- 
clude from  hence,  that  the  volitions  of  moral  agents  are, 
not  only  certain,  but  rendered  certain  by  the  influence  of 
moral  causes  ?  It  may  be  said,  that  it  is  sufficient  that 
the  foreknowledge  of  God  proves  that  human  volitions 
will  certainly  come  to  pass  in  some  way  or  other ;  for  if 
they  will  certainly  come  to  pass  in  any  way,  we  know 
that  they  must  have  some  cause  of  their  existence ;  and 
it  is  just  as  absurd  to  suppose  that  a  voHtion  can  come 
into  being  without  any  cause  of  its  existence,  as  it  is  to 
suppose  that  a  world  can  come  into  being  of  itself.  If 
this  ground  should  be  taken,  (and  it  certainly  will  be,) 
the  reply  is  obvious.  It  would  show  that  the  divine  pre_ 
science  can  only  prove  the  certainty  of  future  events . 
while  it  is  left  to  the  old  maxim,  that  every  effect  mus 


EDWARDS   ON  THE  WILL.  145 

have  a  cause,  in  order  to  make  out  the  doctrine  of  moral 
necessity,  or  the  point  in  disputfe  !  It  would  show,  that 
after  all  the  parade  made  with  the  divine  prescience,  it 
leaves  the  whole  argument  to  rest  upon  ground  which 
has  already  been  occupied  by  one  side,  and  fully  con- 
sidered by  the  other !  It  would  only  show,  that  a  great 
pretence  of  demonstration  had  been  made  from  the  fore- 
knowledge of  God ;  whereas,  in  fact,  it  proves  nothing 
to  the  purpose,  unless  "  its  most  impotent  and  lame  con- 
clusion" be  helped  out  by  something  else  ! 

Another  attempt  is  made  to  link  the  conclusion  drawn 
from  the  foreknowledge  of  God,  with  the  point  to  be  es- 
tablished by  the  necessitarian.  It  is  said,  that  God  could 
not  foreknow  all  future  events,  unless  he  views  them  as 
connected  with  known  causes.  This  ground  is  taken  by 
many  eminent  necessitarians.  Thus,  says  Dr.  John 
Dick,  '*  Future  events  cannot  be  foreseen,  unless  they 
are  certain ;  they  cannot  be  certain,  unless  God  have  de- 
termined to  bring  them  to  pass." 

The  same  position  is  assumed  by  President  Edwards, 
**  There  must  be  a  certainty  in  things  themselves,"  says 
he,  *' before  they  are  certainly  foreknown."  . . .  "There 
must  be  a  certainty  in  things  to  be  a  ground  of  certainty 
of  knowledge,  and  render  things  capable  of  being  known 
to  be  certain."  p.  122.  Now,  what  is  this  certainty  in 
things  themselves,  or  in  human  volitions,  without  which 
they  are  incapable  of  being  foreknown  ?  The  answer 
is  obvious  ;  for  Edwards  every  where  contends,  that  un- 
less volitions  are  brought  to  pass  by  the  influence  of 
moral  causes — that  unless  they  are  necessarily  produced 
by  an  "effectual  power  and  efficacy" — they  are  alto- 
gether uncertain  and  contingent,  and  connected  with  no- 
thing that  can  render  them  certain.  Hence,  he  clearly 
13* 


146  EXAMINATION   OP 

maintains,  that  unless  human  volitions  are  necessarily 
brought  to  pass  by  the  influence  of  motives,  they  are  not 
certain  in  themselves,  and  hence  are  incapable  of  being 
foreknown.  And  besides,  he  has  a  laboured  argument 
to  prove,  that  God  could  not  foreknow  the  future  voli- 
tions of  moral  agents,  unless  he  views  them  as  *•  neces- 
sarily connected  with  something  else  that  is  evident."  pp. 
115 — 117.  This  something  else  is  not  foreknowledge 
itself;  for  it  is  the  ground  of  foreknowledge,  it  is  the 
necessary  influence  of  motives,  or  moral  causes.  But 
we  need  not  dwell  upon  this  point,  as  this  is  so  evidently 
his  meaning ;  and  if  it  is  not,  then  it  is  nothing  to  the 
purpose. 

If  Edwards  means  that  a  thing  cannot  be  foreknown 
unless  it  has  a  sufficient  ground  and  reason  for  its 
existence,  and  does  not  of  itself  come  forth  out  of  no- 
thing, we  are  not  at  all  concerned  to  deny  his  position. 
Every  advocate  of  free-agency  contends,  that  volition 
proceeds  from  the  mind,  acting  in  view  of  motives ;  and 
therefore  is  not  destitute  of  a  sufficient  ground  and  reason 
of  its  existence.  He  denies  that  volition  is  necessarily 
brought  to  pass  by  the  operation  of  motives.  Hence,  if 
Edwards  merely  means  that  God  could  not  foreknow  a 
human  volition,  unless  he  foreknew  all  the  circumstances 
in  view  of  the  mind  when  it  is  to  act,  as  well  as  the  na- 
ture and  all  the  circumstances  of  the  mind  from  which 
the  act  is  to  proceed ;  no  advocate  of  free-agency  is  at 
all  concerned  to  deny  his  position.  It  may  be  true,  or 
it  may  be  false ;  but  it  establishes  nothing  which  may 
not  be  consistently  admitted  by  the  advocates  of  free- 
agency.  If  he  means  any  thing  to  the  purpose,  he  must 
mean,  that  God  could  not  foresee  human  volitions,  unless 
they  are  necessarily  connected  with  causes,  according  to 


*  EDWARDS   ON  THE    WILL.  147 

his  scheme  of  moral  necessity ;  that  is,  unless  they  are 
necessarily  produced  by  "  the  action  or  influence"  of  mo- 
tives, or  moral  causes.  If  this  is  his  meaning,  then  indeed 
it  is  something  to  the  purpose ;  but  what  unbounded 
presumption  is  it,  on  the  part  of  a  poor  blind  worm  of 
the  dust,  thus  to  set  bounds  and  limits  to  the  modes  of 
knowledge  possesssd  by  an  infinite,  all-knowing  God  !  It 
is  true,  that  "  no  understanding,  created  or  uncreated,  can 
see  evidence  where  there  is  none"  ;  but  what  kind  of  evi- 
dence that  is,  by  which  all  things  are  rendered  perfectly 
clear  to  the  eye  of  Omniscience,  it  is  surely  not  for  us  to 
determine.  That  all  things  are  known  to  God,  is  freely 
admitted  ;  but  that  they  can  be  known,  only  by  reason  of 
their  resulting  from  the  necessitating  influence  of  known 
causes,  which  are  themselves  necessitated,  is  more  than 
any  finite  mind  should  presume  to  affirm.  It  were,  indeed, 
to  make  our  shallow,  limited,  and  feeble  intellects,  the 
measure  of  all  possible  modes  of  knowledge.  It  were  to 
make  God  like  one  of  ourselves.  Yet  this  position  the 
necessitarian  has  been  compelled  to  assume.  After  all  his 
pretended  demonstrations  from  the  foreknowledge  of  God, 
his  argument  can  reach  the  point  in  dispute,  only  by 
means  of  this  tremendous  flight  of  presumption. 

Let  the  necessitarian  show,  that  God  cannot  foresee 
future  events,  unless  he  "have  determined  to  bring  them 
to  pass,"  or  unless  they  are  brought  to  pass  by  a  chain  of 
producing  causes,  ultimately  connected  with  his  own  will ; 
and  he  will  prove  something  to  the  purpose.  But  let  him 
not  talk  so  boastfully  about  demonstrations,  while  there  is 
this  exceedingly  weak  link  in  the  chain  of  his  argument. 
If  God  were  so  like  one  of  ourselves,  thai  he  could  not 
foresee  future  volitions,  unless  they  are  brought  to  pass 
by  the  operation  of  known  causes ;  then,  I  admit,  that  his 


148  EXAMINATION  OF 

foreknowledge  would  infer  the  moral  necessity  for  which 
Edwards  contends,  provided  he  really  possesses  that 
knowledge ;  but  if  he  were  so  imperfect  a  being,  I  should 
be  compelled  to  believe,  that  there  are  some  things  which 
he  could  not  foreknow.  ^ 

This  assumption  comes  with  a  peculiarly  ill  grace  from 
the  necessitarian.  He  should  be  the  last  man  to  con- 
tend, that  God  cannot  foresee  future  events  unless  they 
are  involved  in  known  producing  causes ;  just  as  all  that 
we  know  of  the  future  is  ascertained  by  reasoning  from 
known  causes  to  effects.  For  he  contends  that  with  God, 
"  there  is  no  time"  ;  but  that  to  His  view  all  things  are 
seen  as  if  they  were  present.  His  knowledge  is  without 
succession,  and  there  is  no  before  nor  after  with  him  ;  all 
things  are  intimately  present  to  his  mind  from  all  eternity. 
Such  is  the  doctrine  of  both  the  Edwardses ;  and  Dr. 
Dick  believes,  that  **  God  sees  all  things  at  a  glance." 

Now,  present  things  are  not  known  to  exist,  because 
they  are  implied  by  known  causes,  but  because  they  are 
present  and  seen.  And  hence,  if  God  sees  all  things  as 
present,  there  is  not  the  shadow  of  a  foundation  whereon 
to  rest  the  proof  of  "  moral  necessity"  from  his  fore- 
knowledge. It  is  all  taken  away  by  their  own  doctrine, 
and  their  argument  is  left  without  the  least  support  from  it. 

Indeed,  there  is  no  need  of  lugging  the  foreknowledge 
of  God  into  the  present  controversy,  except  it  be  to 
deceive  the  mind.  For  all  future  events  will  certainly  and 
infallibly  come  to  pass,  whether  they  are  foreknown  or 
not;  and  foreknowledge  cannot  make  the  matter  any 
more  certain  than  it  is  without  it.  We  may  say  that  God 
foreknows  all  things,  and  we  may  mix  this  up  with  all 
possible  propositions ;  but  this  will  never  help  the  con- 
clusion, that  "  all  future  things  will  certainly  and  infallibly 


EDWARDS   ON  THE   WILL.  149 

come  to  pass."  If  God  should  cease  to  foreknow  all 
future  volitions,  or  if  he  had  never  foreknown  them,  they 
would,  nevertheless,  just  as  certainly  and  infallibly  come 
to  pass,  as  if  he  had  foreknown  them  from  all  eternity. 
The  bare  naked  fact,  that  they  are  future  infers  all  that  is 
implied  in  God's  foreknowledge  of  them ;  and  it  is  just 
as  much  a  contradiction  in  terms,  to  say  that  what  is 
future  will  not  come  to  pass,  as  it  is  to  say,  that  what 
God  foreknows  will  never  take  place.  Hence,  by  bring- 
ing in  the  prescience  of  Deity,  we  do  not  really  strengthen 
or  add  to  the  conclusion  in  favour  of  necessity.  It  only 
furnishes  a  very  convenient  and  plausible  method  of  beg- 
ging the  question,  or  of  seeming  to  prove  something  by 
hiding  our  sophisms  in  the  blaze  of  the  divine  attributes. 
It  only  serves  as  a  veil,  behind  which  is  concealed  those 
sophistical  tricks,  by  which  both  the  performer  and  the 
spectator  are  deceived.  This  whole  argument  from  the 
foreknowledge  of  God,  is,  indeed,  a  grand  specimen  of 
undesigned  metaphysical  jugglery,  by  which  the  mind  is 
called  off  in  one  direction,  whilst  it  is  deceived,  perplexed, 
and  confounded,  by  not  seeing  what  takes  place  in  another. 
It  appears  from  these  things,  that  those  persons  who 
have  endeavoured  to  clear  up  this  matter,  by  supposing 
that  some  things  are  not  foreknown  to  God ;  have  only 
got  rid  of.  one  of  the  divine  attributes,  and  not  of  their 
difficulty.  It  appears  also,  that  Edwards  might  have 
made  his  argument  far  more  simple  and  direct,  by  leaving 
out  the  long  section  in  which  he  proves  that  God  really 
foreknows  all  future  things ;  and  confining  himself  to 
the  simple  proposition,  "  that  all  future  events  will  cer- 
tainly and  infallibly  come  to  pass ;"  that  "  it  is  a  contra- 
diction in  terms  to  say  that  a  thing  is  future  and  yet  that 
it  will  not  come  to  pass" ;  or,  in  other  words,  "  if  a  thing 


150  EXAMINATION   OF 

is  future,  it  is  impossible  it  should  be  otherwise  than 
true,^^  that  it  will  come  to  pass.  And  how  unreasonable 
are  those,  who  have  imagined  that  we  are  free-agents, 
because  God  has  chosen  not  to  foresee  our  free  actions ; 
as  if  the  supposition  that  he  might  have  foreseen  them, 
does  not  infer  necessity  just  as  much  as  the  fact  that  he 
does  foresee  them.  Indeed,  these  reasoners  seem  to  have 
expected  to  see  one  truth,  by  shutting  their  eyes  upon 
another ! 

Mr.  Hobbes  has  an  argument  to  prove  necessity,  pre- 
cisely like  that  of  Edwards,  except  that  its  nakedness  is 
not  covered  ,up  with  the  foreknowledge  of  God.  "  Let 
the  case  be  put,"  says  he,  "  of  the  weather :  'tis  neces- 
sary that  to-morrow  it  shall  rain  or  not  rain.  If,  therefore, 
it  be  not  necessary  that  it  shall  rain,  it  is  necessary  it  shall 
not  rain ;  otherwise  there  is  no  necessity  that  the  propo- 
sition, it  shall  rain  or  not  rain,  should  be  true."  This 
sophism  confounds  the  axiomatical  necessity  referred 
to  in  the  premise,  that  it  must  rain  or  not  rain,  with  the 
causal  necessity  intended  to  be  deduced  from  it  in  the 
conclusion.  This  poor  sophism  has  been  adopted  by  Mr. 
Locke,  and  seriously  employed  to  prove  that  human  voli- 
tions "  cannot  be  free."  Thus,  says  he,  "  It  is  unavoidably 
necessary  to  prefer  the  doing  or  forbearance  of  an  action 
in  a  man's  power,  which  is  once  proposed  to  a  man's 
thoughts.  The  act  of  volition  or  preferring  one  of  the 
two,  being  that,  which  he  cannot  avoid,  a  man  in  respect 
of  that  act  of  willing  is  under  necessity."  Here  we  have 
precisely  the  same  confusion  of  an  axiomatical  with  a 
causal  necessity,  that  occurs  in  the  argument  of  Mr. 
Hobbes.  And  yet,  the  younger  Edwards  has  deemed 
this  argument  of  Mr.  Locke  as  worthy  of  his  special 
notice  and  commendation ;    and  President  Day  falls  in 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  151 

with  the  same  idea,  alleging  that  "  we  will  because  we 
cannot  avoid  willing,"  because  we  must  either  choose  or 
refuse.  Is  it  not  wonderful,  that  these  philosophers 
should  have  imagined,  that  they  had  any  controversy  with 
any  one,  in  contending  so  manfully  that  the  mind,  under 
certain  circumstances,  must  either  choose  or  refuse  ?  or 
that  they  could  infer  any  thing  from  this,  in  favour  of  a 
causal  necessity — the  only  questibn  in  dispute  ?  With 
what  clearness !  with  what  force  !  would  President  Ed- 
wards have  dashed  this  poor  flimsy  sophism  into  a  thou- 
sand atoms,  if  he  had  come  across  it  in  the  atheism  of 
Hobbes  !  But,  unfortunately,  he  came  across  it  in  a  dif- 
ferent direction ;  and  hence,  he  has  rescued  it  from  the 
loathsome  dunghill  of  atheistical  trash,  invested  it  with 
dignity,  seeming  to  clothe  it  in  the  solemn  sanction  of 
religion,  by  covering  it  up  in  the  ample  folds  of  the  divine 
Omniscience. 

This,  then,  is  the  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter.  The 
prescience  of  God  does  not  make  our  volitions  necessary ; 
it  only  proves  them  to  be  certain.  This  is  conceded  by 
Edwards.  It  proves  them  to  be  certain,  just  as  present 
knowledge  proves  them  to  be  certain.  This  also  is 
admitted  by  Edwards.  But  present  knowledge  proves 
an  act  of  the  mind  to  be  certain,  because  it  is  infallibly 
connected  with  that  knowledge,  and  not  because  it  is 
necessitated  by  the  influence  of  a  cause.  It  proves  it  to 
be  certain,  because  it  is  impossible  for  a  volition,  or  any 
thing  else,  not  to  exist  at  the  time  of  its  existence,  and 
not  because  it  is  impossible  for  it  to  come  to  pass  without 
being  necessitated.  In  short,  it  proves  an  axiomatical 
and  a  logical  necessity,  but  not  a  causal  necessity ;  that 
is  to  say,  it  proves  nothing  to  the  point  in  dispute. 

The  necessitarian  can  connect  his  conclusion  with  the 


152  EXAMINATION   OF 

thing  he  has  undertaken  to  prove,  in  only  one  of  two 
ways :  he  may  say,  that  if  an  event  is  certain,  it  cannot 
come  into  existence  without  a  producing  cause ;  or  he 
may  allege,  that  God  cannot  foresee  them,  unless  he  is 
determined  to  bring  them  to  pass.  If  he  takes  the  former 
position,  he  really  discards  the  argument  from  foreknow- 
ledge, and  returns  for  support  to  the  old  argument,  that 
every  effect  must  have  a  cause.  And  if  he  assumes  the 
latter,  maintaining  that  God  cannot  foreknow  future  events 
unless  he  reasons  from  producing  causes  to  effects,  he 
builds  his  argument,  not  upon  foreknowledge  alone,  but 
upon  this  in  connection  with  a  most  unwarrantable  flight 
of  presumption,  without  which  the  argument  from  pre- 
science is  good  for  nothing. 

And  besides,  the  bringing  in  of  the  divine  prescience, 
only  serves  to  blind,  and  not  to  illuminate.  For  God 
foreknows  only  what  is  future  ;  and  all  future  things  will 
come  to  pass  just  as  infallibly,  without  being  foreknown, 
as  they  will  with  it.  If  we  assume  them  to  be  future,  it 
is  just  as  much  a  contradiction  to  deny  that  they  will  come 
to  pass ;  as  it  is  to  assume  that  they  are  foreknown  and 
yet  deny  it.  Nothing  can  be  proved  in  this  way,  except 
what  is  assumed  or  taken  for  granted  ;  and  the  foreknow- 
ledge of  God  is  only  a  plausible  way  of  begging  the  ques- 
tion, or  concealing  a  sophism. 

In  conclusion,  the  necessitarian  takes  the  wrong  course 
in  his  inquiries,  and  lays  his  premises  in  the  dark.  To 
illustrate  this  point : — I  know  that  I  act ;  and  hence,  I  con- 
clude that  God  foreknew  that  I  would  act.  And  again,  I 
know  that  my  act  is  not  necessitated,  that  it  does  neces- 
sarily proceed  from  the  action  or  influence  of  causes; 
and  hence,  I  conclude  that  God  foreknew  that  I  would 
thus  act  freely,  in  precisely  this  manner,  and  not  other- 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  153 

wise.  Thus,  I  reason  from  what  I  know  to  what  I  do 
not  know,  from  my  knowledge  of  the  actual  world  as  it 
is,  up  to  God's  foreknowledge  respecting  it. 

The  necessitarian  pursues  the  opposite  course.  He 
reasons  from  what  he  does  not  know,  that  is,  from  the 
particulars  of  the  divine  foreknowledge,  about  which  he 
absolutely  knows  nothing  a  priori,  down  to  the  facts  of 
the  actual  world.  Thus,  quitting  the  light  which  shines 
so  brightly  within  us  and  around  us,  he  seeks  for  light  in 
the  midst  of  impenetrable  darkness.  He  endeavours  to 
determine  the  phenomena  of  the  world,  not  by  looking  at 
them  and  seeing  what  they  are ;  but  by  deducing  con- 
clusions from  God's  infinite  foreknowledge  respecting 
them ! 

In  doing  this,  a  grand  illusion  is  practised,  by  his  merely 
supposing  that  the  voHtions  themselves  are  foreknown, 
without  taking  into  the  supposition  the  whole  of  the  case, 
and  recollecting  that  God  not  only  foresees  all  our  actions, 
but  also  all  about  them.  For  if  this  were  done,  if  it  were 
remembered  that  He  not  only  foresees  that  our  volitions 
will  come  to  pass,  but  also  how  they  will  come  to  pass  ; 
the  necessitarian  would  see,  that  nothing  could  be  proved 
in  this  way  except  what  is  first  tacitly  assumed.  The 
grand  illusion  would  vanish,  and  it  would  be  clearly  seen, 
that  if  the  argument  from  foreknowledge  proves  any  thing, 
it  just  as  well  proves  the  necessity  of  freedom,  as  any 
thing  else. 

Indeed,  it  does  seem  to  me,  that  it  is  one  of  the  most 
wonderful  phenomena  in  the  history  of  the  human  mind, 
that,  in  reasoning  about  facts  in  relation  to  which  the  most 
direct  and  palpable  sources  of  evidence  are  open  before 
us,  so  many  of  its  brightest  ornaments  should  so  long 
have  endeavoured  to  draw  conclusions  from  "  the  dark 
14 


154  EXAMINATION   OF 

unknown"  of  God's  foreknowledge ;  without  perceiving 
that  this  is  to  reject  the  true  method,  to  invert  the  true 
order  of  inquiry,  and  to  involve  the  inquirer  in  all  th© 
darkness  and  confusion  inseparable  therefrom:  without 
perceiving  that  no  powers,  however  great,  that  no  genius, 
however  exalted,  can  possibly  extort  from  such  a  method 
any  thing  but  the  dark,  and  confused,  and  perplexing 
exhibitions  of  an  ingenious  logomachy. 


EDWARDS  ON  THE   WILL.  155 


SECTION  xir. 

OF   EDWARDS*    USE    OF   THE    TERM  NECESSITY. 

In  the  controversy  concerning  the  will,  nothing  is  of 
more  importance,  it  will  readily  be  admitted,  than  to 
guard  against  the  influence  of  the  ambiguity  of  words. 
Yet,  it  may  be  shown,  that  President  Edwards  has  used 
the  principal  terms  in  this  controversy  in  an  exceedingly 
loose  and  indeterminate  manner.  This  he  has  done  espe- 
cially in  regard  to  the  term  necessity.  His  very  defini- 
tion prepares  the  way  for  such  an  abuse  of  language. 

"  Philosophical  necessity,^''  says  he,  "  is  really  nothing 
else  than  the  full  and  fixed  connexion  between  the 

THINGS    signified  BY  THE   SUBJECT  AND   PREDICATE  OF    A 

PROPOSITION,  which  affirms  something  to  be  true.  When 
there  is  such  a  connexion,  then  the  thing  affirmed  in  the 
proposition  is  necessary,  in  a  philosophical  sense,  whether 
any  opposition  or  contrary  effiDrt  be  supposed  or  no. 
When  the  subject  and  predicate  of  the  proposition,  which 
affirms  the  existence  of  any  thing,  either  substance, 
quality,  act,  or  circumstance,  have  a  full  and  certain 
CONNEXION,  then  the  existence  or  being  of  that  thing  is 
said  to  be  necessary  in  a  metaphysical  sense.  And  in 
this  sense  I  use  the  word  Necessity,  in  the  following  dis- 
course, when  I  endeavour  to  prove  that  Necessity  is  not 
inconsistent  with  Liberty. 

"The  subject  and  predicate  of  a  proposition,  which 
affirms  existence  of  something,  may  have  a  full,  fixed,  and 
certain  connexion  several  ways." 


156  EXAMINATION   OF 

"  1.  They  may  have  a  full  and  perfect  connexion  in 
and  of  themselves  ;  because  it  may  imply  a  contradic- 
tion, or  gross  absurdity,  to  suppose  them  not  connected. 
Thus  many  things  are  necessary  in  their  own  nature.  So 
the  eternal  existence  of  being,  generally  considered,  is  ne- 
cessary i7i  itself^  because  it  would  be  in  itself  the  greatest 
absurdity,  to  deny  the  existence  of  being  in  general,  or  to 
say  there  was  absolute  and  universal  nothing ;  and  as  it 
were  the  sum  of  all  contradictions  ;  as  might  be  shown, 
if  this  were  the  proper  place  for  it.  So  God's  infinity, 
and  other  attributes  are  necessary.  So  it  is  necessary  in 
its  own  nature,  that  two  and  two  should  be  four ;  and  it 
is  necessary,  that  all  right  lines  drawn  from  the  centre  to 
the  circumference  should  be  equal.  It  is  necessary,  fit, 
and  suitable,  that  men  should  do  to  others,  as  they  would 
that  they  should  do  to  them.  So  innumerable  metaphysi- 
cal and  mathematical  truths  are  necessary  in  themselves  >• 
the  subject  and  predicate  of  the  proposition  which  affirms 
them,  are  perfectly  connected  of  themselves. ^^ 

"  2.  The  connexion  of  the  subject  and  predicate  of  a 
proposition,  which  aflfirms  the  existence  of  something, 
may  be  fixed  and  made  certain,  because  the  existence  of 
that  thing  is  already  come  to  pass ;  and  either  now  is,  or 
has  been ;  and  so  has,  as  it  were,  made  sure  of  existence. 
And  therefore,  the  proposition  which  aflirms  present  or 
past  existence  of  it,  may  by  this  means,  be  made  certain, 
and  necessarily  and  unalterably  true ;  the  past  event  has 
fixed  and  decided  the  matter,  as  to  its  existence ;  and  has 
made  it  impossible  but  that  existence  should  be  truly 
predicated  of  it.  Thus  the  existence  of  whatever  is 
already  come  to  pass,  is  now  become  necessary ;  it  is 
become  impossible  it  should  be  otherwise  than  true,  that 
such  a  thing  has  been." 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  157 

"  3.  The  subject  and  predicate  of  a  proposition  which 
affirms  something  to  be,  may  have  a  real  and  certain  con- 
nexion consequentially  ;  and  so  the  existence  of  the  thing 
may  be  consequentially  necessary,  as  it  may  be  surely  and 
firmly  connected  with  something  else,  that  is  necessary  in 
one  of  the  former  respects.  As  it  is  either  fully  and  tho- 
roughly connected  with  that  which  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary in  its  own  nature ;  or  with  something  which  has 
already  made  sure  of  its  existence.  This  necessity  lies 
in,  and  may  be  explained  by,  the  connexion  between  two 
or  more  propositions,  one  with  another.  Things  which 
are  perfectly  connected  with  other  things  that  are  neces- 
sary, are  necessary  themselves,  by  a  necessity  of  conse- 
quence." 

After  having  defined  what  he  means  by  philosophical 
or  metaphysical  necessity,  he  tells  us,  that  this  is  the 
sense  in  which  he  uses  the  word,  when  he  endeavours  to 
show  that  necessity  is  not  inconsistent  with  liberty.  And 
yet  under  "  this  sense,"  how  many  totally  distinct  ideas 
are  embraced !  The  eternal  existence  of  being  in  general  j 
the  attributes  of  God ;  the  proposition  that  two  and  two 
are  four ;  the  equality  of  the  radii  of  a  circle ;  the  moral 
duty  that  we  should  do  as  we  would  be  done  by ;  the  ex- 
istence of  a  thing  which  has  already  come  to  pass ;  the 
existence  of  things,  that  are  connected  with  that  which  is 
absolutely  necessary  in  itself,  or  with  something  that  has 
already  made  sure  of  its  existence ;  the  connexion  of  two 
or  more  propositions  with  each  other — all  these  things  are 
included  in  his  definition  of  philosophical  necessity  !  And 
yet  he  tells  us,  that  he  uses  the  term  in  this  sense  (in  what 
sense  ?)  when  he  undertakes  to  reconcile  liberty  with  ne- 
cessity !  When  he  says,  that  he  employs  the  word  in 
this  sense,  one  would  suppose  that,  as  a  great  metaphy- 
14* 


158  EXAMINATION   OF 

sician,  he  referred  to  some  one  of  its  precise  and  definite 
significations  ;  but  no  such  thing.  He  merely  refers  to  its 
philosophical  sense,  which,  according  to  his  own  explana- 
tion, embraces  a  multitude  of  different  ideas.  Hence, 
although  he  may  keep  close  to  this  philosophical  sense 
of  the  word,  "  in  the  ensuing  discourse ;"  yet  he  may,  be- 
fore the  discourse  is  concluded,  shift  his  position  a  thou- 
sand times  from  one  of  these  ideas  to  another.  And  he 
may  always  seem,  to  superficial  observers,  to  speak  of  the 
same  thing ;  because  although  the  things  spoken  of  are 
really  different,  they  are  all  drawn  together  under  one 
definition,  and  called  by  one  name.  He  not  only  may 
have  done  this ;  he  actually  has  done  it.  And  if  he  had 
formed  the  express  design  to  envelope  the  whole  subject 
in  a  cloud  of  sophistry,  he  could  not  have  taken  a  better 
course  to  accomplish  his  object. 

It  was  the  design  of  the  Inquiry  to  establish  the  doc- 
trine of  moral  necessity ;  and  hence  it  was  incumbent  on 
President  Edwards  to  reconcile  this  kind  of  necessity,  and 
not  philosophical  necessity,  with  the  free-agency  of  man. 
He  contends  that  there  is  a  necessary  connexion  between 
the  influence  of  motives  and  volitions.  This  he  calls 
moral  necessity.  It  differs  from  natural  necessity,  says 
he,  it  differs  from  the  necessary  connexion  between  cause 
and  effect ;  but  yet,  he  expressly  tells  us,  that  this  differ- 
ence "  does  not  lie  so  much  in  the  nature  of  the  con- 
nexionj  as  in  the  terms  connected"  In  both  cases,  he 
maintains,  the  connexion  is  necessary  and  absolute.  The 
two  terms  connected  are  different ;  but  the  kind  and  nature 
of  the  connexion  is  the  same.  This  is  the  kind  of  neces- 
sity for  which  he  pleads  ;  and  we  can  never  be  satisfied 
with  his  scheme,  until  the  term  shall  be  used  in  this  pre- 
cise and  definite  sense,  and  the  doctrine  it  expresses  shall 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL. 


ISJd 


be  shown  to  be  consistent  with  the  true  idea  and  feeling 
of  liberty  in  the  human  breast.  It  will  not,  it  cannot  satisfy 
the  mind,  that  any  other  kind  of  necessity  is  reconcilable 
with  liberty ;  while  it  remains  to  be  shown  that  moral  ne- 
cessity, as  it  is  defined  and  explained  in  the  Inquiry,  is 
consistent  with  the  free-agency  of  man. 

There  is  one  sense  of  the  term  in  question,  says  he, 
"  which  especially  belongs  to  the  controversy  about  acts 
of  the  will,"  p.  30.  It  is  what  he  calls  "  a  necessity  of 
consequence."  This  would  be  very  true,  if  he  merely 
meant  by  a  necessity  of  consequence,  to  refer  to  the  ne- 
cessary connexion  between  cause  and  effect.  But  this  is 
not  his  meaning ;  for  he  expressly  says,  that  "  a  necessity 
of  consequence"  "  lies  zn,  and  may  be  explained  hy,  the 
connexion  of  two  or  more  propositions  one  with  another." 
Now  what  has  the  connexion  between  any  two  or  all  the 
propositions  in  the  universe,  to  do  with  the  controversy 
about  acts  of  the  will  ?  Is  it  not  evident,  that  it  is  the  con- 
nexion which  subsists  between  effects  and  their  producing 
causes,  and  which  is  supposed  to  subsist  between  motives 
and  actions,  that  has  to  do  with  the  controversy  in  ques- 
tion ;  and  that  the  connexion  which  subsists  between  two 
or  more  propositions  is  entirely  foreign  to  the  subject? 

It  may  be  said,  that  by  "  a  necessity  of  consequence," 
Edwards  referred  not  only  to  the  connexion  between  two 
or  more  propositions,  but  also  to  the  connexion  between 
cause  and  effect.  This  is  undoubtedly  true  ;  for  he  speaks 
of  effects  as  coming  to  pass  by  this  kind  of  necessity.  But 
then  it  is  to  be  lamented  that  two  ideas,  which  are  so  per- 
fectly distinct,  should  have  been  couched  under  the  same 
mode  of  expression,  and  treated  as  if  they  were  identically 
the  same.     Such  a  confounding  of  different  ideas,  has  led 


160  EXAMINATION  OF 

to  no  little  confusion  and  error  in  the  reasoning  of  Presi- 
dent Edwards. 

The  subject  of  the  last  section  furnishes  a  striking 
illustration  of  the  justness  of  this  remark.  From  the  pro- 
position that  a  volition  is  certainly  and  infallibly  fore- 
known, it  follows,  by  a  necessity  of  consequence,  that  it 
will  come  to  pass.  This  is  an  instance  of  the  necessary 
connexion  between  two  ideas  or  propositions  ;  between 
the  idea  or  proposition,  that  a  certain  volition  is  fore- 
known, and  the  idea  that  it  will  come  to  pass  ;  between 
the  proposition  which  affirms  that  it  is  foreknown, 
and  the  idea  that  it  will  come  to  pass.  In  other  words, 
the  proposition  which  affirms  that  it  is  foreknown,  ne- 
cessarily assumes  that  it  will  com.e  to  pass ;  and  to  deny 
this  assumption,  at  the  same  time  that  we  make  it,  is 
surely  to  be  guilty  of  a  contradiction  in  terms.  To  sup- 
pose that  a  volition  will  not  come  to  pass,  is  inconsistent 
with  the  proposition  that  it  is  certainly  and  infallibly 
foreknown.  Edwards  himself  has  frequently  declared 
that  this  is  the  kind  of  necessity  which  is  inferred  from 
foreknowledge. 

In  truth,  the  necessary  connexion  which  exists  be- 
tween the  idea  that  a  thing  is  foreknown,  and  the  truth 
of  the  proposition  which  predicates  future  existence  of 
it,  is  perfectly  distinct  from  the  necessary  connexion 
between  cause  and  effect.  They  are  as  widely  different, 
as  the  connexion  between  any  two  propositions  in  Euclid 
is  from  the  connexion  between  the  motion  of  a  ball  and 
the  force  by  which  it  is  put  in  motion.  Hence,  the  kind 
of  necessity  which  is  involved  in  the  idea  of  foreknow- 
ledge, has  nothing  to  do  with  the  controversy  about  acts 
of  the  will. 


EDWARDS   ON  THE   WILL.  161 

'^here  is,  in  like  manner,  a  necessary  connexion  be- 
tween the  idea  that  a  volition  is  now  certainly  and  infal- 
libly known  to  exist,  and  the  truth  of  the  proposition 
which  affirms  present  existence  of  it;  and  hence,  its  pre- 
sent existence  is  necessary,  by  *'a  necessity  of  conse- 
quence," according  to  the  definition  of  President  Ed- 
wards. But  all  this  has  no  relevancy  to  the  question, 
as  to  how  that  volition  came  to  pass.  Its  present  exist- 
ence is  necessarily  connected  with  the  idea  that  it  is 
certainly  known  to  exist ;  but  this  is  **  a  necessity  of 
consequence"  which  "  lies  in,  and  may  be  explained  by, 
the  connexion  between  two  or  more  propositions."  It  is 
not  "  a  necessity  of  consequence"  that  lies  in,  or  can  be 
explained  hy,  the  connexion  between  cause  and  effect. 
The  two  things  are  entirely  different,  and  it  is  strange, 
that  they  should  always  have  been  confounded  by  Presi- 
dent Edwards.  I  do  most  certainly  and  infallibly  know, 
for  example,  that  I  am  now  willing  to  write ;  and  from 
this  knowledge,  it  necessarily  follows,  that  I  am  now 
willing  to  write.  But  if  any  one  should  infer  from 
hence,  that  I  am  necessitated  to  write,  by  the  operation 
of  some  cause,  we  should  certainly  think  his  inference 
very  badly  drawn.  Yet  this  is  precisely  the  way  in 
which  the  necessitarian  proceeds,  when  he  infers  the 
necessity  of  human  actions  from  the  foreknowledge  of 
God.  He  confounds  the  necessary  connexion  between 
two  propositions,  with  the  necessary  connexion  between 
cause  and  effect.  This  single  ambiguity  has  been  a  mighty 
instrument  in  the  building  up  of  that  portentous  scheme 
of  necessity,  which  has  seemed  to  overshadow  the  glory 
and  beauty  of  man's  nature  as  a  free  and  accountable  being. 
This  is  not  the  only  ambiguity  of  the  term  in  question 
which  has  been  turned  to  account  by  the  necessitarian. 


162  EXAMINATION   OF 

In  opposition  to  the  scheme  of  moral  necessity,  or  the 
necessary  connexion  between  volitions  and  the  influence 
of  motives,  it  has  been  said,  that  volitions  are  produced 
neither  by  motives,  nor  by  preceding  acts  of  choice. 
This  is  a  direct  denial  of  the  doctrine  of  moral  necessity, 
of  the  only  thing  which  we  are  at  all  concerned  to  deny. 
We  may  thus  attempt  to  escape  from  the  thing,  but  the 
name  still  pursues  us. 

For,  to  this  view  of  the  subject.  President  Edwards 
replies  as  follows :  *'  If  any  shall  see  cause  to  deny  this, 
and  say  they  hold  no  such  thing  as  that  every  action  is 
chosen  or  determined  by  a  foregoing  choice ;  but  that  the 
very  first  exertion  of  will  only,  undetermined  by  any  pre- 
ceding act,  is  properly  called  action  ;  then  I  say,  such  a 
man's  notion  of  action  implies  necessity ;  for  what  the 
mind  is  the  subject  of,  without  the  determination  of  its 
own  previous  choice,  it  is  the  subject  of  necessarily,  as 
to  any  hand  that  free  choice  has  in  the  affair ;  and  with- 
out any  ability  the  mind  has  to  prevent  it,  by  any  will  or 
election  of  its  own ;  because  by  the  supposition  it  pre- 
cludes all  previous  acts  of  the  will  or  choice  in  the  case, 
which  might  prevent  it.  So  that  it  is  again,  in  this  other 
way,  implied  in  the  notion  of  an  act,  that  it  is  both  ne- 
cessary and  not  necessary,"  p.  199.  It  is  in  this  man- 
ner, that  President  Edwards  disposes  of  this  important 
view  of  the  subject  of  free-agency.  Let  us  examine  his 
logic. 

In  the  first  place,  the  argument  is  not  sound.  It  pro- 
ceeds on  the  supposition,  that  unless  a  volition  is  pro- 
duced, it  cannot  be  prevented,  by  a  preceding  act  of  voli- 
tion. This  is  a  false  supposition.  I  choose,  for  example, 
to  go  out  at  one  of  the  doors  of  my  room.  This  choice 
is  not  produced  by  any  preceding  act  of  choice.  And  yet 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  16S 

I  can  certainly  prevent  it,  by  choosing  to  go  out  at  the 
other  door  of  the  room,  or  by  choosing  to  sit  still.  Thus 
one  act  of  choice  may,  from  the  very  nature  of  things, 
necessarily  exclude  or  prevent  another  act  of  choice ; 
although  it  could  not  possibly  have  produced  that  other 
act  of  choice. 

But  suppose  the  argument  to  be  sound,  what  does  it 
prove  ?  It  proves  our  actions  to  be  necessary ;  but  in 
what  sense?  Does  it  show  them  to  be  subject  to  that 
moral  necessity,  for  which  Edwards  contends,  and  against 
which  we  protest?  This  is  the  question,  let  me  repeat, 
which  we  have  undertaken  to  discuss ;  and  if  we  would 
not  wander  in  an  eternal  maze  of  words,  we  must  keep 
to  it ;  it  is  the  talisman  which  is  to  conduct  us  out  of  all 
our  difficulties  and  perplexities.  It  is  the  first  point,  and 
the  second  point,  and  the  third  point  in  logic,  to  keep  to 
the  issue,  steadily,  constantly,  and  without  the  least 
shadow  of  turning.  Otherwise  we  shall  lose  ourselves 
in  a  labyrinth  of  words,  in  darkness  and  confusion  inter- 
minable. 

In  what  sense,  then,  does  the  above  argument,  sup- 
posing it  to  be  sound,  prove  our  actions  to  be  necessary  ? 
Does  it  prove  them  to  be  necessary  with  a  moral  neces- 
sity ?  It  does  not.  According  to  the  argument  in  question, 
volitions  are  necessary,  ^^  as  to  any  hand  free  choice  has 
in  the  affair ;  because  by  the  supposition  it  precludes 
all  previous  acts  of  the  will  or  choice  in  the  case,  which 
might  prevent  them^  That  is  to  say,  volitions  are 
necessary  as  to  previous  acts  of  choice;  because  by  the 
supposition  ^xevious  acts  of  choice  do  not  produce  them, 
and  consequently  cannot  prevent  them.  This  is  the 
argument. 

Now,  it  is  very  true,  that  this  is  not  an  unheard  of  use 


164  EXAMINATION    OF 

of  the  term  in  question.  We  say  a  thing  is  necessary, 
when  it  is  dependent  upon  no  cause  for  its  existence. 
Thus  the  existence  of  the  Supreme  Being  is*  said  to  be 
necessary,  because  he  is  the  uncaused  Cause  of  all  things. 
As  he  owes  his  existence  to  nothing,  so  there  is  nothing 
capable  of  destroying  it.  He  is  independent  of  all 
causes ;  and  hence,  his  existence  is  said  to  be  necessary. 

In  like  manner,  a  thing  may  be  said  to  be  necessary  as 
to  any  other  particular  thing,  upon  which  it  does  not  de- 
pend for  its  existence.  As  the  Supreme  Being  is  said  to 
be  necessary  as  to  all  things,  because  his  existence  depends 
upon  nothing ;  so  any  created  object  may  be  said  to  be 
necessary,  as  to  the  influence  of  any  other  object,  to  which 
it  does  not  owe  its  existence,  and  upon  which  its  exist- 
ence does  not  depend.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  our  volitions 
are  shown  to  be  necessary  by  the  above  argument  of  Pre- 
sident Edwards.  A  volition  "  is  necessary  as  to  any  hand 
free  choice  has  in  the  affair ;  because  by  the  supposition 
it  precludes,-  all  previous  acts  of  the  will  or  choice  in  tlie 
case,  which  might  prevent  it."  That  is  to  say,  it  is  ne- 
cessary as  to  preceding  acts  of  choice ;  because,  by  the 
supposition,  it  is  wholly  independent  of  preceding  acts  of 
choice  for  its  existence. 

Now,  in  so  far  as  the  doctrine  of  moral  necessity  is 
concerned,  this  argument  amounts  to  just  exactly  nothing. 
For  although  a  vohtion  may  be  necessary  as  to  one  par- 
ticular cause,  in  consequence  of  its  being  wholly  indepen- 
dent of  that  cause ;  it  does  not  follow  that  it  is  necessarily 
produced  by  another  cause.  Because  it  does  not  result 
from  any  preceding  act  of  volition,  and  consequently  is 
necessary  as  to  any  hand  that  preceding  act  of  volition 
had  in  the  affair,  it  does  not  follow,  that  the  "  strongest 
motive"  produces  it.     Supposing  a  volition  to  be  inde- 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  165 

pendent  of  all  causes,  as  well  as  of  preceding  acts  of  choice ; 
and  then  it  would  be  necessary,  in  the  same  sense,  as  to 
all  causes,  as  well  as  to  preceding  acts  of  choice.  But 
how  infinitely  absurd  would  it  be  to  conclude,  that  because 
a  volition  is  independent  of  the  influence  of  all  causes,  it 
is  therefore  necessarily  connected  with  the  influence  of  a 
particular  cause ! 

We  only  deny  that  volitions  are  necessarily  connected 
with  the  "  power,"  or  "  influence,"  or  "  action,"  of  motives 
or  moral  causes.  This  is  the  only  kind  of  necessity 
against  which,  as  the  advocates  of  free-agency,  we  are  at 
all  concerned  to  contend.  And  it  is  worse  than  idle  for 
the  necessitarian  to  endeavour  to  establish  any  other  kind 
of  necessity  beside  this.  Let  him  come  directly  to  the 
point,  and  keep  to  it,  if  he  would  hope  to  accomplish  any 
thing.  This  shifting  backwards  and  forwards  from  one 
meaning  of  an  ambiguous  term  to  another ;  this  showing 
a  vohtion  to  be  necessary  in  one  sense,  and  then  tacitly 
assuming  it  to  be  necessary  in  another  sense ;  is  not  the  wa^ 
to  silence  and  refute  the  adversaries  of  the  doctrine  of  moral 
necessity.  It  may  show,  (supposing  the  argument  to  b^ 
sound,)  that  a  volition  is  necessary  as  to  a  particular 
cause,  on  the  supposition  that  it  is  not  produced  by  that 
cause ;  and  in  the  same  manner,  it  might  be  shown,  that  a 
volition  is  necessary  as  to  all  causes,  on  the  supposition 
that  it  is  produced  by  no  cause.  But  the  necessity  which 
results  from  such  a  supposition,  would  be  directly  arrayed 
against  the  necessity  for  which  President  Edwards  con- 
tends. In  the  same  sense,  volitions  "  are  necessary  as  to  any 
hand  motives  have  in  the  afliair,"  on  the  supposition  that 
they  do  not  result  from  the  influence  of  motives;  but 
instead  of  building  on  this  kind  of  necessity,  one  would 
15 


166  EXAMINATION   OF 

have  supposed  that  President  Edwards  was  somewhat 
concerned  in  its  destruction. 

In  short,  the  case  stands  thus  :  a  thing  is  said  to  be  ne- 
cessary, on  the  supposition  that  it  has  no  cause  of  its 
existence  ;  or  necessary  as  to  another  thing,  on  the  suppo- 
sition that  it  does  not  depend  on  that  other  thing  for  its 
existence.  Again,  a  thing  is  said  to  be  necessary,  on  the 
supposition  that  it  proceeds  from  the  operation  of  a  cause. 
These  ideas  are  perfecdy  distinct.  The  difference  between 
them  is  as  clear  as  noon-day.  It  is  true,  they  have  the 
same  name  ;  but  to  reason  from  the  one  to  the  other,  is 
about  as  wild  an  abuse  of  language  as  could  be  made.  Pre- 
sident Edwards  is  required  to  show  that  a  volition  is  ne- 
cessary, in  the  sense  of  its  having  a  moral  cause ;  he 
has  shown  that  it  is  necessary  in  the  sense  of  its  not 
having  a  cause.     This  is  his  argument. 

Let  us  view  this  subject  in  another  light.  If  we  say 
that  a  volition  proceeds  from  a  prior  act  of  choice,  we 
certainly  hold  the  doctrine  of  necessity.  President  Ed- 
wards speaks  out  from  the  Inquiry  and  convicts  us  of  this 
doctrine.  "  Their  notion  of  action,"  says  he,  "  implies 
necessity,  and  supposes  that  it  is  necessary,  and  cannot 
be  contingent.  For  they  suppose,  that  whatever  is  pro- 
perly called  action,  must  be  determined  by  the  will  and 
free  choice ;  and  this  is  as  much  as  to  say,  that  it  must 
be  necessary,  being  dependent  upon,  and  determined  by 
something  foregoing ;  namely,  a  foregoing  act  of  choice," 
p.  199.  Thus,  if  we  say  that  a  volition  is  produced  by  a 
preceding  act  of  volition,  we  are  clearly  convicted  of  the 
doctrine  of  necessity. 

Now  let  us  endeavour  to  escape  from  this  accusation. 
For  this  purpose,  let  us  assume  the  directly  opposite  posi- 


EDWARDS   ON   THE   WILL.  167 

tion :  let  us  deny  that  our  volitions  are  produced  by  pre- 
ceding acts  of  choice — and  what  then  ?  Are  we  out  of 
danger?  Far  from  it.  We  are  still  convicted  of  the 
dreaded  doctrine  of  necessity.  On  the  very  supposition 
we  have  made,  diametrically  opposite  as  it  is  to  the  for- 
mer, we  are  still  convicted  of  the  same  doctrine  of  neces- 
sity. We  cannot  escape  from  it.  It  pursues  us,  like  a 
ghost,  through  the  dark  and  ill-defined  shadows  of  an 
ambiguous  phraseology,  and  lays  its  cold  hand  upon  us. 
Turn  wheresoever  we  may,  it  is  sure  to  meet  us  in  some 
shape  or  other. 

This  is  not  all.  We  are  also  convicted  of  a  contra- 
diction in  terms.  It  is  shown,  that  we  hold  an  act  to  be 
"  both  necessary  and  not  necessary."  This  may  appear 
to  be  an  exceedingly  grave  charge ;  and  yet  I  think  we 
may  venture  to  put  in  the  plea  of  "  guilty."  We  do 
hold  an  act  to  be  necessary,  as  to  the  strongest  motive,  as 
well  as  to  any  preceding  act  of  choice,  by  which  we 
contend  it  is  not  produced,  and  by  which  it  cannot  be 
prevented.  We  likewise  most  freely  admit,  that  many 
vohtions  are  necessary  in  other  senses  of  the  word,  as 
explained  by  President  Edwards.  We  cannot  deny  this, 
so  long  as  we  retain  our  senses ;  for  "  a  thing  is  said  to 
be  necessary,  according  to  him,  "when  it  has  already 
come  to  pass,  and  so  made  sure  of  its  existence;  and 
it  is  likewise  said  to  be  necessary,  when  its  present 
existence,  is  certainly  and  infaUibly  known,  as  well  as 
when  its  future  existence  is  certainly  and  infallibly  fore- 
known. But  yet  we  deny,  that  an  act  of  volition  is  neces- 
sary, m  the  sense  that  it  is  produced  by  the  operation  of 
the  strongest  motive,  as  it  is  called.  That  is  to  say,  we 
admit  an  act  of  choice  to  be  necessary,  in  some  senses  of 
the  word ;  and,  in  another  sense  of  it,  we  deny  it  to  be 


168  EXAMINATION    OF 

necessary.  Is  there  any  thing  very  contradictory  in  all 
this  ?  Any  thing  to  shock  the  common  sense  and  reason 
of  mankind  ? 

It  may  be  said,  that  Edwards  does  not  always  endea- 
vour to  establish  the  doctrine  of  moral  necessity  ;  that  he 
frequently  aims  merely  to  show,  that  our  actions  are  "  not 
without  all  necessity."  This  is  unquestionably  true.  He 
frequently  arrives  at  this  conclusion;  and  he  seems  to 
think  that  he  has  done  something,  whenever  he  has  shown 
our  actions  to  be  necessary  in  any  sense  of  the  word  as 
defined  by  himself.  But  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  with 
whom  he  could  have  had  any  controversy.  For  certainly 
no  one  in  his  right  mind,  could  pretend  to  deny  that 
human  actions  are  necessary  in  any  sense,  as  the  word  is 
explained  and  used  in  the  Inquiry.  When  it  is  said,  for 
example,  that  the  truth  of  the  proposition  which  affirms 
the  future  existence  of  an  event,  is  necessarily  connected 
with  the  idea  that  that  event  is  certainly  and  infallibly 
foreknown ;  no  one,  in  his  right  mind,  can  deny  the  posi- 
tion. Such  a  denial,  as  Edwards  says,  involves  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms.  Hence,  this  notion  of  necessity 
only  requires  to  be  stated  and  understood,  in  order  to 
rivet  irresistible  conviction  on  the  mind  of  every  rational 
bemg.  No  light  has  been  thrown  upon  it,  by  the  pages 
which  President  Edwards  has  devoted  to  the  subject; 
nor  could  a  thousand  volumes  render  it  one  whit  clearer 
than  it  is  in  itself.  Hence,  the  author  of  the  Inquiry 
should  have  seen,  that  if  there  was  any  controversy  with 
him  on  this  point,  it  was  not  because  there  was  any 
diversity  of  opinion ;  but  because  there  was  a  misconcep- 
tion of  his  proposition.  And  no  doubt  he  would  have 
seen  this,  if  the  meaning  of  his  own  language  had  been 
clearly  defined  in  his  own  mind :  if  he  had  marked  out 


EDWARDS   ON  THE    WILL.  169 

and  circumscribed,  as  with  a  sunbeam,  the  precise  Hmita- 
tion  within  which  his  own  propositions  are  true,  and 
beyond  which  they  are  false. 

If  he  had  done  this,  he  would  have  seen  that  there 
was,  and  that  there  could  have  been,  but  one  real  point  of 
difference  between  himself  and  his  adversaries.  He 
would  have  seen,  that,  aside  from  the  ambiguities  of  lan- 
guage, there  was  but  one  real  point  in  dispute.  He  would 
have  seen,  that  it  was  affirmed,  on  the  one  side,  that  the 
strongest  motive  operates  to  produce  a  choice  ;  and  that 
this  was  denied  on  the  other.  And  hence,  he  would  have 
put  forth  his  whole  strength  to  establish  this  single  point, 
to  fortify  this  single  doctrine  of  moral  necessity.  He 
would  not  have  crowded  so  many  different  ideas  into  the 
definition  of  the  term  necessity  ;  and  then  imagined  that 
he  was  overwhelming  and  confounding  his  adversaries, 
when  he  was  only  showing  that  human  "  actions  are  not 
without  all  necessity."  And  when  they  said,  that  "  a 
necessary  action  is  a  contradiction,"  he  would  have  seen 
how  they  used  the  term  necessary ;  and  he  would  not 
have  concluded,  as  he  has  done,  that  this  "  notion  of 
action  implies  contingence,  and  excludes  all  necessity,^* 
p.  199.  He  would  have  seen,  that  the  idea  of  an  action, 
in  our  view,  is  inconsistent  with  necessity,  in  one  sense  of 
the  word  ;  and  yet  not  inconsistent  with  every  thing  that 
has  been  called  necessity. 

In  the  definition  of  President  Edwards,  there  is  an 
inherent  and  radical  defect,  which  I  have  not  as  yet  no- 
ticed ;  and  which  is,  indeed,  the  source  of  all  his  vacillat- 
ing on  this  subject.  It  proceeds  from  a  very  common 
error,  which  has  been  well  explained  and  illustrated  by 
Mr.  Stewart  in  his  Essay  on  the  Beautiful. 

The  various  theories,  which  ingenious  men  have  framed 
15* 


170  EXAMINATION   OF 

in  relation  to  the  beautiful,  says  Mr.  Stewart,  "  have  ori- 
ginated in  a  prejudice,  which  has  descended  to  modern 
times  from  the  scholastic  ages ;  that  when  a  word  admits 
of  a  variety  of  significations,  these  different  significations 
must  all  be  species  of  the  same  genus  ;  and  must  conse- 
quently include  some  essential  idea  common  to  every 
individual  to  which  the  generic  term  can  be  applied." 

The  question  of  Aristippas,  "  how  can  beauty  differ  from 
beauty,"  says  Mr.  Stewart,  "  plainly  proceeded  on  a  total 
misconception  of  the  nature  of  the  circumstances,'  which, 
in  the  history  of  language,  attach  different  meanings  to 
the  same  word  ;  and  which  by  slow  and  insensible  grada- 
tions, remove  them  to  such  a  distance  from  their  primitive 
or  radical  sense,  that  no  ingenuity  can  trace  the  successive 
steps  of  their  progress.  The  variety  of  these  circum- 
stances is,  in  fact,  so  great,  that  it  is  impossible  to  attempt 
a  complete  enumeration  of  them  ;  and  I  shall,  therefore, 
select  a  few  of  the  cases,  in  which  the  principle  now  in 
question  appears  most  obviously  and  indisputably  to  fail." 

"  I  shall  begin  with  supposing,  that  the  letters  A,  B,  C, 
D,  E,  denote  a  series  of  objects  ;  that  A  possesses  some 
quality  in  common  with  B  ;  B  a  quality  in  common  with 
C  ;  C  a  quality  in  common  with  D  ;  D  a  quality  in  com- 
mon with  E  ; — while  at  the  same  time,  no  quality  can  be 
found  which  belongs  in  common  to  any  three  objects  in 
the  series.  Is  it  not  conceivable,  that  the  affinity  between 
A  and  B  may  produce  a  transference  of  the  name  of  the 
first  to  the  second  ;  and  that,  in  consequence  of  the  other 
affinities  which  connect  the  remaining  objects  together,  the 
same  name  may  pass  in  succession  from  B  to  C  ;  from 
C  to  D  ;  and  from  D  to  E  ?" 

This  idea,  and  the  reasoning  which  Mr.  Stewart  has 
founded  upon  it,  are  at  once  obvious,  original  and  pro- 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  17   1 

found.  It  shows  that  the  most  gifted  philosophers,  have 
not  been  able  to  frame  a  satisfactory  theory  of  the  beauti- 
ful, because  they  have  proceeded  on  the  false  supposition, 
that  all  those  objects  which  are  called  beautiful  have  some 
common  property,  merely  because  they  have  a  common 
appellation,  by  which  they  are  distinguished  from  other 
objects  ;  and  that  m  endeavouring  to  point  out  and  define 
this  common  property,  they  have  engaged  in  an  impracti- 
cable attempt ;  and  hence  they  have  succeeded  to  their 
own  satisfaction,  only  by  doing  violence  to  the  nature  of 
things. 

This  is  a  fruitful  idea.  It  admits  of  many  illustrations. 
I  shall  select  only  a  few.  Philosophers  and  jurists  have 
frequently  attempted  to  define  executive  power;  but  they 
have  proceeded  on  the  supposition,  that  all  those  powers 
called  executive,  have  a  common  and  distinguishing  pro- 
perty, because  they  have  a  common  name.  Hence,  they 
have  necessarily  failed ;  because  the  supposition  on  which 
they  have  proceeded  is  false.  Executive  power,  properly 
so  called,  is  that  which  sees  to  the  execution  of  the  laws ; 
and  other  powers  are  called  executive,  not  because  they 
partake  of  the  nature  of  such  powers,  but  simply  because 
they  have  been  conferred  upon  the  chief  executive  magis- 
trate. 

The  same  remark  may  be  made,  in  relation  to  the 
attempts  of  ingenious  men,  to  define  the  nature  of  law  in 
general.  If  we  analyze  all  those  things  which  have  been 
called  laws,  we  shall  find  that  they  have  no  element  or 
property  in  common :  the  only  thing  they  have  in  common 
is  the  name.  Hence,  when  we  undertake  to  define  law 
in  general,  or  to  point  out  the  common  property  by  which 
laws  are  distinguished  from  other  things,  we  must  neces- 
sarily fail.    We  may  frame  a  definition  in  words,  as  others 


172  EXAMINATION  OF 

have  done ;  but,  however  carefully  this  may  be  con- 
structed, it  can  be  applied  to  different  kinds  of  laws,  only 
by  giving  totally  different  meanings  to  the  words  of  which 
it  is  composed.  Thus,  for  example,  a  law  is  said  to  be 
"  a  rule  of  conduct,"  given  by  a  superior  to  an  inferior, 
and  "  which  the  inferior  is  bound  to  obey."  Now,  who 
does  not  see,  that  the  words  conduct  and  obedience,  must 
have  totally  distinct  meanings,  when  they  are  applied  to 
inanimate  objects  and  when  they  are  applied  to  the  actions 
of  moral  and  accountable  beings  ?  And  who  does  not 
see,  that  human  beings  are  bound  to  do  their  duty,  in  an 
entirely  different  sense,  from  that  in  which  matter  can  be 
said  to  be  under  an  obligation  ?  The  same  remark  may 
be  extended  to  all  the  definitions  which  have  been  given 
of  law  in  general.  And  whoever  understands  the  phi- 
losophy of  definitions,  will  easily  perceive  that  every 
attempt  to  draw  thyigs,  so  wholly  unlike  each  other,  under 
one  and  the  same  mode  of  expression,  is  not  really  to 
define,  but  to  hide,  the  true  nature  of  things  under  the 
ambiguities  of  language. 

Of  this  common  fault.  President  Edwards  has  been 
guilty.  Instead  of  defining  the  various  senses  of  the  term 
necessity,  and  always  using  it  witli  precision  and  without 
confusion;  he  has  undertaken  to  show  wherein  those 
things  called  necessary  really  agree  in  some  common  pro- 
perty. He  looked  for  a  common  nature,  where  there  is 
only  a  common  name.  As  Aristippas  could  not  conceive, 
"  how  beauty  could  differ  from  beauty ;"  so,  if  we  may 
judge  from  his  argument,  it  was  a  great  difficulty  with 
him,  to  conceive  how  necessity  can  differ  from  necessity. 
Hence,  when  he  proves  an  action  to  be  necessary  in  any 
one  of  the  various  senses  which  are  included  under  his 
definition  of  philosophical  necessity,  he  imagines  that  his 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  173 

work  is  done ;  and  when  his  adversary  denies  that  an 
action  is  necessary  in  any  one  of  those  senses,  he  con- 
cludes that  he  denies  "  all  necessity !"  In  all  this,  we 
see  the  question  as  plainly  as  if  it  had  been  expressly 
written  down,  "  how  can  philosophical  necessity  differ 
from  philosophical  necessity  ?'*  To  which  I  would  sim- 
ply reply,  that  a  thing  cannot  differ  from  itself,  it  is  true ; 
but  the  same  word  may  have  very  different  meanings ;  and 
that  it  is  "  a  prejudice  which  has  descended  to  modern 
times  from  the  scholastic  ages,"  to  suppose  that  things 
have  a  common  nature,  merely  because  they  have  a  com- 
mon name. 

No  better  illustration  of  the  fallacy  of  this  prejudice 
could  be  furnished,  than  that  which  Edwards  has  given 
in  his  definition  of  philosophical  or  metaphysical  neces- 
sity. Under  this  definition,  as  we  have  seen,  he  has 
included  the  being  of  a  God,  which  is  said  to  be  neces- 
sary, because  he  has  existed  from  all  eternity,  unmade 
and  uncaused  ;  and  also  the  existence  of  an  effect,  which 
is  said  to  be  necessary,  because  it  necessarily  results  from 
the  operation  of  a  cause.  Now,  these  two  ideas  stand  in 
direct  opposition  to  each  other ;  and  the  only  thing  they 
have  in  common  is  the  name.  And  yet  President  Ed- 
wards reasons  from  the  one  to  the  other !  If  he  can,  in 
any  way,  reach  the  name,  this  seems  to  satisfy  him.  The 
thing  in  dispute  is  entirely  overlooked.  If  we  say  that 
choice  is  produced  by  choice,  then  he  contends  it  is  an 
effect,  and  consequently  necessary.  If  we  deny  that 
choice  is  produced  by  choice,  then  it  is  necessary  any 
how ;  not  because  it  is  produced  by  a  cause,  but  because 
it  is  independent  of  a  cause,  being  neither  produced  nor 
prevented  by  it.  It  makes  no  difference  with  this  great 
champion  of  necessity,  whether  choice  is  said  to  be  pro- 


174  EXAMINATION   OF 

(luced  by  choice  or  not ;  for,  on  either  of  these  opposite 
suppositions,  he  can  show  that  our  vohtions  are  necessary. 
The  absence  of  the  very  circumstance  which  makes  it 
necessary  in  the  one  case,  is  that  which  makes  it  necessary 
in  the  other.  Is  choice  produced  by  choice  ?  Then  this 
dependence  of  choice  upon  choice,  shows  it  to  be  neces- 
sary. Is  choice  not  produced  by  choice  ?  Then  this 
independence  of  choice  upon  choice  is  the  very  thing 
which  shows  it  to  be  necessary !  Thus  this  great  cham- 
pion of  necessity,  just  passes  from  one  meaning  of  the 
term  to  another,  without  the  least  regard  to  the  point  in 
dispute,  or  to  the  logical  coherency  of  his  argument. 
Surely,  if  "  a  reluctant  world  has  bowed  in  homage"  to 
his  logic,  it  must  have  been  because  the  world  has  been 
too  indolent  to  pry  into  the  sophisms  with  which  it 
swarms.  It  is  only  in  his  onsets  upon  error,  that  the 
might  of  his  resistless  logic  is  felt ;  in  the  defence  of  his 
own  system,  he  does  not  reason  at  all,  he  merely  ram- 
bles. Indeed,  with  all  his  gigantic  power,  he  was  com- 
pelled to  reel  and  stagger  under  the  burden  of  such  a 
cause. 


EDWARDS   ON   THE   WILL.  175 


SECTION  XIII. 

OF  NATURAL  AND  MORAL  NECESSITY. 

I  HAVE  already  said  many  things  bearing  upon  the 
famous  distinction  between  natural  and  moral  necessity; 
but  this  distinction  is  regarded  as  so  important  by  its 
advocates,  that  it  deserves  a  separate  notice.  This  I  shall 
proceed  to  give  it. 

The  distinction  in  question  is  treated  with  no  great 
reverence  by  the  advocates  of  free-agency.  It  is  de- 
nounced by  them  as  a  distinction  without  a  difference ; 
and,  though  this  may  be  true  in  the  main,  yet  this  is  not 
the  way  to  settle  any  thing.  There  is,  indeed,  a  real 
difference  between  natural  and  moral  necessity,  as  they 
are  held  and  described  by  necessitarians ;  and  if  we  pay 
no  attention  to  it,  our  declarations  about  its  futility  will 
be  apt  to  produce  more  heat  than  light.  I  fully  recog- 
nize the  justness  of  the  demand  made  by  Dr.  Edwards, 
that  those  who  insist  that  natural  and  moral  necessity  are 
the  same,  should  tell  us  in  what  respects  they  are  so. 
"We  have  informed  them,"  says  he,  "in  what  respects 
we  hold  them  to  be  different.  We  wish  them  to  be 
equally  explicit  and  candid,"  p.  19.  I  intend  to  be 
equally  explicit  and  candid. 

I  admit,  then,  that  there  is  a  real  difference  between 
natural  and  moral  necessity ;  they  differ,  as  the  Ed- 
wardses  say,  in  the  nature  of  the  terms  connected.  In 
the  one  case,  there  is  a  natural  cause  and  its  effect,  such 
as  force  and  the  motion  produced  by  it,  connected  toge- 


176  EXAMINATION   OF 

ther ;  and  iu  the  other,  there  is  a  motive  and  a  volition. 
In  this  respect,  I  believe  that  there  is  a  greater  difference 
between  them  than  does  the  necessitarian  himself;  for  ht* 
considers  volition  to  be  of  the  same  nature  with  an  effect, 
whereas  I  regard  it  as  essentially  different  in  nature  and 
in  kind  from  an  effect. 

There  is  another  difference  between  natural  and  moral 
necessity.  Natural  necessity  admits  of  an  opposition  of 
the  will ;  whereas  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  any  such  oppo- 
sition in  the  case  of  moral  necessity.  A  man  may  be  so 
bound  that  his  utmost  efforts  to  move  may  prove  una- 
vailing :  in  such  a  case,  he  is  said  to  labour  under  a  na- 
tural necessity.  This  always  implies  and  presupposes 
an  opposition  of  will.  But  not  so  in  regard  to  moral 
necessity.  It  is  absurd  to  suppose,  that  our  wills  can 
ever  be  in  opposition  to  moral  necessity ;  for  this  would 
be  to  suppose  that  we  are  made  willing  by  the  influence 
of  motives,  and  yet  are  not  willing. 

Now,  I  fully  recognize  these  differences  between  na- 
tural and  moral  necessity,  as  they  are  viewed  by  the  ne- 
cessitarian. Whether  they  are  not  inconsistent  with  their 
ideas  of  moral  necessity,  is  another  question.  But  as  I 
am  not  concerned  with  that  question  at  present,  I  am 
willing  to  take  these  differences  without  the  least  abate- 
ment. Admitting,  then,  that  these  distinctions  are  well- 
founded,  and  that  they  are  perfectly  consistent  with  the 
idea  of  moral  necessity,  let  us  see  in  what  respects  there 
is  an  agreement  between  the  things  under  consideration. 
The  difference  does  not  lie,  says  Edwards,  so  much  in 
the  nature  of  the  connexion,  as  in  the  two  terms  con- 
nected. Moral  necessity  is  '*  a  sure  and  perfect  connexion 
between  moral  causes  and  effects."  It  is  "  as  absolute 
as  natural  necessity.'*     The  influence  of  motives  is  not 


EDWARDS   ON   THE  ^  WILL.  177 

a  condition  of  volition,  which  the  will  may  or  may  not 
follow ;  it  is  the  cause  thereof;  and  it  is  absurd  to  sup- 
pose that  the  effect,  the  volition,  can  be  loose  from  the 
influence  of  its  cause,  p.  77-8.  Yes,  volition  is  just 
as  absolutely  and  unconditionally  controlled  by  motive, 
as  the  inanimate  objects  of  nature  are  controlled  by  the 
power  of  the  Almighty.  The  connexion,  the  necessary 
connexion,  which  subsists  between  motion  and  the  force 
by  which  it  is  produced,  is  the  same  in  nature  and  in  kind 
as  that  which  subsists  between  the  "  action  or  influence 
of  motive*'  and  volition.  Herein,  then,  is  the  agreement, 
that  in  moral  necessity,  as  well  as  in  natural,  the  effect 
is  produced  by  the  influence  of  its  cause.  The  nature  of 
the  connexion  is  the  same  in  both;  and  in  both  it  is 
equally  absolute. 

Now  we  have  seen  the  differences,  and  we  have  also 
seen  the  points  of  agreement ;  and  the  question  is,  not 
whether  this  famous  distinction  be  well-founded,  but 
whether  it  will  serve  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  em- 
ployed. In  the  full  light,  and  in  the  perfect  recognition 
of  this  distinction,  we  deny  that  it  will  serve  the  purpose 
of  the  necessitarian. 

It  is  supposed,  that  natural  .necessity  alone  interferes 
with  the  free-agency  of  man,  while  moral  necessity  is 
perfectly  consistent  with  it.  But,  in  reality,  moral  ne- 
cessity is  more  utterly  subversive  of  all  free-agency  and 
accountability  than  natural  necessity  itself.  Think  not 
that  this  is  a  mere  hasty  and  idle  assertion.  Let  us  look 
at  it,  and  see  if  it  is  not  true. 

We  have  already  seen,  that  a  caused  volition  is  no  vo- 
lition at  all ; — that  a  necessary  agent  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms.  In  other  words,  a  power  to  act  must  itself  act, 
and  not  be  made  to  act  by  the  action  of  any  other  power, 
16 


178  EXAMINATION    OF 

or  else  it  does  not  act  at  all.  And  if  it  must  be  caused  to 
act,  before  it  can  act,  then,  as  we  have  already  seen,  there 
must  be  an  infinite  series  of  acts.  These  things  have 
been  fully  illustrated,  and  defended  against  the  false  ana- 
logies, by  which  they  have  been  assailed  ;  and  they  are 
here  mentioned  only  for  the  sake  of  greater  clearness 
and  distinctness. 

If  the  scheme  of  moral  tfecessity  be  true,  then,  ac- 
cording to  which  our  volitions  are  absolutely  caused  by 
the  "action  or  influence  of  motive,"  it  is  idle  to  talk 
about  free  acts  of  the  will ;  for  there  are  no  acts  of  the 
will  at  all.  If  our  wills  are  caused  to  put  forth  volitions, 
and  are  turned  to  one  side  or  the  other,  by  the  controlling 
influence  of  motives,  it  is  idle  to  talk  about  a  free-will ; 
for  we  have  no  will  at  all.  I  know  full  well,  that  Pre- 
sident Edwards  admits  that  we  have  a  will,  and  that  the 
will  does  really  act;  but  this  admission  is  contradicted 
by  bringing  the  will  and  all  its  exercises  under  the  domi- 
nation and  absolute  control  of  motives.  He  obliterates 
the  distinction  between  cause  and  effect,  between  action 
and  passion,  between  mental  activity  and  bodily  motion  ; 
and  thereby  draws  the  phenomena  of  will,  the  volitions 
of  all  intelligent  creatures,  under  the  iron  scheme  of 
necessity.  We  are  eternally  reminded  that  Edwards 
believes  in  tlie  existence  of  a  will,  and  in  the  reality 
of  its  acts.  We  know  it;  but  let  us  not  be  accused 
of  misrepresenting  him,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that 
one  part  of  his  system  does  not  contradict  another, — 
unless  it  can  be  shown,  not  by  false  analogies  and  an 
abuse  of  words,  but  by  valid  evidence,  that  an  act  of  the 
mind  may  be  necessarily  caused.  This  never  has  been 
shown  ;  and  the  attempts  of  the  necessitarian  to  show  it, 
as  we  have  seen,  are  among  the  most  signal  failures  in 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  179 

the  whole  range  of  human  philosophy.  Until  this  be 
shown,  we  must  contend  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
universe  so  diametrically  opposed  to  all  free-agency— to 
all  liberty  of  the  will,  as  the  scheme  of  moral  necessity ; 
which  so  clearly  overthrows  and  demolishes  the  very 
idea  of  a  will  and  all  its  volitions. 

Indeed,  what  is  called  natural  necessity  does  not  pro- 
perly interfere  with  the  liberty  of  the  will  at  all ;  it 
merely  restrains  the  freedom  of  motion.  It  is  moral 
necessity  that  reaches  the  seat  of  the  mind,  and  takes 
away  all  the  freedom  thereof;  even  denying  to  us  the 
possession  of  a  will  itself.  When  my  hand  is  bound,  I 
may  strive  to  move  it  in  vain ;  in  this  case,  my  will  is 
free,  because  I  may  strive,  or  I  may  not ;  but  the  hand 
is  not  free,  because  it  cannot  move.  But  if  motives  cause 
the  mind  to  follow  their  influence,  so  that  it  may  not 
possibly  depart  or  be  loose  from  that  influence ;  then 
we  have  no  will  at  all ;  and  it  is  idle  and  a  mockery  to 
talk  about  freedom  of  the  will.  And  yet,  although  Ed- 
wards would  have  us  to  believe  that  no  system  is  con- 
sistent with  free-agency  but  his  own ;  he  occupies  the 
position,  that  it  is  absurd  to  suppose,  that  a  volition 
may  possibly  be  loose  from  the  influence  of  motive ; 
that  this  is  to  suppose  that  it  is  the  effect  of  motive,  and 
at  the  same  time  that  it  is  not  the  eflfect  of  motive  ! 

"All  agree,"  says  Day,  "that  a  necessity  which  is 
opposed  to  our  choice,  is  inconsistent  with  liberty,"  p. 
91.  That  is  to  say,  a  necessity  which  cuts  off"  or  pre- 
vents the  external  consequence  of  our  choice,  is  incon- 
sistent with  liberty  of  the  will ;  but  that  which  takes 
away  one  choice,  and  sets  up  another,  is  perfectly  con- 
sistent with  it!  If  the  arm  is  held,  so  that  the  free 
choice  cannot  move  it,  then  is  the  liberty  of  the  will 


ISO  EXAMINATION    OF 

interfered  with;  but,  though  the  will  may  be  absolutely- 
swayed  and  controlled,  by  the  influence  of  motives,  or 
by  the  sovereign  power  of  God  himself,  yet  is  it  per- 
fectly free  !  If  such  be  the  liberty  of  the  will,  what  is  it 
worth  ? 

There  are  many  things,  which  it  is  beyond  the  power 
of  the  human  mind  to  accomplish.  Even  in  such  cases, 
the  natural  necessity  under  which  we  are  said  to  labour, 
does  not  interfere  with  the  liberty  of  the  will.  If  we 
cannot  do  such  things,  it  is  not  because  our  will  is  not 
free  in  regard  to  them,  but  because  its  power  is  limited. 
We  might  very  well  attempt  them,  and  put  forth  voli- 
tions in  order  to  accomplish  them,  as  in  our  ignorance 
we  often  do ;  and  if  we  abstain  from  so  doing  in  other 
cases,  wherein  we  might  wish  to  act,  it  is  because  we 
know  they  are  beyond  our  power,  and,  as  rational  crea- 
tures, do  not  choose  to  make  fools  of  ourselves.  To  say 
that  we  are  under  a  natural  necessity,  then,  is  only  to  say 
that  our  power  is  limited,  and  not  that  it  is  not  free.  It 
is  reserved  for  moral  necessity — shall  I  say  to  enslave  ? 
— no,  but  to  annihilate  the  will. 

It  is  true,  if  we  will  to  do  a  thing,  and  are  restrained 
from  doing  it  by  a  superior  force,  we  are  not  to  blame 
for  not  doing  it;  or  if  we  refuse  to  do  it,  and  are  con- 
strained to  do  it,  we  are  equally  blameless.  In  such 
cases,  natural  necessity,  although  it  does  not  reach  the 
will,  is  an  excuse  for  external  conduct.  If  the  question 
were,  is  a  man  accountable  for  his  external  actions  ?  for 
the  movements  of  his  body  ?  then  we  might  talk  about 
natural  necessity.  But  as  the  question,  in  the  present 
controversy,  is,  whether  a  man  is  accountable  for  his 
internal  acts,  for  the  volitions  of  his  mind  ?  to  talk  about 
natural  necessity  is  wholly  irrelevant.     It  has  nothing 


EDWARDS   ON   THE  WILL.  181 

to  do  with  such  a  controversy  ;  and  hence,  Edwards  is 
entirely  mistaken  when  he  supposes  that  it  is  natural 
necessity,  and  that  alone,  which  is  opposed  to  the  free- 
dom of  the  will.  It  is  in  fact  opposed  to  nothing  but  the 
freedom  of  the  body ;  and  by  lugging  it  into  the  present 
controversy,  it  can  only  serve  to  make  confusion  the 
worse  confounded. 

It  is  the  general  sentiment  of  mankind,  that  moral  ne- 
cessity is  inconsistent  with  free-agency  and  accounta- 
bility. Edwards  has  taken  great  pains  to  explain  this 
fact.  His  great  reason  for  it  is,  that  men  are  in  the  habit 
of  excusing  themselves  for  their  outward  conduct,  on  the 
ground  of  natural  necessity.  In  this  way,  by  early  and 
constant  association,  the  idea  of  blamelessness  becomes 
firmly  attached  to  the  term  necessity,  as  well  as  those 
terms,  such  as  must,  cannot,  &c.,  in  which  the  same 
thing  is  implied.  Hence,  we  naturally  suppose  that  we 
are  excusable  for  those  things  which  are  necessary  with 
a  moral  necessity.  Thus,  the  fact  that  men  generally 
regard  moral  necessity  and  free-agency  as  incompatible 
with  each  other,  is  supposed  by  Edwards  to  arise  from 
the  ambiguity  of  language;  and  that  if  we  will  only  shake 
off  this  influence,  we  shall  see  a  perfect  agreement  and 
harmony  between  them. 

But  is  this  so  ?  Let  any  man  fix  his  mind  upon  the 
very  idea  of  moral  necessity  itself,  and  then  answer  this 
question.  Let  him  lay  aside  the  term  necessity,  and  all 
kindred  words  ;  let  him  simply  and  abstractedly  consider 
a  volition  as  being  produced  by  the  "  action  or  influence 
of  motives;"  and  then  ask  himself,  if  the  subject  in 
which  this  eflJect  is  produced  is  accountable  for  it  ?  If  it 
can  be  his  virtue  or  his  vice  ?  Let  him  conceive  of  a 
volition,  or  any  thing  else,  as  being  produced  in  the  hu- 
16* 


182  EXAMINATION   OF 

man  mind,  by  an  extraneous  cause ;  and  then  ask  him- 
self if  the  mind  in  which  it  is  thus  produced  can  be  to 
praise  or  to  blame  for  it  ?  Let  any  man  do  this,  and  I 
think  he  will  see  a  better  reason  for  the  common  senti- 
ment of  mankind  than  any  which  Edwards  has  assigned 
for  it;  he  will  see  that  men  have  generally  regarded 
moral  necessity  as  incompatible  with  free-agency  and  ac- 
countability, just  because  it  is  utterly  irreconcilable  with 
them. 

Indeed,  however  liable  "the  common  people,"  and 
philosophers  too,  may  be  to  be  deceived  and  misled  by 
the  ambiguities  of  language,  there  is  no  such  deception  in 
the  present  case.  The  common  people,  as  they  are 
called,  do  not  always  say,  my  actions  are  "  necessary," 
"I  cannot  help  them,"  and  therefore  I  am  not  accounta- 
ble for  them.  They  as  frequently  say,  that  if  my  actions, 
if  my  volitions,  are  brought  to  pass  by  the  strength  and 
influence  of  motives,  I  am  not  responsible  for  them. 
This  common  sentiment  and  conviction  of  mankind, 
therefore,  does  not  blindly  aim  merely  at  the  name,  while 
it  misses  the  thing ;  it  does  indeed  bear  with  all  its  force 
directly  upon  the  scheme  of  moral  necessity  itself.  And 
its  power  is  sought  to  be  evaded,  as  we  have  seen,  and 
as  we  shall  still  further  see,  not  by  explaining  the  ambi- 
guities of  language,  so  as  to  enlighten  mankind,  but  by 
confounding  the  most  opposite  natures,  such  as  action 
and  passion,  volition  and  local  motion,  through  the  am- 
biguities of  language.  It  is  the  necessitarian,  who  is  al- 
ways talkii'Jg  about  the  ambiguities  of  language,  that  is 
continually  building  upon  them.  Indeed,  it  is  hard  to 
conceive  why  he  has  so  often  been  supposed  to  use  lan- 
guage with  such  wonderful  precision,  if  it  be  not  because 
he  is  eternally  complaining  of  the  want  of  it  in  others. 


EDWARDS   ON  THE   WILL.  I8t 

Just  let  the  common  people,  or  those  of  them  who 
may  desire  an  opiate  for  their  consciences,  see  the  scheme 
of  moral  necessity  as  it  is  in  itself,  stripped  of  all  the  dis- 
guises of  an  ambiguous  phraseology,  and  it  will  satisfy 
them.  It  will  be  the  one  thing  needful  to  their  craving 
and  hungering  appetites.  Let  them  be  made  to  believe 
that  all  our  volitions  are  produced  by  the  action  and  in- 
fluence of  motives,  so  that  they  may  not  be  otherwise 
than  they  are ;  and  a  sense  of  moral  obligation  and  re- 
sponsibility will  be  extinguished  in  their  breasts,  unless 
nature  should  prove  too  strong  for  sophistry.  Indeed, 
if  we  may  believe  the  most  authentic  accounts,  this  doc- 
trine has  done  its  strange  and  fearful  work  among  the 
common  people,  both  in  this  country  and  in  Europe.  It 
is  a  philosophy  which  is  within  the  reach  of  the  most 
ordinary  minds,  as  well  as  the  most  agreeable  to  the  most 
abandoned  hearts ;  and  hence  its  awfully  desolating  power. 
And  if  its  ravages  and  devastations  have  not  extended 
wider  and  deeper  than  they  have,  it  is  because  they  have 
been  checked  by  the  combined  powers  of  nature  and  of 
religion,  rather  than  by  logic ;  by  the  happy  inconsist- 
ency, rather  than  by  the  superior  metaphysical  acumen, 
of  its  advocates  and  admirers. 


184  EXAMINATION   OF 


SECTION  XIV. 


It  was  not  the  design  of  Edwards,  as  it  is  well 
known,  to  interfere  with  the  moral  agency  of  man.  He 
honestly  believed  that  the  scheme  of  necessity,  as  held 
by  himself,  was  perfectly  consistent  with  the  doctrine  of 
liberty ;  and  he  retorted  upon  his  adversaries  that  it  was 
their  system,  and  not  his,  which  struck  at  the  foundation 
of  moral  agency  and  accountability.  But  however  up- 
right may  have  been  his  intentions,  he  has  merely  left  us 
the  name  of  liberty,  while  he  has  in  reality  denied  to  us 
its  nature  and  its  essence. 

According  to  his  view  of  the  subject,  "  The  plain  and 
obvious  meaning  of  the  words  freedom  and  liberty,  in 
common  speech,  is  the  power,  opportunity,  or  advan- 
tage that  any  one  has  to  do  as  he  pleases.  Or,  in  other 
words,  his  being  free  from  hindrance  or  impediment  in 
the  way  of  doing,  or  conducting  in  any  respect  as  h^ 
wills.  And  the  contrary  to  liberty,  whatever  name  we 
call  that  by,  is  a  person's  being  hindered,  or  unable  to 
conduct  as  he  will,  or  being  necessitated  to  do  other- 
wise." 

This  is  the  kind  of  liberty  for  which  he  contends.  And 
he  says,  "There  are  two  things  contrary  to  what  is 
called  liberty  in  common  speech.  One  is  constraint, 
otherwise  called/orce,  compulsion,  and  co-action,  which 


EDWARDS    ON   THE    WILL.  185 

is  a  person's  being  necessitated  to  do  a  thing  contrary  to 
his  will.  The  other  is  restraint ;  which  is  his  being 
hindered,  and  not  having  power  to  do  according  to  his 
will.  But  that  which  has  no  will  cannot  be  the  subject 
of  these  things." 

This  notion  of  liberty,  as  Edwards  says,  presupposes 
the  existence  of  a  will.  In  fact,  it  presupposes  more 
than  this ;  it  presupposes  the  existence  of  a  determina- 
tion of  the  will.  For,  unless  one  is  determined  not  to 
do  a  thing,  he  cannot  be  constrained  to  do  it,  contrary  to 
his  will ;  and,  unless  he  is  determined  to  do  a  thing,  he 
cannot  be  restrained  from  doing  it  according  to  his  will. 
This  kind  of  liberty,  then,  as  it  presupposes  the  exist- 
ence of  a  determination  of  the  will,  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  manner  in  which  that  determination  is  brought 
to  pass.  If  the  determination  of  the  mind  or  will  were 
brought  to  pass,  so  to  speak,  by  an  absolutely  irresistible 
force  ;  just  as  any  other  effect  is  brought  to  pass  by  its  effi- 
cient cause ;  yet  this  kind  of  liberty  might  exist  in  its  ut- 
most perfection.  For  it  only  requires  that  after  the  will  is 
determined  in  this  manner,  or  in  any  other,  that  it  should 
be  left  free  from  constraint  or  restraint,  to  flow  on  just 
as  it  has  been  determined  to  do.  It  is  no  other  liberty 
than  that  which  is  possessed  by  a  current  of  water,  when 
it  is  said  to  flow  freely ,  because  it  is  not  opposed  in  its 
course  by  any  material  obstruction. 

That  the  liberty  for  which  Edwards  contends,  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  manner  in  which  our  actions  or 
volitions  come  to  pass ;  or,  more  properly  speaking,  with 
the  kind  of  relation  between  motives  and  actions,  we  have 
his  own  express  acknowledgment.  *'  What  is  vulgarly 
called  liberty,"  says  he,  "namely,  that  power  and  op- 
portunity for  one  to  do  and  conduct  as  he  will,  or  accord- 


186  EXAMINATION   OF 

ing  to  his  choice,  is  all  that  is  meant  by  it ;  without  taking 
into  the  meaning  of  the  word  any  thing  of  the  cause  of 
that  choice;  or  at  all  considering  how  the  person  came 
to  have  such  a  volition  ;  whether  it  was  caused  by  some 
external  motive,  or  internal  habitual  bias  ;  whether  it 
was  determined  by  some  internal  antecedent  volition,  or 
whether  it  happened  without  a  cause ;  whether  it  was 
necessarily  connected  with  something  foregoing,  or 
not  connected.  Let  the  person  come  by  his  choice  any 
HOW,  yet  if  he  is  able,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the  way 
to  hinder  his  pursuing  and  executing  his  will,  the  man 
is  perfectly  free,  according  to  the  primary  and  common 
notion  of  freedom." 

This  notion  of  liberty,  it  is  easy  to  see,  is  consistent 
with  the  most  absolute  scheme  of  fatality  of  which  it  is 
possible  to  conceive.  For,  according  to  this  idea  of  it, 
if  we  should  come  by  our  choice  **  any  how,"  even  by 
the  most  irresistible  influence  of  external  circumstances, 
yet  we  might  be  *'  perfectly  free."  Hence  it  is  no  won- 
der that  we  find  the  same  definition  of  liberty  in  the 
writings  of  the  most  absolute  fatalists. 

It  is  remarkable  that  Edwards  has  taken  great  pains  to 
define  his  idea  of  philosophical  necessity,  and  to  distin- 
guish it  from  the  common  sense  of  the  word ;  and  yet 
he  supposes  that  the  notion  of  liberty,  about  which  the 
same  dispute  is  conversant,  is  that  which  is  referred  to 
"  in  common  speech,"  or  that  "  which  is  vulgarly  called 
liberty."  He  contends  for  a  philosophical  necessity, 
and  especially  for  a  necessary  connexion  between  the  in- 
fluence of  motives  and  volitions ;  but  the  philosophical 
liberty  which  stands  opposed  to  his  scheme,  which  de- 
nies any  suc\i  necessary  connexion,  he  has  not  deemed 
it  worth  his  while  to  notice ! 


EDWARDS  ON  THE    WILL.  187 

Liberty,  according  to  Edwards'  sense  of  the  term,  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  controversy  respecting  free-agency 
and  necessity.  It  is  as  consistent  with  fatalism  as  could 
be  desired  by  the  most  extravagant  supporters  of  that 
odious  system.  Hence,  when  the  doctrine  of  necessity 
is  denied,  and  that  of  liberty  or  moral  agency  is  asserted, 
something  more  than  this  is  intended.  The  idea  of  liber- 
ty, as  it  stands  connected  with  the  controversy  in  ques- 
tion, has  reference  to  the  manner  in  which  our  volitions 
come  to  pass,  to  the  relation  which  subsists  between  mo- 
tives and  their  corresponding  actions.  When  we  say 
that  the  will  is  free,  we  mean  "  that  it  is  not  necessarily 
determined  by  the  influence  of  motives ;"  we  mean  to 
deny  the  doctrine  of  moral  necessity,  or  that  the  relation 
which  subsists  between  a  motive  and  its  corresponding 
act,  is  not  that  which  subsists  between  an  efficient  cause 
and  it^effect.  We  mean  to  contend  for  a  philosophical 
liberty,  as  President  Edwards  contends  for  a  philosophi- 
cal necessity,  and  not  for  that  "  which  is  vulgarly  called 
liberty." 

There  is  an  inconsistency,  I  am  aware,  in  supposing  a 
choice  to  be  induced  by  the  force  of  external  circumstances, 
or  by  the  force  of  motives,  whether  external  or  internal ; 
but  this  inconsistency  belongs  to  the  scheme  of  necessity  ; 
and  if  I  have  indulged  in  the  supposition  for  a  moment,  it 
was  only  to  meet  the  necessitarian,  and  argue  with  him 
on  his  own  ground.  As  I  have  already  said,  a  will  that 
is  determined^  instead  of  determining,  is  no  will  at  all. 
And  the  liberty  of  the  will  for  which  we  contend,  is  im- 
plied by  the  power  of  the  mind  to  act.  It  does  not  de- 
pend upon  the  presence  or  the  absence  of  any  external 
obstruction.  It  is  no  such  occasional,  or  accidental  thing ; 
it  is  an  inherent  and  essential  attribute  and  power  of  the 


188  EXAMINATION   OF 

mind.     No  power  in  the  universe,  but  that  of  creation, 
can  produce  it,  and  no  chains  on  earth  can  bind  it. 

The  idea  of  Uberty,  as  contended  for  by  President  Ed- 
wards, is  no  other  than  that  entertained  by  Mr.  Locke. 
Thus,  says  the  latter,  "there  may  be  thought,  there 
may  be  will,  there  may  be  volition,  where  there  is  no 
liberty. ^^  In  illustration  of  this  position  he  says,  "A 
man  falling  into  water,  (a  bridge  breaking  under  him,) 
has  not  herein  liberty,  is  not  a  free-agent.  For  though 
he  has  volition,  though  he  prefers  his  not  falling  to 
falling,  yet  the  forbearance  of  that  motion  not  being  in 
his  power,  the  stop  or  cessation  of  that  motion  follows  not 
upon  his  volition ;  and  therefore  therein  he  is  not  free." 

It  is  true,  he  is  not  therein  free,  in  one  of  the  most 
common  senses  of  the  term ;  but  it  is  wrong  to  conclude 
from  hence,  that  there  is  in  such  a  case,  "  no  liberty, ^^ 
For  if  the  volition^  of  which  he  is  said  to  be  posi^ssed, 
did  not  result  from  the  action  of  any  thing,  if  it  was 
simply  an  act  of  the  mind,  which  was  not  necessarily 
produced  by  another  act,  then  he  possessed  freedom  in 
the  philosophical  sense  of  the  term.  He  was  free  in  the 
act  of  willing,  in  the  possession  of  his  volition,  although 
the  consequence  of  that  volition  was  cut  off  and  prevented 
by  an  over-ruling  necessity,  which  had  no  conceivable 
relation  to  the  manner  in  which  he  came  by  his  volition. 
Wherever  there  is  a  volition,  there  is  this  kind  qf  liberty ; 
for  a  volition  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  produced  by  any 
coercive  force. 

The  foregoing  illustration  might  have  been  very  con- 
sistently offered  by  President  Edwards,  who  considered 
a  volition  and  a  preference  of  the  mind  as  identically  the 
same ;  but  it  comes  not  with  so  good  a  grace  from  Mr. 
Locke.  He  considered  an  act  of  the  will  as  different  from 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  189 

a  preference.  According  to  his  doctrine,  a  man  might  pre- 
fer not  to  fall,  in  such  a  case  as  that  put  by  himself,  and 
yet  not  will  not  to  fall.  And  he  illustrates  the  difference 
by  saying,  "  a  man  would  prefer  flying  to  walking,  yet 
who  can  say  he  ever  wills  it?"  Now,  if  a  man  cannot 
will  to  fly,  it  is  very  difficult  to  see  how  he  can  will  not 
to  fall,  in  case  he  were  dropped  from  the  air. 

The  illustration  of  Mr.  Locke  is  fallacious.  It  does 
not  show,  and  I  humbly  conceive  it  cannot  be  shown, 
that  there  can  be  a  volition  anywhere  in  the  universe 
where  there  is  not  freedom.  The  very  idea  of  a  volition, 
or  an  act  of  the  mind,  necessarily  impUes  that  kind  of  phi- 
losophical liberty  for  which  we  contend. 

The  above  notion  of  liberty,  which  Mr.  Locke  borrowed 
from  Hobbes,  and  Edwards  from  Locke,  evidendy  con- 
founds the  motion  of  the  body,  (which  they  frequently 
call  action,)  with  volition  or  action  of  the  mind.  Thus,  no 
matter  how  a  volition  comes  to  pass,  or  is  caused  to  exist, 
if  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  motion  of  the  body  from 
following  its  influence,  we  are  said  to  be  perfectly  free. 
This  kind  of  liberty,  therefore,  refers  to  the  motion  of  the 
body,  and  not  to  the  action  of  the  mind.  It  has  no  refer- 
ence whatever  to  the  question.  Is  the  mind  free  in  the  act 
of  willing?  This  is  the  question  in  dispute  ;  and  hence, 
if  the  necessitarian  would  say  any  thing  to  the  purpose, 
he  must  show  that  his  scheme  is  reconcilable  with  the 
freedom  of  the  mind  in  willing.  This  Edwards  has  not 
attempted  to  do.  He  has,  in  fact,  as  we  have  seen,  only 
given  us  the  name,  while  he  has  taken  from  us  the  sub- 
stance of  liberty. 

The  idea  of  liberty,  for  which  Edwards  contends,  may 
be  illustrated  by  an  unobstructed  fall  of  water.  Indeed, 
this  is  the  very  thing  by  which  Mr.  Hobbes  has  chosen  to 
17 


190  PXAMINATION   OF 

illustrate  and  explain  it.  *'  I  conceive  liberty  to  be  rightly 
defined  in  this  manner,"  says  he ;  "  liberty  is  the  absence 
of  all  the  impediments  to  action,  (motion  ?)  that  are  not 
contained  in  the  nature  and  intrinsical  quality  of  the  agent, 
as  for  example,  the  water  is  said  to  descend  freely,  or  to 
have  liberty  to  descend  by  the  channel  of  the  river,  be- 
cause there  is  no  impediment  that  way,  but  not  across, 
because  the  banks  are  impediments,  and  though  the  water 
cannot  ascend,  yet  men  never  say  it  wants  the  liberty  to 
ascend,  but  the  faculty  or  power,  because  the  impediment 
is  in  the  nature  of  the  water,  and  intrinsical."  Mr.  Hobbes 
encountered  no  more  difficulty  in  reconciling  this  notion 
of  liberty  with  the  scheme  of  fatality  for  which  he  con- 
tended, than  President  Edwards  found  in  reconciling  it 
with  the  same  scheme  in  disguise. 

According  to  the  Inquiry,  then,  we  have  no  other  liberty 
than  that  which  may  be  ascribed  to  the  winds  and  the 
waves  of  the  sea,  as  they  are  carried  onward  in  their 
courses  by  the  power  of  the  Almighty.  Edwards  looks 
for  liberty,  and  he  finds  it,  not  in  the  will,  but  in  the  mo- 
tions of  the  body,  which  is  universally  admitted  to  be  pas- 
sive to  the  action  of  the  will.  He  looks  for  liberty,  and 
he  finds  it,  where,  by  universal  consent,  an  absolute  ne- 
cessity reigns ;  thus  seeking  and  finding  the  living  among 
the  dead.  It  is  no  wonder,  that  he  could  reconcile  such 
a  liberty  with  the  scheme  of  necessity. 

Even  President  Day  is  not  satisfied  with  this  account 
of  liberty.  "  On  the  subject  of  liberty  or  freedom,"  says 
he,  "  which  occupies  a  portion  of  the  fifth  section  of  Ed- 
wards' first  book,  he  has  been  less  particular  than  was 
to  be  expected,  considering  that  this  is  the  great  object  of 
inquiry  in  his  work."  How  could  Edwards  have  been 
more  particular  ?     He  has  repeatedly  and  most  explicitly 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  191 

informed  us,  that  liberty  consists  in  a  power,  or  opportu- 
nity, to  do  as  we  choose ;  without  considering  how  wc 
come  by  our  choice.  If  we  can  only  do  as  we  choose, 
though  our  choice  should  be  produced  by  the  most  abso- 
lute and  irresistible  power  in  the  universe,  yet  are  wc 
perfecdy  free  in  the  highest  conceivable  sense  of  the  word. 
"  If  any  imagine  they  desire,  and  that  they  conceive  of  a 
higher  liberty  than  this,"  says  he,  "  they  are  deceived,  and 
delude  themselves  with  confused  ambiguous  words  instead 
of  ideas."  President  Day  complains  that  all  this  is  not 
sufficiently  particular ;  but  although  he  may  not  have  been 
aware  of  it,  I  apprehend  that  he  has  been  dissatisfied  with 
the  dreadful  particularity  and  precision  with  which  the 
doctrine  of  the  Inquiry  has  been  exhibited.  It  is  precisely 
the  doctrine  of  liberty  which  has  been  held  by  the  most 
absolute  and  unqualified  fatalists  the  world  has  ever  seen ; 
and  it  is  set  forth,  too,  with  a  bold  precision  and  clearness, 
which  would  have  done  honour  to  the  stern  consistency 
of  Hobbes  himself.  It  is  no  wonder,  that  President  Day 
should  have  felt  a  desire  to  see  such  a  doctrine  softened 
down  by  the  author  of  the  Inquiry. 

"The  professed  object  of  his  book,"  says  President 
Day,  "  according  to  the  title-page,  is  an  inquiry  con- 
cerning the  freedom  of  the  will ; — not  the  freedom  of  ex- 
ternal conduct.  We  naturally  look  for  his  meaning  of 
this  internal  liberty.  What  he  has  said,  in  this  section, 
respecting  freedom  of  the  will,  has  rather  the  appearance 
of  evading  such  a  definition  of  it  as  might  be  considered 
his  own."  Yes,  it  is  in  this  section  that  we  naturally  look 
for  his  idea  of  the  liberty  of  the  will ;  but  we  do  not  find 
it.  We  must  turn  to  the  tide-page,  if  we  wish  to  see  any 
thing  about  the  liberty  of  the  will.  "  What  he  has  said, 
in  this  section,  respecting  freedom  of  the  will,"  does  not, 


192  EXAMINATION    OF 

(President  Day  himself  being  judge,)  relate  to  the  freedom 
of  the  will  at  all ;  it  only  relates  to  the  freedom  of  the 
body,  which  has  no  freedom  at  all ;  but  which  is  wholly 
passive  to  the  action  of  the  will.  President  Day  is  not 
satisfied  with  all  this ;  and  hence,  he  proceeds  to  tell  us, 
what  Edwards  would  have  said  in  this  section,  if  he  had 
not  thus  evaded  his  own  definition  of  internal  liberty. 
Let  us  see,  then,  what  he  would  have  said. 

From  a  letter  to  a  minister  of  the  Church  of  Scotland, 
President  Day  finds  that  in  the  phrase  conducting  as  a 
man  pleases,  the  author  of  the  Inquiry  means  to  include 
the  idea  of  choosing  as  he  pleases.  Now,  this  is  all  true  ; 
and  this  is  the  internal  liberty,  which  President  Day  has 
extracted  from  the  aforesaid  letter.  Then,  according  to 
Edwards,  we  have  two  kinds  of  liberty;  the  one  is  a 
liberty  to  move  the  body  as  we  please,  or  as  we  choose ; 
and  the  other  is,  to  choose  as  we  please,  or  as  we  choose. 
In  the  vocabulary,  and  according  to  the  psychology  of 
President  Edwards,  as  we  have  frequently  seen,  and  as 
we  here  see,  our  pleasing  and  our  choosing  are  one  and 
the  same  thing.  Hence,  to  move  our  bodies  according  to 
our  pleasure,  is  to  move  it  according  to  our  choice ;  and 
to  choose  as  we  please,  is  to  choose  as  we  choose.  Pre- 
sident Day  need  not  have  gone  to  the  letter  in  question, 
in  order  to  find  this  doctrine;  for  it  is  repeatedly  set 
forth  In  the  Inquiry.  President  Edwards,  as  we  have 
seen,  frequently  contends  in  the  Inquiry,  that  we  always 
choose  as  we  choose ;  and  as  frequently  makes  his  adver- 
saries assert,  that  we  can  "choose  without  choosing;'* 
which  is  just  as  absurd,  he  truly  declares,  as  to  say  that 
a  body  can  move  while  it  is  in  a  state  of  rest. 

Now,  to  place  liberty  in  this  "  choosing  as  we  choose," 
without  regard  to  the  cause  or  origin  of  our  choice,  is  just 


EDWARDS   ON   THE   WILL.  193 

about  as  rational  as  it  would  be  to  place  it  in  the  axioms 
of  geometry.  Suppose  a  man  is  made  to  choose,  by  an 
absolute  and  uncontrollable  power;  it  is  nevertheless 
true,  that  he  chooses  as  he  does  choose.  This  cannot 
be  otherwise  than  true  ;  it  is  a  self-evident  and  necessary 
truth ;  for  nothing  can  be  different  from  itself,  can  be 
what  it  is,  and  yet  not  what  it  is,  at  one  and  the  same 
time.  To  speak  of  a  power  of  choosing  as  we  choose,  as 
Edwards  and  Day  both  do,  is  just  about  as  reasonable  as 
it  were  to  speak  of  a  power  to  make  two  and  two  equal 
to  four.  Supposing  the  Almighty  should  cause  us  to 
choose,  it  is  not  in  his  power  to  prevent  us  from  choosing 
as  we  do  choose ;  for  he  cannot  work  contradictions. 

Whether  President  Edwards  speaks  of  our  moving  as 
we  please,  or  of  our  choosing  as  we  please ;  whether  he 
speaks  of  an  external  liberty,  or  of  this  internal  liberty  ;  he 
is  always  careful  to  remind  us,  that  it  has  no  reference  to 
the  question,  how  we  come  by  our  pleasure  or  choice. 
In  the  letter  referred  to,  wherein  he  admits  that  a  man's 
liberty  of  conducting  as  he  pleases  or  chooses,  includes 
*'  a  liberty  of  choosing  as  he  pleases,"  he  instantly  adds, 
but  "  without  determining  how  he  came  by  that  plea- 
sure." Yes,  no  matter  how  we  come  by  our  choice, 
though  it  be  wrought  into  us  by  the  most  uncontrollable 
power  in  the  universe,  yet  are  we  free  in  the  highest 
conceivable  sense  of  the  word,  if  we  can  only  "  conduct 
according  to  our  choice."  This,  instead  of  being  the 
greatest  liberty,  is  indeed  the  greatest  mockery,  of  which 
it  is  possible  for  the  imagination  of  man  to  conceive. 
The  liberty  of  fate  itself,  is,  in  all  respects,  to  the  full  as 
desirable  as  such  a  liberty  as  this.  Is  it  not  wonderful, 
to  behold  the  great  and  good  author  of  the  Inquiry,  thus 
planting  himself  upon  the  very  ground  of  atheistical 
17* 


194  EXAMINATION   OF 

fatalism ;  and  from  thence,  in  sober,  serious  earnestness, 
holding  out  to  us,  as  a  great  and  glorious  reality,  the 
mere  name  and  shadow  and  fiction  of  liberty  ?  the  very 
phantom  which  atheists,  in  mockery  and  derision,  have 
been  pleased  to  confer  upon  mankind,  as  upon  poor 
blind  fools,  who  merely  dream  of  liberty,  and  fondly 
dote  upon  the  empty  name  thereof,  whilst  they  are  igno- 
rant of  the  chains  which  bind  them  fast  in  fate. 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  195 


SECTION  XV. 

OF   EDWARDS*    IDEA  OF  VIRTUE. 

In  order  to  reconcile  his  scheme  of  necessity  with  the 
existence  and  reality  of  virtue,  it  appears  that  Ed- 
wards has  adopted  a  false  notion  of  virtue.  This  is  the 
course  he  has  taken,  as  I  have  already  shown,  in  regard 
to  the  doctrine  of  liberty  or  free-agency,  in  order  to  recon- 
cile it  with  necessity ;  and  if  I  mistake  not,  it  may  be 
shown,  that  he  has  been  able  to  reconcile  necessity  and 
virtue  only  by  transforming  the  nature  of  virtue  to  make 
it  suit  his  system. 

I  do  not  intend,  at  present,  to  enter  into  a  full  discus- 
sion of  the  author's  views  in  relation  to  the  nature  of 
virtue.  I  shall  content  myself  with  a  brief  considera- 
tion of  his  notion  of  virtue,  as  it  stands  more  imme- 
diately and  directly  connected  with  the  subject  of  the 
Inquiry. 

It  is  a  fundamental  principle  with  him,  that  **  the  es- 
sence of  the  virtue  and  viciousness  of  dispositions  of  the 
heart,  and  acts  of  the  will,  lies  not  in  their  cause,  but 
their  nature."  In  what  precise  sense  the  author  would 
have  us  to  understand  this  proposition,  I  shall  not  now 
stop  to  inquire.  It  is  sufficient  for  my  present  purpose, 
that  he  attaches  such  a  sense  to  it,  as  to  make  the  idea  of 
virtue  it  is  intended  to  define,  to  agree  not  only  with  his 
doctrine  of  necessity,  but  also  with  any  other  kind  of  ne- 


196  EXAMINATION   OF 

cessity  or  fatality  whatever.  For  he  maintains,  that  as 
the  essence  of  virtue  does  not  consist  in  its  cause,  but  in 
its  nature,  so  a  man  by  the  mere  act  of  creation  may,  in 
the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  be  endowed  with  virtuous 
and  holy  dispositions.  It  is  true,  the  man  himself  has 
had  no  share  in  the  production  of  his  dispositions,  they 
are  exclusively  the  work  of  his  Creator;  but  yet  they 
are  virtuous,  they  are  the  objects  of  moral  approbation, 
because  the  virtuousness  of  dispositions  has  nothing  at 
all  to  do  with  their  cause  or  origin.  It  depends  wholly 
on  their  nature,  and  having  this  nature,  (as  he  supposes 
they  may  have  by  creation  alone,)  he  concludes  that  they 
are  properly  and  truly  virtuous,  although  the  person  in 
whom  they  exist  has  in  no  manner  whatever  contributed 
to  their  production ;  neither  in  whole  nor  in  part,  neither 
exclusively  nor  concurrently  with  his  Maker.  Now,  it 
is  evident,  I  think,- that  if  virtue  may  be  made  to  exist 
in  this  way,  by  a  power  wholly  extraneous  to  the  being 
in  whom  it  exists,  and  wholly  independent  of  all  his  own 
thoughts  and  reflections  and  doings,  then  it  may  be  easily 
reconciled  with  the  rtiost  absolute  scheme  of  fatality  that 
has  ever  been  advocated.  For  it  may  exist  without  any 
agency  or  concurrence  or  consent  on  the  part  of  the  per- 
son in  whom  it  exists ;  and  hence,  there  would  be  no 
difficulty  in  reconciling  it  with  any  scheme  of  necessity 
that  any  fatalist  may  be  pleased  to  advance. 

To  show  that  I  have  not  misrepresented  the  author,  I 
shall  select  from  many  passages  of  similar  import,  the 
following  from  his  work  on  ♦'  Original  Sin  :" — "  Human 
nature  must  be  created  with  some  dispositions ;  a  dispo- 
sition to  relish  some  things  as  good  and  amiable,  and  to 
be  averse  to  other  things  as  odious  and  disagreeable  : 
otherwise  it  must  be  without  any  such  thing  as  inclina- 


EDWARDS   ON    THE   WILL.  197 

tion  or  will,  perfectly  indifferent,  without  preference, 
without  choice  or  aversion  towards  any  thing  as  agreea- 
ble or  disagreeable.  But  if  it  had  any  concreated  dispo- 
sitions at  all,  they  must  be  either  right  or  wrong,  either 
agreeable  or  disagreeable  to  the  nature  of  things.  If  man 
had  at  first  the  highest  relish  of  things  excellent  and  beau- 
tiful, a  disposition  to  have  the  quickest  and  highest  delight 
in  those  things  which  are  most  worthy  of  it,  then  his  dis- 
positions were  morally  right  and  amiable,  and  never  can 
be  excellent  in  a  higher  sense.  But  if  he  had  a  dispo- 
sition to  love  most  those  things  that  were  inferior  and  less 
worthy,  then  his  dispositions  were  vicious.  And  it  is 
evident  there  can  be  no  medium  between  these." 

Now,  this  principle,  that  a  man  may  be  to  praise  or  to 
^ame,  that  he  may  be  esteemed  virtuous  or  vicious,  on 
account  of  what  he  has  wholly  and  exclusively  received 
from  another,  appears  to  me  to  be  utterly  irreconcilable 
with  one  of  the  clearest  and  most  unequivocal  dictates  of 
reason  and  conscience. 

According  to  the  above  passage,  there  can  be  no  me- 
dium between  virtuous  and  vicious  dispositions.  This 
sentiment  is  still  more  explicitly  declared  in  the  following 
words ;  *'  In  a  moral  agent,  subject  to  moral  obligations, 
it  is  the  same  thing  to  be  perfectly  innocent^  as  to  be  per- 
fectly righteous.  It  must  be  the  same,  because  there 
can  no  more  be  any  medium  between  sin  and  righteous- 
ness, or  between  being  right  and  being  wrong,  in  a  moral 
sense,  than  there  can  be  between  being  straight  and 
crooked,  in  a  natural  sense."  Now,  all  this  is  very  true, 
in  regard  to  a  moral  being  who  has  been  called  upon  to 
act ;  for  he  must  either  live  up  to  the  rule  of  duty,  or  he 
must  fall  short  of  it.  If  he  does  the  former,  he  becomes 
righteous  in  the  true  and  proper  sense  of  the  term  ;  and 


198 


EXAMINATION   OF 


if  he  does  the  latter,  he  loses  his  original  innocence,  and 
becomes  a  transgressor.  But  before  he  has  any  oppor- 
tunity of  acting,  at  the  instant  of  his  creation,  I  humbly 
conceive  that  no  moral  agent  is  either  to  be  praised  or 
blamed  for  any  disposition  with  which  he  may  have  been 
endowed  by  his  Maker.  He  is  neither  virtuous  nor 
vicious,  neither  righteous  nor  sinful.  This  was  the  con- 
dition of  Adam,  as  it  very  clearly  appears  to  me,  at  the 
instant  of  his  creation.  He  was  in  a  state  of  perfect  inno- 
cency  ;  having  neither  transgressed  the  law  of  God,  nor 
attained  to  true  holiness.  And  if  this  be  the  case,  then 
in  regard  to  such  a  moral  agent,  before  he  has  an  oppor- 
tunity to  act,  or  to  think,  or  to  feel,  it  is  not  "  the  same 
thing  to  be  perfectly  innocent,  as  to  be  perfectly  righte- 
ous ;"  nor  the  same  thing  to  be  destitute  of  true  righte- 
ousness, as  to  be  sinful. 

It  strikes  my  mind  with  the  force  of  a  self-evident 
truth,  that  nothing  can  be  our  virtue,  unless  we  are  in 
some  sense  the  author  of  it;  and  to  affirm  that  a  man 
may  be  justly  praised  or  blamed,  that  he  may  be  es- 
teemed virtuous  or  vicious,  on  account  of  what  he  has 
wholly  and  exclusively  received  from  another,  appears 
to  me  to  contradict  one  of  the  clearest  and  most  une- 
quivocal dictates  of  reason,  one  of  the  most  universal  and 
irreversible  laws  of  human  belief. 

Though  the  Almighty  endowed  Adam  with  all  that  is 
lovely  in  human  nature,  the  recipient  of  such  noble 
qualities  certainly  deserved  no  credit  for  them,  as  he 
had  no  agency  in  their  production.  All  the  praise  and 
glory  belonged  to  God.  Such  dispositions  are  no  doubt 
the  objects  of  our  admiration  and  love,  but  they  are  no 
more  the  objects  of  our  7noral  approbation  than  is  the 
beauty  of  a  flower.    Both  are  the  work  of  the  same  ere- 


EDWARDS   ON   THE   WILL.        " '—  199 

alive  energy  which  hath  diffused  so  much  of  loveliness 
and  beauty  over  every  part  of  the  creation. 

Hence,  I  deny  that  Adam  was  "  created  or  brought 
into  existence  righteous."  I  am  willing  to  admit,  that 
he  *'  was  brought  into  existence  capable  of  acting  imme- 
diately as  a  moral  agent;  and,  therefore,  he  was  imme- 
diately under  a  rule  of  ri^ht  action.  He  was  obliged  as 
soon  as  he  existed,  to  act  right.'*''  But  I  deny  that 
until  he  did  begin  to  act,  he  could  possess  the  character 
of  true  holiness  or  virtue.  That  President  Edwards 
thought  otherwise,  is  evident,  not  only  from  the  passage 
already  quoted,  but  also  from  many  others,  as  well  as  ^ 
from  the  fact,  that  he  argues  if  Adam  had  not  possessed 
virtuous  dispositions  before  he  began  to  act, — if  he  had 
not  derived  them  directly  from  his  Creator,  then  the 
existence  of  virtue  would  have  been  impossible. 

On  this  subject,  his  argument  is  ingenious  and  plausi- 
ble. It  is  as  follows  :  "  It  is  agreeable  to  the  sense  of 
men,  in  all  nations  and  ages,  not  only  that  the  fruit  or 
effect  of  a  good  choice  is  virtuous,  but  that  the  good 
choice  itself  from  whence  that  effect  proceeds,  is  so ; 
yea,  also  the  antecedent  good  disposition,  temper,  or  af- 
fection of  mind,  from  whence  proceeds  that  good  choice, 
is  virtuous.  This  is  the  general  notion — not  that  princi- 
ples derive  their  goodness  from  actions,  but — that  actions 
derive  their  goodness  from  the  principles  whence  they 
proceed  ;  so  that  the  act  of  choosing  what  is  good,  is  no 
further  virtuous,  than  it  proceeds  from  a  good  principle, 
or  virtuous  disposition  of  mind.  Which  supposes  that  a 
virtuous  disposition  of  mind,  may  be  before  a  virtuous 
act  of  choice ;  and  that,  therefore,  it  is  not  necessary 
there  should  first  be  thought,  reflection,  and  choice,  be- 
fore there  can  be  any  virtuous  disposition.   If  the  choice 


200  EXAMINATION   OF 

be  first,  before  the  existence  of  a  good  disposition  of 
heart,  what  is  the  character  of  that  choice  ?  There  can, 
according  to  our  natural  notions,  be  no  virtue  in  a  choice 
which  proceeds  from  no  virtuous  principle,  but  from 
mere  self-love,  ambition,  or  some  animal  appetite : 
therefore,  a  virtuous  temper  of  mind  may  be  before  a 
good  act  of  choice,  as  a  tree  may  be  before  the  fruit, 
and  the  fountain  before  the  stream  which  proceeds  from 
it,"  p.  407. 

It  is  true,  that  actions  derive  their  good  or  evil  quality, 
as  the  case  may  be,  from  the  principles  whence  they 
proceed.  This  accords,  as  the  author  truly  says,  with 
the  universal  sentiment  of  mankind.  But  this  proposi- 
tion, plain  and  simple  as  it  appears  to  be  at  first  sight, 
may  be  misunderstood.  The  term  "  principle"  is  am- 
biguous ;  and,  according  to  the  idea  attached  to  it,  the 
above  proposition  may  be  true  or  false.  When  it  is  said, 
for  example,  that  a  vicious  or  sinful  action  derives  its 
evil  quality  from  the  principle  or  motive  whence  it  pro- 
ceeds, I  apprehend  that  no  one  pretends  to  fix  the  brand 
of  condemnation  on  the  implanted  principle,  or  the  natu- 
ral spring  of  action,  from  which  it  is  supposed  to  pro- 
ceed. To  take  the  very  case  in  question ;  our  first  parents, 
in  eating  the  forbidden  fruit,  acted  partly  from  a  desire  of 
food  and  partly  from  a  desire  of  knowledge.  Now,  this 
was  a  sinful  action,  because  forbidden,  and  consequently, 
according  to  the  sense  of  men  in  all  ages  and  nations,  it 
must  have  proceeded  from  a  sinful  inclination  or  princi- 
ple. But  yet  no  one,  I  presume,  will  contend  that  either 
the  desire  of  food  or  the  desire  of  knowledge,  from  which 
it  is  supposed  to  have  proceeded,  is  in  itself  sinful.  They 
were  implanted  in  our  nature  by  the  finger  of  God,  for 
wise  and  beneficent  purposes ;  and  to  assert  that  they 


EDWARDS   ON   THE   WILL.  201 

are  sinful,  is  to  make  God  the  author  of  sin.  Our  first 
parents  were  not  to  blame  because  they  were  endowed 
with  these  principles.  Hence,  when  it  is  said,  that  a 
sinful  action  must  proceed  from  a  sinful  principle,  we 
are  not  to  understand  the  proposition  as  meaning  that  the 
inherent  constitutional  principle  of  action  from  which  it 
is  supposed  to  proceed  is  sinful.  Our  first  parents  sinned, 
not  in  possessing  an  appetite  for  food,  or  a  desire  for  know- 
ledge, but  in  indulging  these  contrary  to  the  will  of  God. 
It  was  their  intention  and  design  to  do  that  which  God 
had  commanded  them  not  to  do,  and  which  they  knew  it 
was  wrong  for  them  to  do.  It  was  this  intention  and 
design,  which  was  certainly  not  an  implanted  principle, 
or  any  part  of  the  work  of  the  Creator,  which  consti- 
tuted their  sin  ;  and  it  is  this  intention  and  design  that  is 
pointed  at,  when  it  is  said,  that  the  principle  or  motive 
from  which  their  transgression  proceeded,  was  a  sinful 
principle  or  motive.  And  hence,  we  very  clearly  per- 
ceive, that  a  sinful  action  may  result  from  those  princi- 
ples of  our  constitution,  which  are  in  themselves  neither 
virtuous  nor  vicious,  which  are  wholly  destitute  of  any 
moral  character  whatever.  So,  in  like  manner,  a  vir- 
tuous action  may  result  from  a  principle  of  our  nature, 
implanted  in  the  human  breast  by  the  Author  of  our 
being,  although  such  principle  may  not,  properly  speak- 
ing, be  called  a  virtuous  principle,  or  an  object  of  moral 
approbation. 

The  fallacy  of  the  author's  argument,  I  conceive,  has 
arisen  from  the  ambiguity  of  the  term  principle.  As 
it  is  truly  said,  that  a  holy  action  can  proceed  only  from 
a  holy  principle  or  disposition,  he  concluded,  that  if  man 
had  not  been  created  with  a  principle  of  virtue  or  holi- 
ness in  his  heart,  then  no  such  thing  as  virtue  or  holiness 
18 


202  EXAMINATION   OF 

could  ever  have  found  its  way  into  the  world.  Sup- 
posing, all  the  time,  that  it  is  universally  considered  that 
a  virtuous  act  could  proceed  only  from  an  implanted 
principle  of  virtue,  of  which  God  alone  is  the  author ; 
whereas,  in  fact,  the  virtuous  principle  from  which  the 
virtuous  act  is  supposed  to  derive  its  character,  is  not  an 
implanted  principle  at  all,  but  the  design,  or  intention, 
or  motive  with  which  the  act  is  done ;  and  of  which  the 
created  agent  is  himself  the  author. 

There  is  one  thing  well  worthy  of  remark  in  this  con- 
nexion. President  Edwards  contends,  as  we  have  seen, 
that  Adam  must  have  been  created  with  a  principle  of 
virtue,  of  which  his  Maker  was  the  sole  author,  or  else 
the  existence  of  virtue  would  have  been  impossible.  And 
yet,  he  contends  that  Adam  was  created  perfectly  free 
from  sin  ; — that  as  he  came  from  the  hand  of  his  Maker, 
he  was  perfectly  pure  and  holy,  without  the  least  stain 
or  blemish  of  any  wrong  or  vicious  principle  upon  his 
nature.  Is  it  not  wonderful,  that  it  did  not  occur  to  so 
acute  a  reasoner  as  the  author  of  the  *'  Inquiry,"  that  if 
his  own  argument  was  sound,  it  would,  according  to  his 
own  principle,  prove  the  introduction  of  sin  into  the 
world  to  be  utterly  impossible?  That  he  did  not  see, 
if  it  is  impossible  to  account  for  the  existence  of  holi- 
ness, except  on  the  supposition  that  man  was  created  or 
brought  into  the  world  with  a  principle  of  holiness 
implanted  in  his  heart;  so,  for  the  same  reason,  it  is 
equally  impossible  to  account  for  the  existence  of  sin, 
except  on  the  supposition  that  a  sinful  principle  was 
implanted  in  the  breast  of  man  by  the  hand  of  his  Maker  ? 

The  above  extract,  by  which  Edwards  endeavours  to 
prove  that  Adam  could  not  have  performed  a  virtuous 
act,  unless  a  virtuous  principle  had  been  planted  in  his 


EDWARDS   QN   THE    WILL.  208 

nature  by  the  Creator,  would  be  just  as  correct  and  con- 
clusive, if  we  were  to  read  vicious  instead  of  virtuous. 
By  the  very  same  argument,  we  might  prove  that  he 
could  not  have  sinned,  and  so  sin  would  have  been 
impossible,  unless  God  had  planted  a  sinful  principle  or 
disposition  in  his  nature. 

It  is  sufficiently  evident,  that  President  Edwards' 
idea  of  the  essence  of  virtue,  was  not  altogether  correct, 
and  that  he  was  led  to  adopt  it  by  the  necessities  of  a 
false  system.  For  if  we  admit  that  the  essence  of  vir- 
tue or  of  sin  consists  in  its  nature,  and  not  in  its  cause 
or  origin,  it  must  be  conceded,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  the  nature  of  those  principles,  or  dispositions, 
or  volitions,  or  habits,  (call  them  what  we  may,) 
which  are  termed  virtuous  or  vicious,  depend  in  a  very 
important  sense  upon  their  cause  or  origin.  It  must  be 
conceded,  that  no  disposition  or  principle  whatever 
which  has  derived  its  origin  wholly  from  any  cause  or 
power  extraneous  to  the  moral  agent  in  which  it  exists, 
can  be  properly  denominated  virtuous  or  vicious.  It 
cannot  partake  of  the  nature  of  virtue  or  of  vice,  unless 
it  owes  its  origin  to  the  agent  whose  virtue  or  whose 
vice  it  is  supposed  to  be.  If  it  proceeds  wholly  from  the 
*'  power,  influence,  or  action,"  of  motives,  or  from  the 
hand  of  the  Creator,  it  is  not  the  act  of  the  agent  in  whom 
it  exists,  and  consequently  he  is  not  accountable  for  it. 
Or,  in  other  words,  the  nature  of  virtue  and  vice  is  such, 
that  thpy  cannot  possibly  be  produced  by  any  "  cause, 
or  power,  or  influence,"  which  is  wholly  extraneous  to 
the  mind  in  which  they  exist.  Virtue  and  vice,  in  the 
strict  and  proper  sense  of  the  words,  must  have  the  con- 
currence and  consent  of  the  mind  in  which  they  exist, 
or  they  cannot  possibly  exist  at  all.   To  speak  of  virtue, 


204  EXAMINATION   OF 

—of  that  which  deserves  our  moral  approbation,  as  being 
wholly  derived  from  another- — as  being  exclusively  the 
work  of  God  in  the  soul,  is  to  be  guilty  of  a  contradic- 
tion, as  plain  and  palpable  as  the  light  of  heaven.  It  is 
to  be  regretted,  it  is  to  be  deeply  lamented,  that  Edwards 
did  not  try  to  bring  his  doctrine  of  the  will  into  harmony 
with  the  common  sentiments  of  mankind  with  respect  to 
the  nature  of  virtue  and  free-agency,  instead  of  exerting 
his  matchless  powers  to  make  virtue  and  free-agency 
agree  with  his  scheme  of  necessity,  by  explaining  away 
and  transforming  their  natures.  It  is  to  be  lamented ; 
because  in  attempting  to  uphold  and  support  the  dis- 
tinctive peculiarities  of  his  own  system  of  theology,  he 
has  unintentionally  struck  a  deadly  blow  at  the  vital  and 
fundamental  principles  of  all  religion,  both  natural  and 
revealed.  The  infidel  and  the  atheist  are  much  indebted 
to  him  for  such  an  pxertion  of  his  immortal  powers. 


EDWARDS   ON   THE   WILL.  SOS 

SECTION  XVI. 

OF    THE    SELF-DETERMINING   POWER. 

The  advocates  of  free-agency  have  contended  that  the 
will  is  determined  by  itself,  and  not  by  the  strongest  mo- 
tive. This  is  the  ground  which,  so  far  as  I  know,  has 
always  been  taken  against  the  doctrine  of  necessity ;  but  it 
may  be  questioned  whether  it  is  tenable,  and  whether  the 
friends  of  moral  agency  might  not  have  made  far  greater 
headway  against  their  adversaries  if  they  had  not  as- 
sumed such  a  position.  It  appears  to  be  involved  in 
several  inevitable  contradictions ;  in  the  exposure  of 
which  the  necessitarian  has  been  accustomed  to  tri- 
umph. 

The  leading  argument  of  Edwards  against  the  self- 
determining  power  may  be  substantially  stated  in  a  few 
words.  The  will  can  be  the  cause  of  no  effect,  says  he, 
except  by  acting  or  putting  forth  a  volition  to  cause  it ; 
and  hence,  if  we  assert  that  the  will  causes  its  own  voli- 
tions, we  must  suppose  it  causes  them  by  preceding 
volitions.  It  can  cause  a  volition  only  by  a  prior  voli- 
tion, which,  in  its  turn,  can  be  caused  only  by  another 
volition  prior  to  it;  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  Thus, 
according  to  Edwards,  the  self-determining  power  of  the 
will  necessarily  runs  out  into  the  absurdity  of  an  infinite 
series  of  volitions. 

If  this  reasoning  is  just,  the  doctrine  in  question  must 

be  abandoned ;  for  no  sound  doctrine  can  lead  to  such 

a  conclusion.     But  is  it  just?     Does  such  an  absurdity 

really  flow  from  the  self-determining  power  of  the  will  ? 

18* 


206  EXAMINATION   OF 

It  has  been  objected  to  the  argument  of  Edwards,  that 
it  is  based  on  a  false  assumption.  The  position  of 
Edwards,  *' that  if  the  will  determines  itself,  it  must 
determine  itself  by  an  act  of  choice,"  is,  it  has  been 
contended,  clearly  an  assumption  unsupported,  and  inca- 
pable of  being  supported.  The  reason  assigned  for  this 
objection  is,  that  we  do  not  know  how  any  cause  exerts 
itself  in  the  production  of  phenomena ;  and  consequently 
we  have  no  right  to  assume  that  the  will  can  cause  its 
volitions  only  by  volitions.  In  other  words,  as  we  do 
not  know  how  any  cause  produces  its  effects,  so  it  is 
wholly  a  gratuitous  assumption  to  say,  that  if  the  will 
causes  its  volitions,  it  must  cause  them  in  this  particular 
manner,  that  is,  by  preceding  acts  of  volition. 

This  objection  does  not  seem  to  be  well  taken.  When 
we  say,  that  the  will  is  the  cause  of  any  thing,  we  do 
not  really  mean  that  the  will  itself  is  the  cause  of  it ;  for 
the  will  itself  does  not  act :  it  is  not  an  agent,  it  is  merely 
the  power  of  an  agent.  It  is  that  power  by  which  the 
mind  acts.  Hence,  when  the  will  is  said  to  cause  a 
thing,  the  language  must  either  have  no  intelligible 
meaning,  or  it  must  be  understood  to  mean,  that  the 
mind  causes  it  by  an  exercise  of  its  power  of  willing. 
But  to  say  that  the  mind  causes  a  thing  by  an  exercise 
of  its  power  of  willing,  is  to  say  that  it  causes  it  by  an 
act  of  the  will  or  a  volition;  which  brings  us  to  the  as- 
sumption of  Edwards.  Hence,  if  the  language  that  "  the 
will  causes  its  own  volitions"  means  any  thing,  it  must 
mean  what  Edwards  supposes  it  does.  That  is,  if  the 
will  causes  its  volitions,  or  rather,  if  the  mind  in  the  act 
of  willing  causes  them,  then  they  must  be  caused  by  voli- 
tions or  acts  of  the  will. 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  2i)7 

It  is  said,  that  *'  we  do  not  know  how  any  cause 
acts.'*  This  is  very  true,  when  properly  understood ; 
but  in  the  true  sense  of  this  maxim,  Edwards  has  not 
undertaken  to  explain  how  a  cause  acts;  nor  has  he 
made  any  assumption  as  to  how  it  acts.  The  term 
cause  has  a  variety  of  meanings;  and  it  is  frequently 
applied  with  extreme  vagueness  and  want  of  precision. 
What  is  the  cause  of  an  effect? — of  the  motion  of  the 
hand,  for  example  ?  It  is  the  mind,  says  one ;  it  is  the 
will,  says  another;  it  is  a  volition,  replies  a  third.  Now 
here  are  three  distinct  things, — the  mind,  the  will,  and 
the  volition ;  and  yet  each  is  said  to  be  the  cause  of  the 
same  identical  effect.  This  diversity  of  expression 
may  do  very  well  in  popular  discourse,  but  it  must 
be  laid  aside  whenever  philosophical  precision  is  re- 
quired. 

What  is  then,  really  and  properly  speaking,  the  cause 
of  the  motion  in  question  ?  It  is  neither  the  mind,  nor 
the  will ;  for  these  might  both  exist,  and  yet  no  such 
effect  result  from  them.  A  mind,  or  a  will,  that  lies  still 
and  does  not  act,  is  the  cause  of  no  effect.  If  we  would 
speak  with  philosophical  precision,  then,  we  should  say 
that  the  act  of  the  mind  is  the  cause  of  the  effect  in  ques- 
tion. The  idea  of  a  cause,  in  the  strict  and  proper  sense 
of  the  term,  is  that  from  which  the  effect  immediately 
and  necessarily  flows.  Now  the  motion  of  the  hand  is 
not  necessarily  connected  with  the  mind  itself;  for  if  the 
mind  were  to  lie  still  and  not  act,  no  such  effect  would 
follow.  It  is  with  the  act  of  the  mind  that  the  effect  in 
question  is  connected  as  with  its  efficient  cause.  It  is 
the  act  of  the  mind  which  implies  the  motion  of  the  hand, 
and  that  is  implied  by  it;  and  hence,  it  is  the  act  of  the 
mind,  or  the  volition,  that  is  properly  said  to  be  the 


208  EXAMINATION   OF 

cause  of  such  motion.  For  cause  and  effect  are  said  to 
imply  each  other. 

Now  Edwards  has  not  pretended  to  say  how  a  volition 
acts  upon  the  external  part  of  our  being ;  if  he  had  done 
so,  he  would  have  been  justly  obnoxious  to  the  charge 
of  presuming  to  know  how  a  cause  acts,  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word;  but  he  has  done  no  such  thing.  The 
connexion  between  cause  and  effect,  in  the  proper  sense 
of  the  terras,  he  has  left  enveloped  in  profound  mystery. 
He  has  not  presumed  to  say  how  an  act,  or  cause,  pro- 
perly so  called,  produces  its  corresponding  effect. 

He  does  not  assume  to  know  how  a  cause  acts ;  but 
how  what  is  sometimes  called  a  cause  really  becomes 
such.  The  will  may  be  called  a  cause,  if  you  please ; 
but,  in  reality,  unless  it  acts,  it  is  the  cause  of  no  effect ; 
and  even  then,  properly  speaking,  the  act  is  the  cause. 
He  clearly  saw  that  a  will  which  lies  still  and  does  no- 
thing, is  the  cause  of  no  effect ;  and  hence  he  slated  the 
simple  fact,  that  it  must  act  in  order  to  become  a  cause, 
or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  in  order  to  produce  an  effect. 
And  is  not  this  perfectly  self-evident?  We  do  not  know 
how  the  will  acts,  nor  how  its  act  produces  a  change  in 
the  external  part  of  our  being ;  but  yet  do  we  not  cer- 
tainly know,  that  a  dormant  will  can  do  nothing,  and  that 
it  must  act  in  order  to  produce  an  effect.  If  this  be  to 
explain  how  a  cause  acts,  I  humbly  conceive  that  we 
may  do  so  with  perfect  propriety. 

Indeed,  all  that  is  assumed  by  Edwards,  has  been  con- 
ceded to  him  by  most  of  his  adversaries.  Thus  says 
Dr.  West,  as  quoted  by  Edwards  the  younger,  "  No 
being  can  become  a  cause,  i.  e.  an  efficient,  or  that  which 
produces  an  effect,  but  by  first  operating,  acting,  or  ener- 
gizing."    Here  we  are  told,  not  how  a  cause  acts,  but 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  208 

how  the  mind  becomes  a  cause,  or  the  author  of  effects. 
This  is  all  that  Edwards  takes  for  granted ;  and,  for 
aught  that  I  can  see,  he  has  done  so  with  perfect  pro- 
priety. 

The  same  thing  is  conceded  by  Dr.  Reid.  "The 
change,"  says  he,  "  whether  it  be  of  thought,  of  will, 
or  of  motion,  is  the  effect.  Active  power,  therefore,  is 
a  quality  in  the  cause,  which  enables  it  to  produce  the 
effect.  And  the  exertion  of  that  active  power  in  pro- 
ducing the  effect,  is  called  action,  agency,  efficiency. 
In  order  to  the  production  of  any  effect,  there  must  be  in 
the  cause,  not  only  power,  hut  the  exertion  of  that 
power.''^ — Essays  on  the  Active  Powers,  p.  259.  Here 
it  is  declared  by  Dr.  Reid,  that  active  power  or  the  will 
must  act,  in  order  to  produce  an  effect,  whether  the  effect 
be  in  the  mind  itself,  or  out  of  the  mind,  whether  it  be 
"  of  thought,  of  will,  or  of  motion."  This  is  all  that 
Edwards  assumes  as  the  basis  of  his  argument. 

But  the  question  is  not  so  much  what  has  been  con- 
ceded, as  what  is  true.  Is  it  true,  then,  that  if  the  will 
causes  its  own  volitions,  it  can  cause  them  only  by  pre- 
ceding volitions?  It  is,  as  we  have  already  seen,  ac- 
cording to  the  common  acceptation  of  the  terms ;  for 
a  dormant  cause  can  produce  no  effect ;  it  must  act  in 
order  to  produce  effects.  Edwards  has  truly  said,  that 
"if  the  will  be  determined,  there  is  a  determiner.  This 
must  be  supposed  to  be  intended  even  by  those  that 
say  the  will  determines  itself.  If  it  be  so,  the  will  is 
both  determiner  and  determined ;  it  is  a  cause  that  acts 
and  produces  effects  upon  itself,  and  is  the  object  of  its 
own  influence  and  action."  p.  19.  Now,  whatever  may 
be  the  meaning  of  those  who  choose  to  affirm  that  the 
will  determines   itself,  admitting  that  it  is  both  deter- 


210  EXAMINATION  OF 

mined  and  determiner;  the  conclusion  of  Edwards 
seems  to  be  fairly  drawn  from  the  language  in  which 
their  doctrine  is  expressed.  To  say  the  least,  he  fairly 
reduces  the  obvious  meaning  of  their  language  to  the 
absurdity  of  an  infinite  series  of  volitions. 

If  the  phrase,  that  the  will  is  determined  by  itself,  has 
any  meaning,  it  must  mean,  either  that  the  will  is  made 
to  act  by  a  preceding  act  of  the  will,  or  that  the  will 
simply  acts.  If  the  meaning  be,  that  the  act  or  choice 
of  the  will  is  produced  by  a  preceding  act  of  the  will, 
then  is  the  inference  of  Edwards  well  drawn,  and  the 
self-determining  power  is  involved  in  the  aforesaid  ad 
infinitum  absurdity.  But  if  the  meaning  be,  that  the 
will  simply  acts,  why  not  present  the  idea  in  this  its  true 
and  unambiguous  form  ? 

It  is  evident,  that  while  the  will  remains  inactive,  it 
can  produce  no  effect ;  it  must  act,  in  order  to  become 
the  author  of  effects.  The  effect  caused,  and  the  causa- 
tive act,  are  clearly  distinct ;  the  one  produces  the  other. 
If  the  causative  act  is  a  volition,  then  we  have  an  infi- 
nite series  of  volitions.  And  if  it  be  not  a  volition,  but 
some  other  effort  of  the  mind,  the  same  difficulty  arises ; 
for  if  it  be  necessary  to  suppose  a  preceding  effort  of  the 
mind  in  order  to  account  for  a  volition,  it  will  be  equally 
necessary  to  suppose  the  existence  of  another  effort  to 
account  for  that ;  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  And  an  infi- 
nite series  of  efforts  is  just  as  great  an  absurdity  as  an 
infinite  series  of  volitions. 

Now  let  us  suppose  that,  in  order  to  escape  these  dif- 
ficulties, an  advocate  of  the  self-determining  power 
should  deny  that  there  is  any  causative  act  of  volition ; 
but  that  volition  is  itself  an  act  uncaused  by  any  pre- 
ceding act.     According  to  this  view,  what  does  the  self- 


EDWARDS    ON   THE    WILL.  211 

determining  power  amount  to  ?  It  amounts  to  just  this, 
that  the  will  itself  acts, — a  position  which  is  as  freely- 
recognized  by  Edwards  as  it  could  possibly  be  by  the 
warmest  advocate  of  the  self-determining  power.  If  this 
be  all  that  is  meant  by  self-determination,  why  not  state 
the  simple  fact  that  the  will  itself  acts,  in  plain  English, 
instead  of  going  about  to  envelope  it  in  a  mist  of  words  ? 
If  this  be  all  that  is  meant,  why  not  state  the  thing  so 
that  it  may  be  acquiesced  in  by  the  necessitarian,  instead 
of  keeping  up  such  a  war  of  words  ?  Indeed,  it  appears 
plain  to  me,  that  the  assertion  that  the  will  is  determined 
by  itself,  is  either  false  doctrine,  or  else  the  language  in 
which  it  is  couched  is  not  a  clear  and  distint  expression 
of  its  own  meaning.  On  either  supposition,  this  mode 
of  expression  should  be  abandoned. 

I  have  long  been  impressed  with  the  conviction,  that 
the  self-determining  power,  as  it  is  generally  understood, 
is  full  of  inconsistencies.  While  we  hold  this  doctrine, 
we  cannot  with  a  good  grace  contend  that  the  motive- 
determining  power  is  involved  in  the  absurdity  of  an 
infinite  series  of  causes ;  for  we  ourselves  are  involved 
in  it.  Nor  can  we  very  well  maintain  that  **  a  necessary 
agent  is  no  agent  at  all ;"  for  the  necessitarian  will  reply, 
as  he  always  does,  that  according  to  our  own  scheme, 
our  actions  are  caused ;  and  hence,  if  it  be  absurd  to 
speak  of  a  caused  action,  this  is  equally  true,  whether 
the  cause  be  intrinsic  or  extrinsic.  Moreover,  if  we 
should  complain  that,  according  to  the  necessitarian,  the 
phenomena  of  the  will  are  involved  in  the  "mechanism 
of  cause  and  effect,"  he  will  be  sure  to  reply,  that  the 
same  thing  is  true  according  to  our  own  scheme,  inas- 
much as  we  admit  volition  to  be  an  effect,  and  place  it 
under  the  dominion  of  an  internal  cause.     These  diffi- 


212  EXAMINATION  OF 

culties,  as  well  as.  some  others,  have  always  encumbered 
the  cause  of  free  and  accountable  agency ;  just  because 
it  has  been  supposed  to  consist  in  the  self-determining 
power  of  the  will.  We  should,  therefore,  abandon  this 
doctrine.  If  Clarke,  and  Price,  and  Reid,  and  West, 
have  not  been  able  to  maintain  it  without  running  into 
such  inconsistencies,  it  is  high  time  it  should  be  laid 
aside  forever. 

It  has  always  been  taken  for  granted  that  the  will  is 
determined.  The  use  of  this  word  clearly  implies 
that  the  will  is  acted  upon,  either  by  the  will  itself, 
or  by  something  else.  It  has  been  conceded,  on  all 
sides,  that  it  is  determined ;  and  the  only  controversy 
has  been,  as  to  what  is  the  determiner.  It  is  deter- 
mined by  the  strongest  motive,  says  one;  it  is  deter- 
mined by  itself,  says  another;  and  upon  these  two 
positions  the  combatants  have  arranged  themselves.  But 
behind  all  this  controversy,  there  is  a  question  which 
has  not  been  agitated;  and  that  is,  whether  the  will  is 
determined  at  all  ?  For  my  part,  I  am  firmly  and  fully 
persuaded  that  it  is  not,  but  that  it  simply  determines.  It 
is  the  "determiner,"  but  not  the  **  determined."  It  is 
never  the  object  of  its  own  determination.  It  acts,  but 
there  is  no  causative  act,  by  which  it  is  made  to  act. 
This  position,  I  trust,  has  been  made  good  in  the  pre- 
ceding pages. 

If  we  say  that  the  will  is  determined  by  itself,  this 
implies  that  it  is  determined  in  the  passive  voice,  at  the 
same  time  that  it  determines  in  the  active  voice ;  whereas, 
in  reality,  it  is  simply  active,  and  not  passive  to  the  ac- 
tion of  any  thing,  in  its  determinations.  We  should  not 
say,  then,  that  the  mind  is  self-determined,  but  simply 
that  it  is  self-active.     On  this  ground  we  may  securely 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  213 

rest  in  our  opposition  to  the  scheme  of  necessity.  It 
can  never  be  shown  that  it  is  involved  in  the  absurdity 
of  an  endless  series  of  causes  ;  it  will  remain  for  the  ne- 
cessitarian alone  to  extricate  himself  from  that  absurdity. 
That  the  mind  is  self-active,  I  have  already  shown,  by 
showing  that  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  an  act  of  the 
mind  is  produced  by  the  action  of  any  thing  upon  it.  It 
is  right  here,  then,  upon  the  self-activity  of  the  human 
mind,  that  we  take  our  stand,  in  order  to  plant  the  lever 
which  shall  heave  the  scheme  of  moral  necessity  from 
its  foundations.  It  is  right  here  that  we  find  our  strong- 
hold ;  that  we  erect  the  bulwark  and  the  fortifications  of 
man's  free-agency,  against  which,  as  against  a  wall  of 
adamant,  all  the  shafts  of  the  necessitarian  will  fall 
blunted  to  the  earth,  or  else  recoil  with  destructive  force 
upon  himself. 

But  why  fight  against  the  doctrine  of  those  who  have 
laboured  in  the  same  great  cause  with  myself?  Truly, 
most  truly,  not  because  it  is  a  grateful  task,  but  because 
it  is  a  deep  and  earnest  conviction,  wrought  into  my  mind 
by  the  meditation  of  years,  that  the  great  and  glorious 
cause  of  free-agency  has  been  retarded  by  some  of  the 
errors  of  its  friends,  more  than  by  all  the  truths  of  its  ene- 
mies. This  has  appeared  to  be  the  case  especially  in 
regard  to  the  self-determining  power  of  the  will.  It 
seems  to  have  retained  its  hold  upon  the  mind  of  its 
friends,  not  so  much  by  its  intrinsic  merits,  as  by  its  de- 
nial of  moral  necessity,  and  the  idea  that  it  is  the  only 
mode  of  such  denial.  As  the  scheme  of  moral  necessity 
has  triumphed  in  the  weakness  of  the  self-determining 
power,  so  has  the  self-determining  power  resisted  the 
siege  of  centuries,  in  the  unconquerable  energy  of  its 
opposition  to  the  determining  and  controlling  power  of 
19 


214  EXAMINATION    OF 

motives.  And  if  both  have  stood  together,  each  deriving 
strength  from  the  weakness  of  the  other,  is  it  not  possi- 
ble that  both  may  fall  together,  and  that  a  more  complete 
and  satisfactory  scheme  of  moral  agency  may  arise  out 
of  the  common  ruins  ? 


EDWARDS  ON   THE   WILL.  215 

SECTION  XVII. 

OF   THE    DEFINITION   OF    A   FREE   AGENT. 

Having  shown,  as  I  trust,  that  there  is  no  influence 
whatever  operating  upon  the  mind  to  produce  volition,  I 
am  now  prepared  to  declare  the  true  idea  of  a  free- 
agent. 

A  free-agent,  then,  is  one  who  acts  without  being 
caused  to  act.  Here  the  question  arises.  Is  such  a  thing 
possible  ?  Can  any  being  act,  without  being  caused  to 
act?  The  answer  to  this  question,  depends  upon  the 
meaning  which  is  attached  to  the  very  ambiguous  term 
cause.  If  it  means  an  efficient  cause,  or  that  which  pro- 
duces a  thing  by  prior  action  or  influence,  it  is  possible 
for  a  spirit  to  act  without  being  caused  to  do  so ;  and, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  if  there  can  be  no  action  with- 
out such  a  cause  of  its  existence,  then  there  must  be  an 
infinite  series  of  actions  or  causes.  But  if  the  question 
be.  Can  an  act  arise  and  come  into  being,  without  a  suf- 
ficient "  ground  and  reason*'  of  its  existence  ?  I  answer, 
No.  It  is  very  necessary  to  separate  the  different  ques- 
tions included  in  the  general  one,  Is  not  a  volition 
caused  ?  or  has  it  not  a  cause  ?  and  to  pass  upon  them 
separately. 

There  is,  I  admit,  a  "sufficient  ground  and  reason" 
for  our  actions ;  but  not  an  efficient  cause  of  them.  This 
is  the  all-important  distinction  which  has  been  over- 
looked in  the  present  controversy.  Edwards  frequently 
asks,  if  a  volition  is  without  a  cause  ?  Now  we  call  for  a 


216  EXAMINATION    OF 

division  of  this  question.  Has  volition  an  efficient 
cause  ?  I  answer,  No.  Has  it  a  "  sufficient  ground  and 
reason"  of  its  existence  ?  I  answer,  Yes.  No  one  ever 
imagined  that  there  are  no  indispensable  antecedents  to 
choice,  without  which  it  could  not  take  place ;  but  Ed- 
wards has  framed  this  question  in  such  a  manner,  that 
we  cannot  give  a  categorical  answer  to  it,  without  either 
denying  our  own  doctrine,  or  else  subscribing  to  his. 
Unless  there  were  a  mind,  there  could  be  no  act  of  the 
mind ;  and  unless  the  mind  possessed  a  power  of  act- 
ing, it  could  not  put  forth  volitions.  The  mind,  then, 
and  the  power  of  the  mind  called  will,  constitute  the 
ground  of  action  or  volition. 

But  a  power  to  act,  it  will  be  said,  is  not  a  sufficient 
reason  to  account  for  the  existence  of  action.  This  is 
true.  The  reason  is  to  come.  The  sufficient  reason, 
however,  is  not  an  efficient  cause ;  for  there  is  some  dif- 
ference between  a  blind  impulse  or  force,  and  rationality. 
The  mind  is  endowed  with  various  appetites,  passions, 
and  desires, — with  noble  affections,  and,  above  all,  with 
a  feeling  of  moral  approbation  and  disapprobation.  These 
are  not  the  "  active  principles,"  or  the  "  motive  powers," 
as  they  have  been  called ;  they  are  the  ends  of  our  act- 
ing: we  simply  act  in  order  to  gratify  them.  They 
exert  no  influence  over  the  will,  much  less  is  the  will 
controlled  by  them ;  and  hence,  we  are  perfectly  free,  to 
gratify  the  one  or  the  other  of  them ; — to  act  in  obedience 
to  the  dictates  of  conscience,  or  in  order  to  gratify  the 
lowest  appetites  of  our  nature.  We  see  that  certain 
means  must  be  used,  in  order  to  gratify  the  passion,  de- 
sire, affection,  or  feeling,  which  we  intend  to  gratify ; 
and  we  act  accordingly.  In  all  this,  we  form  our  de- 
signs or  intentions  free  from  all  influence  whatever: 


EDWARDS   ON    THE   WILL.  217 

nothing  acts  upon  the  will :  we  fix  upon  the  end,  and 
we  choose  the  means  to  accomplish  it.  We  adapt  the 
means  to  our  end ;  because  there  is  a  fitness  in  them  to 
accomplish  that  end  or  design ;  and  because,  as  rational 
creatures,  we  perceive  that  fitness.  Thus,  we  act  ac- 
cording to  reason,  but  not  from  the  influence  of  reason. 
We  act  with  a  view  to  our  desires,  but  not  from  the 
influence  of  our  desires ;  and  our  volition  is  virtuous  or  vi- 
cious according  to  the  intention  with  which  it  is  put  forth, 
•—according  to  the  design  with  which  it  is  directed. 
Passion  is  not  "  the  gale,"  it  is  "  the  card."  Reason  is 
not  the  force,  it  is  the  law.  All  the  power  resides  in  the 
free,  untrammelled  will.  He  who  overlooks  this,  and 
blindly  seeks  for  something  to  "  move  the  mind  to  voli- 
tion," loses  sight  of  the  grand  and  distinctive  peculiarity 
of  man's  nature,  and  brings  it  down  to  the  dust,  subject- 
ing it  to  the  laws  of  matter  and  to  bondage. 

We  do  not  allow  Mr.  Hobbes  to  declare  our  idea  of  a 
free-agent,  as  **  one  that,  when  all  the  circumstances 
necessary  to  produce  action  are  present,  can  neverthe- 
less not  act  ;^'  nor  do  we  accept  of  the  amendment  of 
another,  "  that  a  free-agent  is  one  who,  when  all  the  cir- 
cumstances necessary  to  produce  action  are  present,  can 
act."  For  if  all  the  circumstances  necessary  to  produce 
action  are  present,  then  they  would  produce  it ;  and  no- 
thing would  be  left  for  the  will  to  do,  except  to  receive 
the  producing  influence.  In  other  words,  if  volition  is 
produced  by  circumstances,  then  it  is  a  passive  impres- 
sion made  upon  the  will,  and  not  an  act  at  all. 

It  is  contended  by  Edwards,  that  it  is  just  as  absurd  to 

say,  that  a  volition  can  come  into  existence  without  a 

cause,  as  it  is  that  a  world  should  do  so.    It  is  true,  that 

a  world  cannot  arise  out  of  nothing,  and  come  into  exist- 

19* 


218  EXAMINATION   OF 

ence  of  itself ;  and  this  is  also  equally  true  of  a  volition. 
But  is  the  mind  nothing?  Is  the  will  nothing?  Is  a 
free,  intelligent,  designing  cause  nothing? 

The  mind  is  something ;  and  it  is  capable  of  acting  in 
order  to  fulfil  its  own  designs,  though  it  be  not  impelled 
to  act.  Is  this  idea  absurd  ?  Is  it  self-contradictory  ? 
Is  it  any  thing  like  the  assertion,  that  an  effect  has  no 
cause  ?  It  is  not.  It  implies  no  contradiction ; — it  is  a 
possible  idea.  How  does  it  act,  then  ?  I  do  not  know. 
This  is  a  mystery.  Indeed,  every  ultimate  fact  in  man's 
nature,  and  every  simple  exercise  of  his  intellectual 
powers,  is  a  mystery.  An  exercise  of  the  power  of  con- 
ception, by  which  the  past  is  called  up,  and  made  to  pass 
in  review  before  us ;  an  exercise  of  the  imagination,  by 
which  the  world  is  made  to  teem  with  wonders  of  our 
own  creation ;  and  an  exercise  of  the  will,  by  which  we 
produce  changes  in  the  external  world ;  are  all  myste- 
ries ?  Now,  shall  we  fly  from  these  mysteries  ?  Shall 
we  strive  to  make  the  matter  plain,  in  a  single  instance, 
by  assigning  an  efficient  cause  to  an  act  of  the  will?  If 
so,  whether  we  escape  the  mystery  or  not,  we  shall  cer- 
tainly plunge  into  absurdity.  We  shall  embrace  a 
doctrine,  which  denies  the  nature  of  action,  and  which 
is  necessarily  involved  in  the  great  absurdity  of  an  infi- 
nite series  of  causes.  For  my  part,  I  prefer  a  simple 
statement  of  the  fact  of  volition,  with  its  attendant  cir- 
cumstances, how  much  soever  of  mystery  it  may  seem 
to  leave  around  the  subject,  to  any  explanation  which 
involves  it  in  absurdity. 

The  philosophers  of  all  ages  have  sought  for  the 
efficient  cause  of  volition  ;  but  who  has  found  it  ?  Is  it 
in  the  will  ?  The  necessitarian  has  shown  the  absurdities 
of  this  hypothesis.     Is  it  in  the  power  of  motive  ?    This 


EDWARDS   ON    THE   WILL.  219 

hypothesis  is  fraught  with  the  very  same  absurdities.  Is 
it  in  the  uncaused  volition  of  Deity?  The  younger  Ed- 
wards could  do  nothing  with  this  hypothesis.  In  truth, 
the  efficient  cause  of  volition  is  nowhere.  It  has  never 
been  found,  because  it  does  not  exist ;  and  it  never  will 
be  found,  so  long  as  an  action  of  mind  continues  to  be 
what  it  is. 

This,  then,  is  th«  true  idea  of  a  free-agent:  it  is  one 
who,  in  view  of  circumstances,  both  external  and  inter- 
nal, can  act,  without  being  efficiently  caused  to  do  so. 
This  is  the  idea  of  a  free-agent  which  God  has  realized 
by  the  creation  of  the  soul  of  man.  It  may  be  a  mys- 
tery ;  but  it  is  not  a  contradiction.  It  may  be  a  mystery ; 
but  then  it  solves  a  thousand  difficulties  which  we  have 
unnecessarily  created  to  ourselves.  It  may  be  a  mys- 
tery ;  but  then  it  is  the  only  safe  retreat  from  self-contra- 
diction, absurdity,  and  atheism. 

It  is  no  reason  for  disbelieving  a  thing,  that  we  cannot 
conceive  how  it  is.  This  will  be  readily  admitted  ;  but 
this  principle,  like  every  other,  may  be  misapplied  and 
abused.  If  any  thing  is  possible  in  itself  considered, 
that  is,  if  it  implies  no  contradiction,  we  should  not  re- 
fuse to  believe  it,  because  we  cannot  conceive  how  it  is. 
When  confined  within  these  limits,  the  principle  or 
maxim  in  question  is  one  of  immense  importance ;  and 
to  disregard  it  betrays  one  of  the  greatest  weaknesses  to 
which  the  human  mind  is  exposed.  If  we  do  not  adhere 
to  it,  there  is  no  resting-place  for  us  this  side  of  the  most 
unqualified  atheism  :  we  shall  be  compelled  to  renounce, 
not  only  the  stupendous  facts  and  mysteries  of  revela- 
tion, but  also  all  the  great  truths  of  natural  religion.  The 
very  being  and  attributes  of  God  can  find  no  place  in  our 
minds,  if  we  expunge  this  principle  from  them ;  and  in- 


220  EXAMINATION   OF 

sist  upon  seeing  how  every  iftiing  is,  before  we  consent 
to  receive  it  as  an  object  of  belief. 

We  should  find  no  difficulty,  therefore,  in  believing 
that  the  mind  of  man  acts,  without  being  efficiently 
caused  to  act.  This  implies  no  contradiction;  and 
hence  the  creative  power  of  God  can  produce  such  a 
being — a  being  that  acts  freely,  without  labouring  under 
any  necessity,  either  natural  or  moral,  in  its  accountable 
and  moral  agency.  A  being,  the  end  of  whose  action  is 
found  in  the  sensibility ;  the  intention,  the  design,  and 
the  plan  of  whose  action  is  formed  in  the  intelligence  ; 
and  the  power  by  which  this  intention  is  executed,  and 
this  plan  accomplished,  is  in  the  will  alone.  It  is  in 
this  tri-unity  of  the  sensibility,  the  intelligence,  and  the 
will,  that  the  glory  of  man's  nature,  as  a  free  and  ac- 
countable being,  consists.  The  relation  between  them  is 
most  intimate, — is  inconceivably  intimate;  but  the  rela- 
tion is  not  the  same  in  nature  and  kind  as  that  which  sub- 
sists between  an  effect  and  its  efficient,  or  producing 
cause.  The  only  relation  of  this  kind,  which  is  to  be 
found  in  the  case,  is  that  which  subsists  between  the 
action  of  the  will,  or  the  volition,  and  the  corre- 
sponding change  which  it  produces  in  the  external  part 
of  our  being.  I  say,  we  can  very  easily  believe  all  jlhis, 
as  it  implies  no  contradiction ;  and  yet  not  feel  ourselves 
bound,  by  a  regard  for  consistency,  to  believe  that  a 
world  may  rise  up  out  of  nothing,  and  come  into  being 
of  itself,  without  any  cause  of  its  existence.  These 
things  are  blended  together,  in  the  philosophy  of  the  ne- 
cessitarian, by  a  most  convenient  use  of  an  ambiguous 
phraseology ;  but  they  are,  indeed,  as  widely  different 
from  each  other  as  mystery  is  from  absurdity, — as  light 
IS  from  darkness. 


EDWARDS   ON  THE    WILL.  221 

But  the  above  maxim,  as  I  have  already  said,  may  be 
grievously  misappUed ;  and  thus  the  garb  of  intellectual 
humility  may  be  thrown  over  the  greatest  absurdities. 
We  may  be  told,  for  example,  that  the  same  body  may 
be  wholly  in  one  place,  and  wholly  in  a  far  distant  place, 
at  one  and  the  same  time ;  and,  if  we  object  to  this  doc- 
trine, thelnurmurings  of  reason  are  sought  to  be  silenced, 
by  reminding  us,  that  it  is  exceedingly  weak  and  pre- 
sumptuous for  poor  blind  creatures  like  ourselves,  to 
reject  a  truth  because  we  cannot  conceive  how  it  is.  In 
like  manner,  we  are  informed  that  a  volition,  or  an  act 
of  the  will,  may  be  produced  in  the  mind,  may  be  ne- 
cessitated, by  the  action  of  an  extraneous  cause,  or,  if 
you  please,  of  an  intrinsic  cause  ;  and  if  we  ask  how  this 
can  be,  without  interfering  with  our  free-agency,  it  is 
frequently  replied,  that  we  cannot  tell ;  but  that  it  is  ex- 
ceedingly absurd  and  presumptuous  to  disbelieve  a  thing 
because  we  cannot  conceive  how  it  is.  That  God 
operates  upon  the  mind,  not  to  rectify  and  elevate 
its  powers,  but  to  produce  a  volition  in  it ;  not  to  cleanse 
and  purify  the  whole  stream  and  current  of  our  natures, 
but  merely  to  throw  up  a  bubble  upon  the  surface  thereof, 
for  which  effect  he  holds  us  accountable :  that  he  does  this, 
we  are  told,  is  a  great  mystery,  which  we  should  not  pre- 
sume to  call  in  question.  For  my  part,  I  had  rather  be- 
lieve the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation  itself,  than  such  a 
mystery  as  this. 

There  is  some  difference,  I  have  supposed,  between 
disbelieving  a  thing  because  we  cannot  see  how  it  is,  and 
disbelieving  it,  because  we  very  clearly  see  that  it  cannot 
possibly  be  any  how  at  all.  It  is  upon  this  distinction 
that  I  stand,  when  I  receive  the  great  mysteries  of  the 
Godhead,  and  reject  the  absurdities  of  transubstantiation. 


222  EXAMINATION   OF 

And  it  is  upon  the  same  ground,  that  I  most  freely  and 
fully  recognize  and  embrace  the  great  mysteries  of  our 
being,  whilst  I  reject  the  absurdities  of  an  efficiently 
caused  and  accountable  agency. 

Is  not  this  distinction  properly  applied  ?  If  the  action 
or  influence  of  any  thing  produces  an  effect  upon  the 
mind,  is  not  that  effect  merely  a  passive  impression  ?  Is 
it  not  absurd  to  suppose,  that  it  is  a  passive  impression, 
produced  by  the  action  of  something  else,  and  yet  that  it 
is  an  action  of  the  mind  itself?  If  so,  and  so  I  think  it 
has  been  made  to  appear,  then  we  not  only  should,  but 
must,  reject  it.  We  must  reject  it,  unless  we  suffer  our- 
selves to  be  blinded  by  false  analogies,  and  verbal  ambi- 
guities. 

This  is  not  to  deny  the  divine  influence,  as  has  been 
so  often  imagined.  The  regeneration,  the  new  creation, 
of  the  soul,  by  the  power  of  God,  is  no  more  inconsistent 
with  free  and  accountable  agency,  than  was  the  original 
creation  of  it  with  all  its  powers ;  but  this  cannot  be  said 
of  the  production  of  our  acts  or  volitions  by  a  divine  in- 
fluence. Those  must  take  an  exceedingly  narrow  and 
superficial  view  of  the  great  work  of  regeneration,  who 
suppose  that  it  is  altogether  denied,  unless  we  admit  that 
the  Spirit  produces  our  volitions ;  who  suppose  that  the 
divine  agency  can  in  no  way  cleanse  and  purify  our 
powers,  unless  it  can  superinduce  a  volition,  or  an  act, 
upon  our  depraved  natures.  How  many  persons  have 
laboured  in  vain,  to  reconcile  the  free-agency  of  man  with 
the  reality  of  a  divine  influence ;  just  because  they  have 
laboured  under  the  superficial  notion,  the  grand  illusion, 
that  the  Spirit  of  God  cannot  act  upon  the  mind  at  all, 
unless  it  acts  to  produce  a  volition !  It  is  no  wonder 
that  they  have  laboured  in  vain,  and  abandoned  the  task 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  323 

in  despair ;  because  what  they  have  taken  for  a  seeming 
difficulty,  is,  when  narrowly  inspected,  seen  to  be  a  real 
absurdity.  Lay  this  aside,  and  there  will  be  a  mystery 
in  the  case,  it  is  true ;  but  there  will  not  be  even  a  seem- 
ing contradiction. 

But  I  do  not  intend  to  enter  upon  the  subject  of  the- 
ology. This  is  entirely  beside  the  purpose  of  the  present 
work ;  and  if  I  have  touched  upon  it  for  a  moment,  it 
was  only  to  show,  by  a  passing  glance,  how  very  easy 
it  were  for  any  one,  if  he  were  so  disposed,  to  draw 
false  conclusions  with  respect  to  theology,  from  the 
views  which  have  been  advanced  in  regard  to  the  philo- 
sophy of  the  will.  True  philosophy  and  religion  will 
always  perfectly  harmonize  ;  but  then  he  is  very  apt  to 
be  a  poor  philosopher,  who  derives  his  philosophy  from 
his  religion ;  and  he  a  miserable  theologian,  who  de- 
rives his  religion  from  his  philosophy.  It  was  in  that 
way,  that  Edwards  became  a  necessitarian ;  it  is  in  this, 
that  many  a  necessitarian  has  become  an  infidel  or  an 
atheist. 


224  EXAMINATION   OF 


SECTION  XVIII. 

OF  THE  TESTIMONY  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Whether  our  volitions  come  to  pass  in  the  manner 
we  call  freely,  or  are  brought  to  pass  by  the  operation  of 
necessary  causes,  is  a  question  of  fact,  which  should  be 
referred  to  the  tribunal  of  consciousness.  If  we  ever 
hope  to  settle  this  question,  we  must  occasionally  turn 
from  the  arena  of  dialectics,  and  unite  our  efforts  in  the 
cultivation  of  the  much-neglected  field  of  observation.  We 
must  turn  from  the  dust  and  smoke  of  mere  logical  con- 
tention, and  consult  the  living  oracle  within ;  we  must 
behold  the  pure  light  that  ever  burns  behind  the  dark- 
ened veil  of  disputation. 

This  appeal  is  not  declined  by  the  necessitarian.  He 
consents  to  the  appeal ;  and  the  dispute  is,  as  to  the 
true  interpretation  of  the  decision  of  the  tribunal  in  ques- 
tion. We  contend  that  the  testimony  of  consciousness 
is  clearly  and  unequivocally  in  favour  of  the  doctrine  of 
liberty,  while  our  opponents  allege  the  same  evidence  in 
their  own  favour.  Now,  what  is  the  real  import  of  this 
testimony? 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  President  Edwards  has  said 
so  little  on  this  subject.  He  has  disposed  of  it  in  one 
brief  note  ;  as  if  the  nature  of  our  mental  operations  were 
to  be  determined  by  abstract  and  universal  propositions, 
or  truisms,  and  observation  consulted  only  to  confirm  our 
preconceived  opinions.     What  little  he  has  said  on  this 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  225 

subject,  however,  is  sufficient  to  show  with  what  faint 
hope  of  success  the  necessitarian  can  venture  to  submit 
his  cause  to  the  tribunal  of  consciousness. 

The  testimony  of  consciousness,  I  have  no  doubt, 
might  have  been  made  much  stronger  in  our  favour,  if 
the  wrong  question  had  not  been  submitted  to  it.  All  the  ad- 
vocates of  free-agency,  so  far  as  I  remember,  have  said 
that  we  are  conscious  of  freedom  ;  that  we  are  conscious 
of  a  power  of  contrary  phoice.  Or,  in  other  words,  that 
when  we  put  forth  a  volition,  we  are  conscious  that  we 
might  forbear  to  do  so.  But  this  does  not  seem  to  be 
the  case.  We  are  not  conscious  of  what  does  not  take 
place  in  our  minds ;  and  hence,  we  are  only  conscious 
of  the  volition  which  we  put  forth.  We  are  not  even 
conscious  of  our  power  to  act ;  this  is  necessarily  infer- 
red from  the  acts  of  which  we  are  conscious.  As  we 
do  not  then,  according  to  the  supposition,  put  forth  the 
contrary  choice,  we  cannot  be  conscious  of  it,  nor  of  the 
power  to  put  it  forth.  By  referring  this,  therefore,  to 
the  tribunal  of  consciousness,  it  seems  to  me  that  most 
advocates  of  free-agency  have  rendered  a  dis-service 
to  the  cause  which  they  have  so  ably  supported  in 
other  respects.  For  the  necessitarian  sees,  that  the 
doctrine  of  liberty,  or  the  power  of  choice  to  the  con- 
trary, cannot  be  established  by  the  direct  testimony  of 
consciousness  alone ;  and  hence  he  strengthens  himself  in 
his  own  convictions,  by  picking  flaws  in  our  evidence. 
He  sees  that  we  are  not  borne  out  by  the  testimony  of 
consciousness,  in  regard  to  the  point  which  we  submit  to 
it;  and  hence,  he  readily  concludes  that  we  are  wrong 
in  the  whole  matter.  It  is  well,  it  is  exceedingly  impor- 
tant, to  observe  what  are  the  strong  points  of  our  cause, 
upon  which  we  can  rest  with  unshaken  confidence,  and  to 
20 


226  EXAMINATION    OF 

take  our  stand  upon  them  ;  giving  up  all  untenable  posi- 
tions. 

By  consciousness,  then,  we  discover  the  existence  of 
an  act.  We  see  no  cause  by  which  it  is  produced.  If 
it  were  produced  by  the  act  or  operation  of  any  thing 
else,  it  would  be  a  passive  impression,  and  not  an  act  of 
the  mind  itself.  The  mind  would  be  wholly  passive  in 
relation  to  it,  and  it  would  not  be  an  act  at  all.  Whether 
it  is  produced  by  a  preceding  act  of  the  mind,  or  by  the 
action  of  any  thing  else,  the  mind  would  be  passive  as 
to  the  effect  produced.  But  we  see,  in  the  clear  and 
unquestionable  light  of  consciousness,  that  instead  of 
being  passive,  the  mind  is  active  in  its  volitions. — 
Hence,  it  follows  by  an  inference  as  clear  as  noonday, 
and  as  irresistible  as  fate,  that  the  action  of  the  mind  is 
not  a  produced  effect.  It  is  not  a  passive  impression ; 
and  hence  it  does  not,  it  cannot,  result  from  the  action  of 
any  thing  else.  To  say  that  it  is  produced  by  the  action 
of  something  else  upon  the  mind,  is  to  say  that  it  is  a 
passive  impression,  and  to  deny  that  it  is  an  act.  We 
are  simply  conscious  of  an  act  then,  and  the  irresistible 
inference  which  results  from  this  fact,  stands  out  in  direct 
and  eternal  opposition  to  the  doctrine  of  necessity. 

When  we  reflect  upon  the  operation  of  the  will,  or  of 
the  mind  in  the  act  of  willing,  we  simply  find  ourselves 
in  possession  of  a  volition.  We  do  not  see  how  we 
come  by  this  volition ;  how  we  come  to  exist  in  this  state 
of  activity.  On  this  point,  I  am  happy  to  find  that  the 
consciousness  of  President  Edwards  agreed  with  ray 
own.  "  It  is  true,"  says  he,  "  I  find  myself  possessed 
of  my  volitions  before  I  can  see  the  effectual  power  of 
any  cause  to  produce  them,  for  the  power  and  eflicacy 
of  the  cause  is  seen  but  by  the  effect,  and  this,  for  aught 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  227 

I  know,  may  make  some  imagine  that  volition  has  no 
cause,  or  that  it  produces  itself." 

Our  consciousness  is  precisely  the  same ;  but  just  ob- 
serve how  he  interprets  it.  He  finds  himself  possessed 
of  a  volition;  but  does  he  look  at  this  volition  to  see 
what  it  is  ?  Does  he  ask  himself  whether  it  is  the  same 
in  nature  and  in  kind  with  a  produced  effect?  He  does 
not.  It  is  most  unquestionably  a  produced  effect ;  this 
is  beyond  all  doubt,  and  it  is  taken  for  granted.  He  sees 
no  effectual  power  by  which  this  volition  is  produced ; 
but  he  knows  it  is  a  produced  effect,  and  therefore  he 
knows  it  must  have  a  producing  cause.  The  oracle  is 
not  consulted  on  this  point  at  all.  It  would  be  an  insult 
to  reason  to  consult  the  great  oracle  of  nature  on  so  plain 
a  point  as  this.  This  has  been  decided  long  ago,  and  the 
ear  is  deaf  to  any  response  that  might  possibly  contra- 
vene so  clear  a  decision.  Thus  it  is  that  the  necessita- 
rian goes  to  the  true  oracle  within,  and  delivers  oracles 
himself. 

He  reasons  not  from  the  observed,  but  from  the  as- 
sumed, nature  of  a  volition.  It  must  be  an  effect,  says 
he,  and  though  I  do  not  see  "the  effectual  power  by 
which  it  is  produced  ;"  yet  there  must  be  such  a  power. 
Yes,  it  is  just  as  absurd  to  suppose  that  it  can  exist,  with- 
out being  produced  by  the  effectual  power  of  something 
operating  upon  the  mind,  as  it  is  to  suppose  that  a  world 
can  create  itself! 

But  as  we  appeal  to  consciousness,  let  us  pay  some 
little  attention  to  its  teaching.  We  find  ourselves,  then, 
possessed  of  a  volition  ;  we  find  our  minds  in  a  state  of 
acting.  This  is  all  we  discover  by  the  light  of  conscious- 
ness. We  see  "not  the  effectual  power  of  any  cause" 
operating  to  produce  it.     What  shall  we  conclude  then  ? 


228  EXAMINATION   OF 

Shall  we  conclude  that  there  must  be  some  cause  to  pro- 
duce it?  This  were  not  to  study  nature,  as  '*  the  hum- 
ble servants  and  interpreters  thereof;"  but  to  approach 
it  in  the  attitude  of  dictators. 

If  we  draw  such  an  inference  at  all,  it  must  be  from 
the  fact,  it  seems,  that  volition  is  a  produced  effect.  But 
is  it  such  an  effect?  "What  says  consciousness  upon  this 
point?  We  have  already  repeatedly  seen,  what  every 
man  may  see,  that  a  volition  is  not  the  passive  result 
of  any  prior  action ;  it  is  action  itself.  It  is  not  a  pro- 
duced effect ;  it  is  a  producing  cause.  It  is  not  deter- 
mined at  all ;  it  is  simply  a  determination.  As  it  stands 
out  in  the  light  of  consciousness,  it  is  as  perfectly  distinct 
from  the  idea  of  an  effect,  as  any  one  thing  can  possibly 
be  from  another ;  and  if  it  has  not  so  appeared  to  every 
reflecting  mind,  it  is  because  it  has  not  been  simply  looked 
at,  and  beheld  as  it  is  in  itself,  but  has  been  viewed  through 
the  medium  of  a  certain  fixed  notion,  a  certain  precon- 
ceived form  of  thought,  a  certain  grand  illusion,  by  which 
he  witchery  of  the  senses  has  blinded  the  eye  of  con- 
sciousness. Every  change  in  the  external  world  requires 
a  producing  cause  ;  who  then  can  possibly  conceive  of  a 
volition  as  existing  upon  any  other  terms  or  conditions  ! 
It  is  this  fallacy,  this  begging  of  the  question,  this  per- 
petual declaration  that  it  is  self-evident,  that  has,  through 
a  natural  illusion  of  the  senses,  spread  the  scheme  of  ne- 
cessity far  and  wide  over  the  minds  of  men.  It  is  this 
grand  illusion  of  the  senses,  or,  if  you  please,  of  the 
mind,  that  has  brought  "  the  dictates  of  reason,"  as  they 
have  been  called,  into  conflict  with  the  testimony  of 
consciousness. 

The  doctrine  of  liberty  is  as  inevitably  connected  with 
the  observed  nature  of  a  volition,  as  that  of  necessity  is 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  229 

connected  with  its  assumed  nature.  I  would  not  say- 
that  we  are  conscious  of  liberty ;  for  that  would  not  be 
correct ;  but  I  will  say,  that  we  are  conscious  of  that 
which  necessarily  leads  to  the  conviction  that  we  are  free, 
that  we  have  a  power  of  contrary  choice.  I  would  not 
say  with  Dr.  Clarke,  that  liberty  consists  in  a  power  to 
act ;  but  I  will  say,  that  it  necessarily  results  from  it.  I 
would  not  say,  that  we  are  conscious  of  the  existence  of 
no  producing  cause  of  our  volitions ;  for  we  cannot  be 
conscious  of  that  which  does  not  exist.  But  I  will  say, 
that  as  we  are  conscious  of  the  existence  of  an  act,  so 
we  see  and  do  know  that  this  is  not  a  passive  impression, 
or  a  produced  effect.  And  as  we  are  not  compelled  to  act, 
so  we  know  that  we  may  act  or  may  not  act,  so  we  know 
that  our  actions  are  not  necessitated,  but  may  be  put  forth 
or  withheld.  This  is  liberty,  this  is  '« a  power  of  contrary 
choice."  This  idea  of  liberty,  I  say,  follows  from  the 
fact  of  consciousness  that  we  do  act,  by  an  inference  as 
clear  as  noonday ;  by  an  inference  so  natural,  so  direct, 
and  so  inconceivably  rapid,  that  it  has  often  been  supposed 
to  be  included  in  the  testimony  of  consciousness  itself. 
No  man  could  help  the  conclusion,  if  he  would  only 
allow  his  reason  to  speak  for  itself. 

Is  this  doctrine  any  the  less  certain,  because  it  is  a 
matter  of  inference?  It  will  be  conceded  that  it  is 
not.  The  most  unquestionable  facts  in  the  universe  are 
made  known  by  the  same  kind  of  evidence.  It  is  some- 
times said,  that  we  are  conscious  of  our  own  existence  ; 
but  this  is  not  to  use  language  with  philosophical  pre- 
cision. We  are  merely  conscious  of  the  existence  of 
thought,  of  feeling,  of  voHtion ;  and  we  are  so  made, 
that  we  are  compelled  to  believe  that  there  is  something 
which  thinks,  and  feels,  and  wills.   It  is  thus,  by  what 


230  EXAMINATION   OF 

has  been  called  a  fundamental  law  of  belief,  that  we  arrive 
at  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  our  minds.  In 
like  manner,  from  the  fact  of  consciousness  that  we  do 
act,  or  put  forth  volitions,  we  are  forced,  by  a  funda- 
mental law  of  belief,  to  yield  to  the  conviction  that  we 
are  free.  This  inference  as  necessarily  results  from  the 
observed  phenomena  of  the  mind,  as  the  existence  of 
the  mind  itself  results  from  the  same  phenomena.  And 
if  the  doctrine  of  the  necessitarian  were  true,  that  vo- 
lition is  a  produced  effect,  we  should  never  infer  from  it 
that  we  have  a  power  of  acting  at  all ;  we  should  simply 
infer  that  we  are  susceptible  of  passive  impressions. 

I  have  said,  that  we  are  not  conscious  that  there  is  no 
producing  cause  of  volition.  No  man  can  be  conscious 
of  that  which  does  not  exist.  Hence,  it  is  highly  absurd 
to  require  us,  to  furnish  the  evidence  of  consciousness 
that  there  is  no  such,  cause  of  volition.  It  cannot  testify 
to  any  such  universal  negative ;  and  one  might  as  well 
require  a  mathematical  demonstration  of  the  point  in  dis- 
pute, as  to  demand  such  evidence  from  us.  And  yet, 
President  Edwards  declares,  that  by  experience  he 
knows  nothing  like  the  doctrine,  that  "any  volition 
arises  in  his  mind  contingently;"  that  is  to  say,  he  was 
not  conscious  that  a  volition  has  no  producing  cause  of 
its  existence.  Did  he  expect  that  we  should  prove  the 
non-existence  of  a  thing  by  the  direct  evidence  of  con- 
sciousness ?  All  that  he  could  reasonably  expect  in  such 
a  case  is,  that  we  should  not  be  conscious  of  any  such 
influence;  and  this  President  Edwards  himself  admits. 
He  admits,  that  we  do  not  see  the  "  effectual  power  of  any 
cause,"  or  feel  its  influence,  operating  to  produce  a  voli- 
tion :  he  merely  infers  this  from  the  assumption  that  vo- 
lition is  a  produced  effect. 


EDWARDS   ON   THE    WILL.  231 

He  also  says,  I  find  "  that  the  acts  of  my  Will  are  my 
own ;  i.  e.  that  they  are  acts  of  my  will — the  volitions  of 
my  own  mind ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  what  I  will,  I 
will ;  which,  I  suppose,  is  the  sum  of  what  others  expe- 
rience in  this  affair."  Surely,  no  one  was  ever  so  silly 
as  to  deny  that  what  a  man  wills,  he  wills ;  and  if  this  is 
all  that  consciousness  teaches  on  the  subject,  its  informa- 
tion can  throw  no  light  upon  this  or  upon  any  other 
controversy.  This  proposition,  that  a  man  wills  what  he 
wills,  is  independent  of  all  experience  and  all  conscious- 
ness. It  is  an  identical  proposition,  which  experience 
can  neither  shake  nor  confirm.  We  may  see,  nay,  we 
must  see,  that  each  and  every  thing  in  the  universe  is 
what  it  is,  without  any  reference  to  consciousness  or 
experience. 

Indeed,  it  is  as  absurd  to  appeal  to  experience  or  con- 
sciousness for  the  truth  of  such  a  universal  and  self- 
evident  axiom,  as  it  is  to  appeal  to  universal  and  self- 
evident  axioms,  to  ascertain  and  determine  the  nature  of 
our  mental  phenomena, — of  the  states  and  processes  of 
the  mind.  Edwards  has  done  both  :  he  has  deduced  the 
truth  of  the  proposition,  that  a  man  wills  what  he  wills, 
from  the  evidence  of  consciousness  or  experience,  as  the 
sum  of  all  its  teaching ;  and  he  has  established  the  fact, 
that  a  volition  is  produced  by  the  operation  of  an  effectual 
power,  by  an  appeal  to  a  universal  axiom.  He  has  sub- 
mitted a  truism,  which  declines  every  test  of  its  truth, 
to  the  tribunal  of  consciousness ;  and  he  has  determined 
the  nature  of  a  volition,  as  well  as  the  manner  of  its  pro- 
duction, by  the  application  of  a  similar  truism,  which 
contains  no  conceivable  information  respecting  the  nature 
of  any  thing  in  the  universe. 


232  EXAMINATION   OF 

Edwards  says,  "  I  find  myself  possessed  of  my  voli- 
tions."    He  was  conscious  of  his  own  acts.     This  is  a 
sufficient  foundation  for  the  doctrine  of  liberty ;  for  such 
a  consciousness  is  utterly  irreconcilable  with  the  suppo- 
sition that  those  acts  are  produced  by  the  operation  of 
efficient  causes.     To  say  that  they  are  *'  my  acts,"  and 
yet  to  say  that  they  are  produced  by  the  action  of  some- 
thing else,  is,  as  we  have  repeatedly  seen,  to  say  that 
they  are  my  acts,  and  at  the  same  time  to  say  that  they 
are  not  my  actSt  but  effects  produced  upon  my  mind. 
This  very  admission,  therefore,  lays  the  foundation  of 
the  doctrine  of  liberty.     And  hence,  it  has  been  sup- 
posed that  Edwards  himself  was  an  advocate  of  this 
doctrine ;  because  he  has  spoken  of  the  soul  as  exerting 
its  own  voUtions.     From  such  an  admission,  it  has  been 
concluded  by  some  of  his  admirers,  that  he  really  re- 
garded the  mind  as  the  **  efficient  cause  of  its  own  acts," 
and    "motives  as  inerely  the  occasions  on  which  it 
acts."     But  such  an  admission  only  proves,  that  his 
consciousness   cannot   be  reconciled   with   his    theory. 
His  consciousness  lays  the  foundation  of  liberty;  but 
he  does  not  build  thereon.    On  the  contrary,  he  lays  the 
foundation  of  his  system  in  universal  abstractions,  and 
not  in  observed  facts ;  and  hence,  as  it  is  not  derived 
from  an  observation  of  nature,  so  it  can  never  be  brought 
into  harmony  with  the  dictates  and  operations  of  nature. 
It  is  altogether  a  thing  of  definitions  and  words ;  and  as 
such  it  must  pass  away,  when  men  shall  cease  to  con- 
struct for  themselves,  and  come  forward  as  •*  the  hum- 
ble servants  and  interpreters  of  nature,"  to  study  the 
world  of  mind  upon  the  true  principles  of  the  inductive 
method. 
Edwards  did  not  observe  the  intellectual  world  just  as 


EDWARDS   ON    THE    WILL.  233 

it  has  been  constructed  by  the  Almighty,  and  narrowly 
watch  it  in  its  workings ;  he  only  reasoned  about  it  and 
about  it ;  and  hence,  he  was  necessarily  devoted  to  blind- 
ness. With  all  his  gigantic  power,  he  was  necessarily 
compelled  to  go  around,  eternally,  upon  the  treadmill  of 
a  merely  dialectical  philosophy,  which  of  itself  can  yield 
no  fruit,  instead  of  going  forth  to  the  harvest  upon  the 
rich  and  boundless  field  of  discovery.  Why  should  the 
failure  of  other  times,  resulting  from  such  a  course,  in- 
spire us  with  despair  ?  We  hope  for  better  results,  not 
from  better  minds,  but  from  better  methods.  Socrates 
dissuaded  the  men  of  his  time  from  the  study  of  nature, 
alleging  that  "  the  wonderful  art"  wherewith  the  heavens 
had  been  constructed,  was  concealed  from  their  eyes ;  and 
that  it  was  displeasing  to  the  gods,  that  men  should  so 
vainly  strive  to  pry  into  mysteries  which  are  so  far  above 
their  reach.  Faint-hearted  sage!  Though  Bacon  had 
beheld  the  genius  and  labour  of  two  thousand  years  after 
Socrates  had  been  laid  in  the  dust,  wasted  upon  the  same 
great  problem,  yet  did  not  the  unconquerable  ardour  of 
his  hope  droop  for  a  moment.  Rising  aloft,  even  from 
the  wild  waste  which  men  had  made  of  their  powers  in 
all  times  past,  he  poured  down  the  floods  of  his  indigna- 
tion upon  those  who  are  thus  ready  and  willing  to  devote 
mankind  to  darkness  and  despair.  Inspired  by  his  phi- 
losophy, and  pursuing  his  method,  the  more  than  immor- 
tal Newton  did  not  fear,  cautiously  yet  boldly,  humbly 
yet  hopefully,  to  pry  into  "  the  wonderful  art"  where- 
with the  Almighty  has  constructed  the  heavens ;  and  the 
great  problem  which  Socrates  had  so  timidly,  yet  so 
rashly,  pronounced  to  lie  beyond  the  reach  of  man,  did 
this  humble  student  of  nature  most  triumphantly  solve ; 
showing,  to  the  admiration  of  the  world  and  the  glory 
21 


234  EXAMINATION    OF 

of  God,  that  that  wonderful  art  is  infinitely  more  wonder- 
ful than  any  thing  which  had  ever  been  dreamed  of  in 
the  philosophy  of  antiquity.  How  great  soever,  then, 
the  failure  of  times  past  may  have  been,  we  should  not 
despair.  Nor  should  we  listen,  for  a  moment,  to  those 
who  are  ever  ready  to  declare,  that  the  great  problem  of 
the  intellectual  system  of  the  universe  is  not  within  the 
reach  of  the  human  faculties. 


Nole, — The  edition  of  Edwards'  works  quoted  in  this  volume, 
is  that  by  G.  &  C.&  H.  Carvill,  New  York,  1830. 


S^        or  THE     ^'    . 

TTNivEi^rrX 


ERRATA. 

Page  101,  line  16,  instead  of"  are  always,"  read  are  not  always. 
125,         20,  « hardly"  read  humbly. 


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